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Abstract 
This thesis consists of 3 chapters plus an introductory chapter and a concluding 
chapter. They are on three different topics, but they are all related to China’s health 
insurance system from 2000 to 2011.  
Chapter 1 is the introduction to the thesis, providing background to the Chinese 
insurance system, the theoretical underpinning of the three chapters, a description of 
the datasets used in the thesis, and an overview of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 investigates whether there is adverse or advantageous selection in China’s 
private health insurance market before 2003. We found evidence in favour of adverse 
selection in a pure private insurance market. For the public insurance group where 
people already got covered by a public insurance but face the choice of buying a 
supplementary private insurance, we found advantageous selection.  
Chapter 3 examines whether implementing nearly universal coverage in 2009 led to 
a decrease in individual preventive behaviour prior to illness, termed ex-ante moral 
hazard. We exploit the longitudinal dimension of data from 2006 and 2009 and use 
Coarsened Exact Matching methods. The results do not provide strong evidence for 
ex-ante moral hazard.  
Chapter 4 aims at evaluating whether there is ex-post moral hazard after the 
introduction of universal coverage. We measured ex-post moral hazard as the impact 
of co-payment rate on treatment cost, to assess the variation of total medical 
expenditure to patients due to the decrease of price. We conclude that there is ex-post 
moral hazard in outpatient services after the reform of universal coverage in China.   
Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter, including a summary of the findings, policy 
implications, strength and limitations of the thesis, and challenges for future research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
The health insurance market in China has experienced large reforms over the past 
few decades. From the 1940s to the 1990s, China’s health system witnessed a 
transformation from a pure government delivery model to a model that was radically 
driven by profit incentives.  Since the 1990s, the Government accelerated the 
marketization of hospitals. The Government cut subsidies to hospitals and pushed 
them to operate in a competitive market, although hospitals are still owned by the 
Government. However, a health insurance system was not well-structured in China. 
Not all people (19%) were covered by public insurance and commercial health 
insurance markets were very small. Only 9% of the population were covered by private 
insurance by 2000 (China Health Statistical Yearbook 2001). As a consequence, 
accessing a doctor has been difficult and expensive for an individual. This has been a 
major social concern for Chinese people which has led to social instability in recent 
years. After a nationwide extensive debate on the clashes between a “government 
approach” and “market approach”, the Government of China initiated a comprehensive 
health-care reform in 2003, committing over RMB 850 billion (about 85 billion GBP) 
to the project in response to the increasingly severe problem in the health care system.  
The reform signals a new chapter of China’s health care system. Total health 
expenditure has increased from 3.65% of GDP in 1994 to 5.01% of GDP in 2010. This 
growth was primarily from out-of-pocket spending, but government spending 
contribution gradually became a major source after the health care reform. Private 
spending, i.e. payment directly from the patients, reached a peak of 59.97% of the total 
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health spending in 2001 and gradually declined to 35.52% by 2010 as a consequence 
of health care reform (2012 National Health Account). The reform was primarily 
focused on the following five areas: public insurance, service delivery, essential 
medicines, public health and public hospital reform. Among them, one of the most 
remarkable achievements is that the reform increased the population coverage of 
public insurance from 20% in 2000 to 99.6% in 2014 by providing two new public 
insurance schemes, namely the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) and the 
Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI). 
    In recent years, there have been various studies examining the effectiveness of 
China’s healthcare reform. Some studies look at the effect on access to health services 
(Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008; Wagstaff et al. 2009; Meng et al. 2012). The results 
consistently show that the reform has significantly increased the utilization of 
healthcare facilities. Another strand of literature looks at the effect of healthcare 
reform on health outcomes (Liang et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2015). The results are 
mixed. Some of the studies suggest that population health has improved after the 
reform, while others claim that there is no significant statistical result supporting this 
idea. Another strand of literature looks at the effect of China’s healthcare reform on 
out-of-pocket expenditure (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008; Wagstaff et al. 2009; Yip 
and Hsiao, 2009; Long et al, 2013). Results indicates that the current reform appears 
to have no effect on reducing out-of-pocket expenditure.  
    No studies have looked at unintended consequences of China’s healthcare reform. 
While the health reforms have allowed many more individuals to access health care 
services, there remain important research questions about the efficiency of the system. 
In particular, an important question is whether near universal coverage comes with 
certain concerns that are often associated with health insurance markets, such as 
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adverse selection and moral hazard. The rapid change in China’s private and public 
health insurance market has provided a valuable scenario to evaluate such effects and 
to complement existing empirical evidence on adverse selection and moral hazard.  
1.2 Background of Chinese insurance system 
    1.2.1 Before the era of Universal Coverage: 1950s-2002 
There has been a long history of Chinese insurance policies being designed 
separately for rural and urban populations. Figure 1 presents the insurance coverage 
situation during this period. Between the 1950s and 1970s, when China was under a 
central planning economy, China’s health system was “a government delivery model 
and featured by government hospitals personnel funded by government or pooled 
community funds” (Ho, 2011). This means that all hospitals were operated by the 
government, with funding from either government or pooled community funds. 
Government subsidies were mainly given to providers rather than consumers. During 
the 1950s to 1970s, 80% of the population were rural and most of them were covered 
by Cooperative Medical Schemes (CMS). Run by agricultural communes in different 
areas, these schemes only covered primary health care services like basic medicines 
and immunization services. Although village doctors could only provide minimal care 
because of a lack of training, life expectancy at birth was improved from 40 years in 
1949 to 65.5 years in 1980, a substantial improvement in population heath (Miller et 
al., 2011). Most of the urban population had access to health services through the 
employment based Labour Insurance System or the Government Insurance System. 
Chinese citizens in rural and urban locales had equal access to primary health care 
services at that time (Miller et al., 2011). There was no commercial insurance market 
during this 20-year period due to a massive nationalization movement in the 1950s. 
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Figure 1: Public health insurance in China from the 1950s to the 1970s 
 
Figure 2 shows the health insurance system from the 1980s to the early 2000s. It 
was characterized by decentralization with the economy transforming from central 
planning to a market-based economy. Government revenue dropped sharply because 
it liberalized its economy and it began to decentralize financial management to local 
governments. By the early 1980s, the Cooperative Medical Scheme almost collapsed 
with the radical Cultural Revolution. Insurance coverage of counties in rural areas 
dropped from more than 90% to 7% of the counties by 1999, with village doctors 
becoming fee-for-service providers (Eggleston, 2012). In urban areas, public funding 
also declined dramatically, and local government tended to see care providers like 
other economic entities and encourage them to self-finance (Yip and Hsiao, 2015). 
Subsidies to the supply side only covered up to 10% of the expenses, leaving 90% of 
provider income from out-of-pocket payment from uninsured patients. The 
Government controlled the price for basic medicines to ensure financial accessibility 
to basic health care. However, hospitals and other care providers had profit-driven 
incentives to invest in high-end technologies that were without price control, leading 
to an over-utilization of higher-priced drugs and tests (Eggleston, 2012). The 
insurance coverage was declining over time. The majority of the Chinese population 
did not have public insurance between 1980 and 2002. Commercial health insurance 
Chinese
population
Rural
Cooperative
medical scheme
Urban
Work-unit-based
medical scheme
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served as a role of supplementary to public insurance, but the market was relatively 
small. The share of the out-of-pocket spending out of total health expenditure 
increased from 20.43% in 1978 to 59.97% in 2001. This figure was underestimated 
because it was without “under the table” money from patients to doctors, called “red 
packet”, paid in order to get better services (Eggleston, 2012).  
By the late 1990s, problems and concerns had emerged in the health sector resulting 
from the rapid transformation of the Chinese economy. First, unnecessary high-priced 
drugs and high-tech tests led to a lack of efficiency of health care. Second, inflation in 
health care expenditure increased rapidly. China’s total health spending increased 
from 3.65% of GDP in 1994 to 5.01% of GDP in 2010, with rapid growth primarily 
from out-of-pocket spending. Financial barriers on the demand side became one of the 
most severe problems (Eggleston, 2012). Third, there were disparities between rural 
and urban areas in terms of population health. For instance, mortality rates for under 
five-year-olds was much higher in rural areas than in urban areas (33 in 1000 in rural 
versus 13 in urban area in 2003) (Yip and Hsiao, 2015).  
 
Figure 2: Public health insurance in China from the 1980s to 2002 
 
Chinese
Population
Urban
Formal
employees
Work-unit-based
health insruance
other urban
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     1.2.2 The path towards Universal Coverage: 2003-2008   
In the early 2000s, seeing a doctor was difficult and expensive became a major 
social concern for Chinese people and caused social instability. In response to huge 
criticism, the Chinese government started to pilot reforms in China’s health care 
system. Generally speaking, the period between 2003 and 2009 saw the transformation 
of Government’s subsidies from the supply side to the demand side mainly through 
subsidies to premiums for public health insurance. As shown in Figure 3, there were 
three public insurance programs being designed to expand insurance coverage to the 
whole population of China: 1) New Cooperative Scheme (NCMS) for rural residents, 
2) Urban Employee’s Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) for urban employees, 3) 
Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) for other urban residents.  
Figure 3: Timeline to Chinese health insurance reform 
 
Public health insurance in rural area 
In rural areas where 50.3% of the population live, the Government announced 
direct budgetary support for the NCMS in 2002. It was piloted in selected villages in 
2003 and quickly expanded to nationwide. Three guidelines were given by central 
government to counties. First, it is a voluntary programme, but it requires full 
household participation to reduce adverse selection. That is to say, a family either has 
to have all members enrolled into the program or none. Second, the scheme is 
administrated (designed and implemented) at county level and the risk pooling is also 
at county level. Therefore, the programmes vary across counties in terms of premiums, 
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deductibles, and co-payments. Third, central government, local government and 
households all contribute to the funding. The primary objective is to deal with 
catastrophic expenditure and then gradually improve the benefit package of health 
insurance.  
Beneficial packages of NCMS differ in three main aspects across counties: 1) the 
reimbursement rate of inpatient services; 2) the reimbursement rate of outpatient 
services; 3) whether the reimbursement is from a medical savings account. Medical 
savings accounts act like a bank account but can only be used for health care facilities. 
It can be used by any member from a household. Usually, funds in this account 
combine the premium paid by every family member with the subsidies from 
Government sources. Since each household differs in their numbers and composition 
and every local government differs in the amount of subsidy, the value across family 
medical accounts is not necessarily the same for each household. Only household 
members are entitled to use the funds in their own account.  
Table 1: Models of different benefit packages for NCMS 
Models Outpatient service Inpatient service  
Model 1 Paid by family saving accounts 
（Deductibles and caps apply） 
Reimbursed according to a 
formula (Deductibles and 
caps apply) 
65% 
Model 2 Reimbursed through collective funds 
(No deductibles and caps) 
Reimbursed according to a 
formula (No deductibles and 
caps) 
7% 
Model 3 Only reimburse expenditures for 
critical disease (Deductibles and caps 
apply)  
Only reimburse expenditures 
for critical disease 
(Deductibles and caps apply) 
11% 
Model 4 Not covered by NCMS Reimbursed according to a 
formula (Deductibles and 
caps apply) 
17% 
 
There are four main models of benefit packages for NCMS as shown in Table 1. A 
similarity shared by all four models is that benefit packages for critical illnesses like 
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cancer, uremia, etc. are more generous than other diseases. 65% of the counties 
implement the first model, in which inpatient services are reimbursed according to a 
formula while outpatient services are mainly paid by family medical saving accounts. 
Deductibles and reimbursement caps apply to the medical saving account. For instance, 
patients need to pay RMB 10 (approximately £1) out-of-pocket before they can use 
medical saving account to pay the remainder. They also have a reimbursement cap per 
outpatient visit and per year respectively. Reimbursement cap is the maximum amount 
that individuals can get reimbursed from the insurance policy. The amount that is 
above the cap is paid out-of-pocket by the patients. Deductibles, reimbursement rates 
and caps vary across different geographical regions and insurance schemes. The 
reimbursement rate of inpatient services was usually up to 50% during the piloting 
years. The second model, which is used in 7% of the counties, adopts the same way of 
reimbursement of inpatient services as the first one. The difference lies in outpatient 
services since outpatient reimbursement is through collective funds run by counties 
according to a specified formula. Families do not have a medical savings account in 
this model, and all the reimbursement for outpatient services are through collective 
funds, which is financed by insurance premiums, local and central government 
subsidies. There is no deductible or reimbursement cap under this model. The third 
model only reimburses expenditure for critical diseases, including both inpatient and 
outpatient services with different deductibles and reimbursement caps respectively. 
11% of the counties use this model. The fourth model, implemented in 17% of the 
counties, only reimburses inpatient services but not outpatient services. Overall, 
benefits from NCMS are less generous than the other two schemes.  
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Public insurance in urban area 
Among the urban population, employment-based coverage has been replaced by 
UEBMI from 1998 (Liu et al., 2012). UEBMI covers employees who are formally 
employed in the urban labour market. UEBMI covers 64% of the urban employed 
population which only accounts for 31% of the total urban population (Wan et al. 
2011).  Full-time employees are required to buy UEBMI. The premium is around 2% 
of their income. Their employers, acting as sponsors, pay 6% to 10% of individuals’ 
income as subsidies. Employers’ payments vary according to the ages of the 
employees. Payments from individuals go to an individual medical savings account. 
It is very similar to the family medical savings accounts in NCMS but can only be 
used by the employee rather than the entire family. Individuals can only use money 
from this account for medical expenditure.  Payments from the sponsors go to “health 
care funds” run by the government used for redistribution. Co-payment rates vary from 
0% to 50% for this insurance plan depending on insurance policies designed by local 
governments. The benefit is the most generous among the three social insurance 
schemes. 
Later in 2006, central government piloted a similar program as NCMS to cover 
urban citizens who were not eligible for UEBMI, including the unemployed, students, 
retirees, and other dependents. It is called the Urban Residence Basic Medical 
Insurance Scheme (URBMI), which is a voluntary scheme, with government 
subsidizing premiums. Similar to the NCMS, the enrolment is at household level and 
the administration is at city government level. Generally speaking, the premium is 
lower than UEBMI but a little higher than NCMS. The premium is partly paid by the 
insured person and partly subsidized by central and local government. The benefit 
package puts emphasis on inpatient services and catastrophic diseases. Different 
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deductibles and reimbursement caps are applied according to levels of hospitals and 
different kind of diseases. The reimbursement rate varies from 50% to 65%. It 
reimburses very little or no outpatient expenditure. 
Figure 4: Public health insurance from 2003 to 2008
  
    Commercial insurance market 
With regard to commercial insurance, individuals still have an incentive to 
purchase this even though they are covered by public insurance. First of all, public 
insurance plans do not provide full insurance. In other words, individuals still have to 
pay for some medical services out-of-pocket, such as dental services and hearing aid 
services. Secondly, medical costs have been climbing in recent years, especially for 
expensive devices and patented drugs. As a result, out-of-pocket payments from 
individuals could be significant even for services which there is partial subsidy. 
Thirdly, although the benefit package varies among different plans and different areas, 
public insurance schemes, especially URBMI and NCMS, often have low caps for 
reimbursement. Consequently, individuals who have serious acute illnesses or chronic 
illnesses will still have a huge financial burden even though they are partially covered 
by public insurance. Therefore, there is an opportunity for private insurance plans to 
fill the coverage gaps for public insurance. 
Chinese 
population 
Urban
Formal 
employees
Urban Employees 
Basic Medical 
Schemes
Other urban 
citizens
Urban Residents 
Basic Medial 
Schemes
Rural
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Mecial Scheme
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Private health insurance in China serves around 7% of its population by 2012. It is 
mainly used by the public as a supplement to public health insurance. Private health 
insurance in China is mostly purchased by individuals rather than households. 
Although the size of the commercial insurance market is relatively small compared 
with public health insurance, it has undergone rapid growth in recent years. According 
to a report from McKinsey consultancy (2012), the number of private health insurance 
companies has grown at an annual rate of over 25% from 2001 to 2011. In addition, 
the per capita spending on private health insurance is almost ten times what it was ten 
years ago. 
The number of private health insurance plans is also increasing. In 2008, there were 
a total of 300 insurance plans. The figure increased to about 1000 in 2012. 
Nevertheless, those plans are usually undifferentiated and concentrate on partial 
payments for hospitalization or contract on a particular severe disease. Currently, most 
of the top Chinese insurance companies offer private health insurance to groups and 
individuals, even though unlike many other mature insurance markets, there are no tax 
incentives for firms to buy group commercial insurance for their employees. To 
enhance their competitiveness and improve the service, most of insurance companies 
have launched a so-called instant claim initiative, which cover thousands of hospitals 
across the country. It is an operation model initiated by local government to build 
collaboration between hospitals and private health insurers.  The most common 
initiative is the direct settlement of patient bills between hospitals and insurers (Chen 
and Wang, 2012). Through cooperation between insurance companies and hospitals, 
the public can not only receive better service from hospitals but also competitive offers 
from insurance companies. 
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 Chapter 2 investigates the private insurance market from 2003 to 2009 in order to 
evaluate whether there is evidence of advantageous or adverse selection. During this 
period, a group of people had access to public insurance schemes and faced the choice 
to buy a supplementary private health insurance. Meanwhile other people who were 
not in a piloting area and were not eligible for public insurance had to choose between 
having no insurance coverage and buying private cover.  
    1.2.3   The path towards Universal Coverage: 2009—  
After approximately 6 years of piloting insurance programs, the Chinese 
government officially announced a comprehensive health reform in 2009, with an 
investment of RMB 850 billion (around GBP85 billion) over three years (Ho, 2011). 
The first of five priorities of the reform was to further expand public insurance 
coverage and achieve universal coverage. In reality, more government investments 
were spent to subsidize the premiums of NCMS and URBMI to enroll as many 
residents as possible. By 2013, significant progress was made in terms of coverage 
rate, and the improvement of the benefit package. More than 95% of the population 
was covered by one kind of social insurance according to China Health Statistical 
Yearbook 2013. Meanwhile, reimbursement for NCMS became more generous, with 
the inpatient reimbursement rate gradually increased up to 75% and the outpatient rate 
increased up to 50% of expenditure (Yip and Hsiao, 2015). 
Because the benefit packages and fund level are different across urban and rural 
health schemes, this fragmentation of rural and urban public health schemes is 
considered as a factor that cause disparities between rural and urban residents (Zheng, 
2014). Since the middle of 2014, some areas in seven provinces piloted the 
consolidation of NCMS and URBMI schemes in order to coordinate the rural and 
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urban social development (Meng et al., 2015). However, data after 2013 are not 
available for our analyses, this consolidation element is not included in the thesis.  
Expanding insurance coverage may usually be associated with the problem of 
moral hazard (Arrow, 1963). Although co-payment and household enrollment policies 
are introduced to deal with the problem, total cost of health care has increased 
tremendously after the implementation of near universal coverage. The rapid growth 
could partly due to satisfying previous unmet needs, and partly attributed by moral 
hazard (Tang et al., 2012). The aim of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is to test whether there 
is ex-ante or ex-post moral hazard comparing the data before and after the reform.  
In the next section, I will present the theoretical background for main economic 
concepts discussed in the thesis, including adverse selection, advantageous selection, 
ex-ante moral hazard and ex-post moral hazard.  
1.3  Theoretical background of the chapters 
      1.3.1 Theoretical model for adverse selection 
    Adverse selection exists in a market with asymmetric information. As discussed by 
Arrow (1963), insurance companies can only charge an average price under 
asymmetric information because they do not know the risk type of their consumers. In 
this case, generous plans will attract sicker people, while moderate plans will attract 
healthier ones. Later on, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) further developed this model 
and declared that competitive equilibrium cannot exist in a market with asymmetric 
information. The health insurance market is exactly such a market because consumers 
have greater information about their own risk type than health plans (Frank et al., 
2000). The classical model predicts that consumers with higher risk of suffering 
financial loss due to sickness intend to have higher levels of health insurance coverage.  
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    The basic model is established in a competitive market, characterized by free entry 
and perfect competition. Competitive insurance market equilibrium is defined as a 
status that “when customers choose contracts to maximize expected utility, (i) no 
contract in the equilibrium set makes negative expected profits; and (ii) there is no 
contract outside the equilibrium set that, if offered, will make a nonnegative profit.” 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).  
    Here we present a very simple version of Rothschild and Stiglitz model.  Assume 
there is no insurance, individual’s income is 𝑦ℎ = 𝑌. If sick, his/her disposable income 
becomes 𝑦𝑠 = 𝑌 − 𝑀, where M represents the cost of medical care. With insurance, 
the individual has disposal income 𝑦ℎ = 𝑌-P, where P denotes the insurance premium 
if s/he is healthy. If the consumer suffers from sickness, disposal income becomes 
to 𝑦𝑠 = 𝑌 − 𝑀 − 𝑃 + 𝐼, that is income minus medical care cost minus premium P, 
plus reimbursement I. Consumers choose the insurance contract to maximize their 
expected utility = 𝜋𝑢(𝑦𝑠) +  (1 − 𝜋)𝑢(𝑦ℎ)  , where π denotes the probability of 
getting sick. In this model, all consumers are assumed to be risk-averse (𝑈′′ < 0), 
which means that their utility function is concave. There are two types of consumers 
in the market, namely, L-type with low probability of getting sick (𝜋𝐿) and H-type 
with high probability of getting sick (𝜋𝐻), with 𝜋𝐻 > 𝜋𝐿 . They are identical in all 
aspects except for risk type.  
    The other kind of participants in the market are the competing insurers who sell 
insurance contracts. Companies are assumed to be risk-neutral and only concerned 
about expected profits. Two types of health plan are available for consumers – a 
generous plan (𝛼1) and a moderate plan (𝛼2). Generous plans are designed for H-type 
15 
 
consumers with higher premium and moderate plans are designed for L-type 
consumers with lower premium.               
          Figure 5: No equilibrium under symmetric information 
 
If information about an individual’s risk type is symmetric between consumers and 
insurance company, competitive equilibrium does not exist. As shown by Figure 5, CH 
and CL are indifference curves for H-type and L-type consumers respectively. Each 
point on the indifference curve gives the individual the same utility. X-axis and Y-axis 
refer to income when individual is healthy and sick. Points on diagonal line are full 
insurance because it gives no income difference with being sick or not. Point A is the 
initial endowment of all the consumers. Point A must be below the diagonal line (45% 
line) because 𝑦ℎ > 𝑦𝑠 when individual does not have insurance. Suppose contracts α1 
and α2 satisfy separating equilibrium which allow both types of consumers to be fully 
insured which maximize their expected utility, α1 and α2 locate on the 45 degree line. 
Because consumers are risk-averse, both contracts will leave them the same disposable 
income regardless of their health status. Under perfect competition and free entry, 
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(Source: adapted from Rothschild and Stigliz (1976)) 
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insurance companies make 0 profits. Line 1 and Line 2 are fair-odds lines which 
represents zero profit.  
At this stage, H-type consumers have the incentive to buy a contract with lower 
premium α2 which gives them higher disposable income when they are sick. Therefore, 
the equilibrium is not sustainable because H-type consumers have an incentive to 
deviate from α1.  
However, symmetric information is not the case in reality where the information 
about risk type is only one-dimensional to consumers. Rothschild-Stiglitz model 
shows that pooling contract equilibrium in which both types of consumers buy the 
same contract does not exist either. The proof is given in Figure 6. 
Suppose the contract α* in Figure 6 signals a pooling equilibrium. Profit in 
equilibrium should be zero under perfect competition. A contract Q which is slightly 
above α* will attract L-type consumers to deviate from α* because it delivers higher 
utility. If there is a contract Q available in the market, this contract will attract the 
whole market because the market is perfectly competitive. Thus, it violates 
equilibrium condition (ii) stated above: “there is no contract outside the equilibrium 
set that will make a nonnegative profit” (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). 
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    An alternative equilibrium—separating equilibrium—may exist if the proportion of 
low risk type is itself low. In a separating equilibrium, two types of individuals buy 
different insurance contracts. As indicated in Figure 7, contract αL for L-type 
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Figure 6: No pooling equilibrium under asymmetric information 
Figure 7: Separating equilibrium under asymmetric information 
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consumers lies on line AL with a slope of (1 − πL)/πL and contract α
H for H-type 
consumers lies on line AH with a slope of (1 − πH)/πH. H-type consumers would 
prefer contract αH since they are fully insured. With regard to L-type consumers, they 
would prefer a contract on line AL. Similarly, contract β which gives them complete 
insurance would be more attractive than αL. However, if the insurance company sells 
both contract αH and β, H-type consumers would prefer β than αH. In the case of 
asymmetric information, all consumers would buy β, which would make the insurance 
company not profitable. Therefore, contract αH and β would not constitute equilibrium. 
Only when the insurance company offers contract αH and αL will there be equilibrium, 
because contract αL lies on the intersection of H-type and L-type’s indifference curves 
so that H-type prefer αH than αL while L-type prefer αL than αH. As a consequent, low-
risk type consumers are only partly insured. Therefore, equity problem comes out here 
because high-risk individuals may “either receives poor care and poor service or pays 
a very high premium for good care and good service”, which decrease their access to 
health care services (Ellis, 2000). 
    In conclusion, Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) predicted a positive relationship between 
risk and insurance coverage. Individuals with high risk of suffering a loss will have 
high reimbursement and higher consumption.  
   1.3.2 Theoretical model for advantageous selection 
De Meza and Webb (2001) explained contradictory empirical findings 
(Buchmueller et al., 2013) of adverse selection from a theoretical perspective. They 
introduced two additional factors –risk preference heterogeneity and transaction 
costs— that the classical model did not take into account to start their discussion.  
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The first innovation of this model that is different from Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) is the inclusion of risk preference heterogeneity. The classical model simply 
assumes that all individuals have the same risk preference and that they only vary 
across their expected costs. De Meza and Webb (2001) relax this assumption and 
assert that risk averse individuals are not only more cautious to prevent bad events but 
also are more likely to buy insurance than risk-tolerant individuals.  
Advantageous selection may emerge because of risk preference heterogeneity. 
Apart from individuals’ differences in their expected risk of financial loss, individuals 
who are more risk averse may invest more in preventive health care, so they usually 
have lower risk. Moreover, willingness-to-pay for insurance increases with the degree 
of risk aversion. If individuals that are most risk averse are also associated with lowest 
expected cost through lower risk, and if their proportion is sufficiently large, 
advantageous selection would occur (Einav and Finkelstein, 2011).  
Transaction or administrative costs related to marketing health insurance plans, 
selling plans and processing claims may also play a role. Newhouse (2004) provides 
evidence that the transaction fee in the health insurance sector is a factor that cannot 
be neglected. He points out that there is a competition over loading charges in the 
American health insurance market in recent years. De Meza and Webb (2001) point 
out that an implication of transaction costs is that it is not socially efficient to insure 
everyone if the transaction cost is greater than the risk premium for some individuals.  
In their theoretical model, De Meza and Webb (2001) demonstrated the existence 
of pooling, and separating equilibria under advantageous selection. The basic model 
is built in a competitive market. They assume there are two insurance companies in 
the market and two types of individuals, T and B. Type T individuals are risk averse 
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and type B individuals are risk neutral. Both types of individuals are equally wealthy 
but differ in risk preference. They further assume that each insurance company has a 
transaction cost, 𝐶, per claim. Therefore, their utility functions could be expressed as: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝐹𝑖, 𝑃𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖, 𝑊) = 𝜋( 𝐹𝑖)𝑈𝑖(𝑊 − 𝑃) + (1 − 𝜋(𝐹𝑖))𝑈𝑖(𝑊 − 𝑀 + 𝜆𝑃) − 𝐹𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝑇, 𝐵                                                                                                                 
(1.1) 
Where 𝐹𝑖  is a binary variable indicating individuals’ preventive effort. 𝑃𝑖  is the 
premium of the insurance, W represents wealth and 𝜆𝑃 (𝜆 > 0) is the net premium 
pay-out in the event of sickness. M is the total medical expenditure in the event of 
sickness. 𝐹𝑖 is a binary variable that “affects the probability of financial loss in the 
same way for all individuals.”, which could be seen as their effort of taking precautions 
to prevent financial loss in future. Thus  𝜋( 𝐹𝑖) can be seen as the probability of being 
sick. The authors assume that if 𝐹𝑖 = 0 , the probability of being healthy is 𝜋0. Then 
the expected utility is: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝐹𝑖, 𝑃𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, 𝑊) = 𝜋0𝑈𝑖(𝑊 − 𝑃) + (1 − 𝜋0)𝑈𝑖(𝑊 − 𝑀 + 𝜆𝑃),    𝑖 = 𝑇, 𝐵            
(1.2) 
But if 𝐹𝑖 = ?̅?, the probability rises to 𝜋𝐹. The expected utility is: 
𝐸𝑈𝑖(𝐹𝑖, 𝑃𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, 𝑊) = 𝜋𝐹𝑈𝑖(𝑊 − 𝑃) + (1 − 𝜋𝐹)𝑈𝑖(𝑊 − 𝑀 + 𝜆𝑃) − ?̅?,    𝑖 = 𝑇, 𝐵        
(1.3) 
Then, if we use equation (1.3) minus equation (1.2), we get equation (1.4). This 
indicates the gain in terms of expected utility from taking precautions to prevent the 
event of financial loss: 
∆𝑖= (𝜋𝐹 − 𝜋0)[𝑈𝑖(𝑊 − 𝑃) − 𝑈𝑖(𝑊 − 𝑀 + 𝜆𝑃)] − ?̅?, with ∆𝑇> ∆𝐵                   (1.4) 
21 
 
Their model shows that partial pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium are 
possible. The proof is shown in Figure 8. Suppose there are two types of individuals, 
Ts and Bs, in the market. Their respective utility functions are 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈(𝛾𝑖 + 𝑊) − 𝐹𝑖, 
where i denotes the type of individual with respect to their risk preference,  𝛾𝑖 is the 
parameter indicating preference of specific individuals, W represents wealth. For Ts, 
they have a lower 𝛼𝑖 and they are risk averse with a strictly concave utility function 𝑈𝑇. 
Meanwhile, Bs have higher 𝛼𝑖 and they are assumed to be risk neutral with a linear 
utility function 𝑈𝐵.  
In Figure 8, Point A is the wealth endowment with (W, 𝑊 − 𝑀). Setting equation 
(1.4) equal to zero, we get the line PP′. It shows the state of (W, 𝑊 − 𝑀 ) that delivers 
∆𝑇= 0. If ∆𝑇≤ 0, Ts have no incentive to take prevention effort because it does not 
yield higher utility. As shown in Figure 8, individuals (Ts) located in the lower region 
of PP′  take preventive effort, while Ts located in the upper region do not take 
preventive efforts. With regard to Bs, they are assumed to be the ones that never take 
precautions. 
The indifference curves CT are drawn in income space assuming optimal level of 
precautions is chosen. They are kinked where they cross PP′. This is because above 
PP′, the probability of loss is raised, and so the indifference curve is flattened. AA′ is 
the indifference curve of a B. It is linear because Bs are risk neutral and they never 
take preventive efforts.  
Under perfect competition, insurance companies make zero profit. The location of 
zero profit curve depends on the level of transaction cost Φ. When all insurance 
applicants take preventive efforts, the zero-profit curve is JJ′ where Φ is the lowest. J 
is below A because there is administrative cost for insurance companies. The size of 
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transaction cost Φ is shown in Figure 8 as the shaded area. This area captures the 
difference between the endowment point A and point J (the starting point of zero-
profit curve of insurance companies). Curve JM shows the zero-profit curve when Ts 
take preventive efforts and Bs do not. JN is the zero-profit curve when nobody takes 
preventive efforts. When transaction cost is sufficiently high, no insurance company 
will offer insurance contract and all agents remain at their endowment point.  
    There is a partial pooling equilibrium when this contract X locates at the tangency 
between indifference curve of Ts and Bs, which are IT and AA′respectively in Figure 
8.  It maximizes the utility of Ts (risk averse individuals) and leaving some Bs (risk 
neutral individuals) uninsured. With regard to welfare, De Meza and Webb (2001) 
suggest that introducing a small but fixed tax on each insurance plan could yield a 
strict Pareto improvement if they further return the tax as a lump-sum subsidy to the 
whole population.  
 
IT 
▪ X 
P’ 
P 
A 
Ys 
yh 
CT 
(Source: adapted from De Meza and Webb (2001)) 
Figure 8: Partial pooling equilibrium when individuals’ have 
different risk preferences 
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Separate equilibrium may exist if the contracts (ZT and ZB) with Ts and Bs satisfied 
with the incentive compatibility: 
E𝑈𝑇(𝑍𝑇) ≥ E𝑈𝑇(𝑍𝐵) 
E𝑈𝐵(𝑍𝐵) ≥ E𝑈𝐵(𝑍𝑇) 
It indicates that expected utility for Ts from purchasing contract 𝑍𝑇 should be no 
less than the expected utility from purchasing contract 𝑍𝐵. Meanwhile, the expected 
utility for Bs from purchasing contract 𝑍𝐵 should be no less than the expected utility 
from purchasing contract 𝑍𝑇.  
Another condition that is needed to satisfy is the precautions incentive compatibility: 
𝐹𝑖 = {
?̅?  𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑖≥  0
0 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑖<  0
 
Under separate equilibrium, all Ts get contract ZT but Bs  are uninsured. They also 
further show that a fixed tax on every insurance plan which later being returned as 
lump-sum subsidies to the whole population would be a strict Pareto improvement 
conditioning on the slope of Ts’s indifference curve.  
In summary, the above mentioned two theoretical frameworks start with different 
assumptions and end up with different conclusions. At the beginning, empirical studies 
were conducted to test the classical predictions from Rothschild and Stigliz (1976). 
However, not all of them confirm the classical prediction. This literature was mainly 
trying to test the relationship between individual’s risk type and their insurance 
coverage.  
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   1.3.3 Theoretical framework for ex-ante moral hazard 
Ex-ante moral hazard refers to actions taken before the individual develops a 
condition. Returning again to the model we presented in section 1.3.1, the probability 
of illness is now a function of preventive effort 𝜋(𝑉) with 𝜋′(𝑉) < 0. The probability 
of illness is decreasing when individual makes more preventive effort. In order to look 
at the effect of insurance on prevention effort, we need to compare individual’s 
incentive with and without insurance.  
Here we present a simplified model adapted from Zweifel and Manning (2000). 
Suppose the individual has no health insurance, and s/he chooses the optimal 
prevention that maximizes their expected utility, which is 
𝐸𝑈 = 𝜋(𝑉)𝑢𝑠(𝑌 − 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑉) + (1 − 𝜋(𝑉))𝑢ℎ(𝑌 − 𝑤𝑉)                                   (1.5) 
Where Y is income, M is total medical cost, w is wage and 𝑤𝑉  indicates the 
monetary lost when taking preventive efforts.  
The optimal level of preventive effort can be obtained from the first order condition: 
𝜋′(𝑉)[𝑢𝑠(𝑌 − 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑉) − 𝑢ℎ(𝑌 − 𝑤𝑉)] = 𝑤[𝜋(𝑉)𝑢′𝑠 + (1 − 𝜋(𝑉))𝑢′ℎ]     (1.6) 
The right hand side of equation (1.6) in square bracket is equal to 𝐸𝑈′(𝑦). Thus we 
get equation (1.7) below:  
𝜋′(𝑉)[𝑢𝑠(𝑌 − 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑉) − 𝑢ℎ(𝑌 − 𝑤𝑉)] = 𝑤𝐸𝑈′(𝑦)                                        (1.7) 
The optimality condition indicates that the marginal benefit from reducing the risk 
of illness is equal to the marginal cost of preventive effort.  
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Now, suppose the individual has full insurance, he does not need to pay any medical 
expenditure now, but has a premium P to pay for the insurance. His/her expected 
utility is: 
𝐸𝑈 = 𝜋(𝑉)𝑢𝑠(𝑌 − 𝑃 − 𝑤𝑉) + (1 − 𝜋(𝑉))𝑢ℎ(𝑌 − 𝑃 − 𝑤𝑉)                              (1.8) 
The individual chooses the optimal prevention effort to maximize his expected 
utility, which gives the optimality condition: 
𝜋′(𝑉)[𝑢𝑠(𝑌 − 𝑃 − 𝑤𝑉) − 𝑢ℎ(𝑌 − 𝑃 − 𝑤𝑉)] = 𝑤𝐸𝑈′(𝑦)                                 (1.9) 
If we use the left-hand side of equation (1.9) to subtract the left hand side of equation 
(1.7), we get equation (1.10). It tells the difference of marginal benefit from prevention 
between the individuals with and without full insurance. 
𝜋′(𝑉)[𝑢𝑠(𝑀 − 𝑃) + 𝑢ℎ(𝑃)]                                                                             (1.10) 
We assume that π′(V) < 0.  𝑢𝑠(𝑀 − 𝑝) and 𝑢ℎ(𝑃) are both greater than zero. Thus 
the sign of equation (1.10) is negative. Compared to the case without insurance, the 
marginal benefit from prevention is reduced. This indicates that insurance reduces 
incentives towards prevention (Zweifel and Manning, 2000). 
    1.3.4 Theoretical framework for ex-post moral hazard 
Since medical insurance lowers the marginal cost of health care to individuals, it 
may increase use (Pauly, 1974). This is termed as “ex-post moral hazard” in the 
insurance literature. There are two implicit assumptions under ex-post moral hazard. 
Firstly, the amount of health care is not contractible in insurance policy. Secondly, 
doctors would not implement optimal health care (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000).  
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Suppose individual’s elastic demand of health care is a function of the price: 
𝑞𝐷=g(p). The price elasticity of the demand is 𝑒𝑝 =
𝑑𝑄/𝑄
𝑑𝑃/𝑃
 
Figure 9 presents three situations under different price levels of health care. 
Suppose the price of health care is set at M. With no insurance, the optimal 
consumption for individual is 𝑄1. It is the intersection of supply and the price level. 
With full insurance when the price of health care drops to zero, the individual 
consumes 𝑄2. With a co-payment, the price of insurance M’ would be less than M but 
greater than zero. A positive P’ reduces overconsumption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 illustrates that overconsumption reduces when demand is less elastic, 
there will be no ex-post moral hazard when the demand is inelastic when the demand 
curve is vertical.  
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Figure 9: Ex-post moral hazard with elastic demand 
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Figure 11 suggests that if we take a price elastic supply curve into consideration, 
then overconsumption is even larger. In the health care market, physicians and patients 
jointly determine what treatments will be performed. However, physicians will have 
a better idea than patients about the likely consequences of treatment (Folland et al., 
2007). This theory suggests that physicians can influence the demand of health care 
services. If doctors allocate quantity 𝑄1 to patients, there will be no moral hazard.  
As shown in in Figure 11, when doctors have incentive to increase the quantity of 
supply as price goes up, the supply curve is upward sloping. Deadweight loss from 
overconsumption for a lower price of health care is even higher. Doctors’ behaviour 
and their incentives depend on factors like degree of motivation, financial incentives, 
government allocation of resources, etc. (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). Therefore, the 
degree of over-supply and the deadweight loss depend on these factors.  
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Figure 10: Ex-post moral hazard under different demand elasticities 
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In China, the main source of provider payments is fee-for-service payments (Yip 
and Hiao, 2009). Under fee-for-service payments, healthcare providers are reimbursed 
retrospectively. Thus, fee-for-service encourages providers to provide a higher 
quantity of services than under alternative payment arrangements because they do not 
bear the full financial-risk of over-provision. For example, drug mark-ups were 
allowed by the Chinese government before 2016, meaning that Chinese hospitals 
could sell drugs at higher prices than their costs, with the mark-ups normally 
amounting to 15 to 20 percent (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997).  According to the China 
Health Statistical Yearbook 2013, income from selling drugs accounts for 
approximately 40 percent of their total income from 2005 to 2013. Income from drugs 
is illustrated across a number of years in Figure 12. While the proportion of income 
from this source has been decreasing slowly over time, there remains a strong 
incentive for doctors to over-provide expensive drugs, which may lead to ex-post 
moral hazard.  
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Figure 11: Ex-post moral hazard with upward sloping supply curve 
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Figure 12: Composition of hospital income 
 
  
1.4   Data used in the thesis 
We explore questions about adverse or advantageous selection and ex-ante moral 
hazard empirically by exploiting data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS). To research the question around ex-post moral hazard, we use an alternative 
dataset The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS).  
    1.4.1 The China Health and Nutrition Survey 
For Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the CHNS is used. This is an ongoing cohort that was 
designed to examine the effects of the health, nutrition, and family planning policies 
and programs. This international collaborative project is conducted under the 
cooperation between the Carolina Population Centre at the University of North 
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Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and Health at the 
Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. It is a longitudinal survey starting 
in 1989 with eight additional panels collected in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 
2009 and 2011. The survey covers nine provinces that vary substantially in geography, 
economic development, public resources, and health indicators. It uses a multistage, 
random cluster process to draw samples from each province. The sample size is 
documented to cover 4,400 households, covering 19,000 individuals with high follow-
up rates. An advantage of this dataset is that it provides various information that we 
need for our analysis. Each round contains four categories of survey, including the 
household survey, individual survey, nutrition and physical examination and 
community survey. It contains respondents’ health (e.g. self-reported health, disabled 
status, utilization of health facilities, medical expenditure, health insurance status, etc.), 
demographic information (age, gender, marital status, etc.), and socioeconomic status 
(household income, employment status, etc.).  
Besides the advantages of the survey, there are also challenges with using this 
dataset. Firstly, there are many observations with missing values for some variables, 
especially for the health insurance premium, medical expenditure, marital status, 
education, self-reported health and household income. Even for age and gender, there 
are observations with missing values. In the process of cleaning the data, we found 
that almost all observations with missing age or gender have missing values for all 
variables. We have to assume that data is missing completely at random. Secondly, 
the information is not recorded in a consistent fashion across waves. In both chapters, 
lag values of some variables are key for the analyses. For example, lag values are used 
to predict expected medical expenditure for observations in Chapter 2. However, more 
than 1,000 observations do not have information on self-reported health or household 
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income in both waves. Therefore, although it is documented that there are around 
19,000 observations in each wave, less than half of these are available for the analyses 
undertaken in this thesis.  
To deal with missing data, we use three methods depending on different situations. 
Firstly, the observations with missing data for most of the variables (5.67% of the total 
sample) are simply dropped from the analysis. Secondly, we used imputation methods 
when there is missing data for a key variable. Take Chapter 2 for illustration, the 
premium for private insurance is a crucial to the analysis. However, there are a lot of 
respondents who bought insurance but did not report the premium. We employed 
linear prediction methods for those observations with missing data to impute the 
premium. Prediction error is a potential limitation for Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
        1.4.2 The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study 
    The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study is employed in Chapter 4. 
It is a dataset focusing on Chinese residents ages 45 and older to serve the needs of 
scientific research on the middle aged and elderly. The research team is based at 
Peking University with the support from the National Natural Science Foundation of 
China, the Behavioural and Social Research Division of the National Institute on 
Aging and the World Bank. The first round survey was undertaken in 2011, and 
included about 10,000 households and 17,500 individuals in 150 counties/districts and 
450 villages/resident committees. It is conducted every two years. Wave 2011 and 
wave 2013 are currently available to the public. The study population of the survey 
draws from 28 provinces with various socioeconomic factors and other related health, 
nutritional and demographic measures. CHARLS adopts a multistage stratified 
Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling, and an innovative software package 
32 
 
(CHALRS-GIS) to make village sampling frames. All samples are drawn in four 
stages, including county-level sampling, neighbourhood-level sampling, household-
level sampling and respondent-level sampling. The goal of the sampling strategy is to 
collect a sample representative of the whole country. 
I use this dataset for Chapter 4 for three reasons. Firstly, it contains sufficient 
information that I require for the analysis from the household questionnaire, including 
demographics, family structure, health status and function, biomarkers, health care 
and insurance, work, retirement and pension, income and consumption. Secondly, I 
would like to investigate the causal relationship between insurance status and medical 
expenditure. Since it is a survey with residents over 45 years old, the rate of getting 
sickness in this dataset is higher than in CHNS so CHARLS offers a larger sample 
size in analysis with increasing statistical power. Thirdly, the follow up rate is higher 
and there is less of a problem of missing data in CHARLS. It means that there is less 
concern about missing data bias, imputation bias or low statistical power in explaining 
the results.  
1.5   Overview of the thesis 
The second chapter investigates whether there is adverse or advantageous selection 
in China’s private health insurance market. Traditionally economists argued that there 
is adverse selection, suggesting that high risk individuals purchase insurance (Arrow, 
1963 and Rothschild and Stigliz, 1976). However, recent empirical evidence 
challenged the traditional approach and found that mainly low risk people buy 
insurance, which is referred to as advantageous selection (Buchmueller et al., 2013). 
Existing literature delivers inconsistent conclusion on the relationship between risk 
type and level of insurance coverage.  Most of the existing literature examined adverse 
or advantageous effect in the context of a supplementary insurance market due to the 
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universal coverage for public insurance in high-income countries. The Chinese private 
insurance market before 2003 is a bit different from the markets in high-income 
countries, because only a small proportion of the population (i.e. formal employees) 
got covered by public insurance leaving the rest facing the choice between having no 
insurance or to purchase private insurance. This feature makes it an interesting case to 
investigate.  
The sample data is divided into two subgroups according to people’s public 
insurance status, because public insurance is not available for everybody in China. The 
first subgroup contains people without any public insurance. This enables us to 
identify the selection effect in a pure private market. The second subgroup includes 
those people who have public insurance. Since public insurance does not cover all 
medical expenditure, they have to decide whether to purchase supplementary private 
insurance. This subsample helps us to capture the effect in a supplementary insurance 
market. Logistic regression is adopted to identify the correlation between individual’s 
risk and insurance coverage. Since at the time of the decision on purchasing 
supplementary insurance, the exact medical expenditure in the next period is unknown 
to individuals, we measure their risk by estimating whether their predicted medical 
expenditure is greater than the premium for private insurance. For the non-public 
insurance subgroup, we find evidence in favour of adverse selection. If people’s 
expected medical expenditure is greater than the premium of private insurance, their 
probability of buying private insurance is 0.9% higher. This probability is relatively 
small but robust, but bear in mind that there were only 2% of the sample who bought 
private insurance. For the public insurance subgroup, we found advantageous selection. 
If individuals’ expected medical expenditure is greater that the premium, their 
probability of buying supplementary private insurance is 2.5% lower. Inpatient 
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reimbursement rate, time for exercise and living in urban area are also significant 
indicators of purchasing private insurance. 
The third chapter examines whether there has been an increase in ex-ante moral 
hazard following the introduction of public health insurance in China, and whether 
implementing nearly universal coverage led to a decrease in individual preventive 
behaviour prior to illness. Ex-ante moral hazard is predicted by classical economic 
theory suggesting that health insurance will reduce an individual’s incentive towards 
taking preventive efforts to remain healthy (Arrow, 1963). Hopefully, this chapter 
could provide some policy implications if the Government wants to improve the 
efficiency of the program. 
We exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data and use Coarsened Exact 
Matching methods. This makes it possible to deal with the self-selection into both 
voluntary programmes by matching individual’s characteristics across a control and a 
treatment group prior to the reform. Proxies for preventive effort include smoking, 
vegetable and fruit consumption, overweight, obesity, preventive care, number of 
cigarette per day and time for exercise per day. The results do not provide strong 
evidence for ex-ante moral hazard. Insured and uninsured individuals are not 
significantly different in smoking, number of cigarettes per day, vegetable and fruit 
consumption, obesity, overweight, and preventive care visits post reform. 
Nevertheless, we find significant differences between treatment and control groups in 
terms of time spent exercising. People with insurance spend less time doing exercise 
than people without insurance, which provides supporting evidence of ex-ante moral 
hazard. 
The fourth chapter aims at evaluating whether there is ex-post moral hazard after 
the reform and whether current deductibles and co-payments are effective enough to 
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reduce moral hazard. It investigates whether and to what extent total hospital medical 
expenditure increases as the price of health care services decreases. The health reform 
has increased the insured population coverage from 20% in 2000 to 99.6% in 2014. 
The reform increased people’s access towards health care by reducing the price they 
face which potentially satisfied previously unmet need. Nevertheless, classical 
economic theory predicted that having insurance will increase the use of health care 
because the price is lower than it would be.  
In order to disentangle adverse selection from ex-post moral hazard, we measured 
ex-post moral hazard as the impact of co-payment rate variation on treatment cost, 
which is the price elasiticy of the medical care. The sources of variation come from 
different places of residence and different insurance policies. We separate the sample 
by outpaitent and inpatient users. The key explanatory variable co-payment rate is 
found to be negatively associated with medical costs for the outpatient sample. This 
indicates that individuals who face higher co-payment rate are more likely to have 
lower medical costs. As the co-payment rate increases by 1%, medical costs decrease 
by 0.44% in 2011, and the magnitude increases to 1.64% from wave 2011 to wave 
2013. No significant effect has been found for the sample of inpatient sample due to 
the small sample size. 
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Chapter 2: Adverse Selection or Advantageous 
Selection—Evidence from Chinese Health Insurance 
Market 
2.1   Introduction 
    Who is going to buy health insurance? Traditionally economists argued that high 
risk people do so, a form of adverse selection (Arrow, 1963 and Rothschild and Stigliz, 
1976). It has therefore been argued that a free market for health insurance has adverse 
consequences especially in light of the almost universally accepted health policy aim 
of equal access to health care according to need (Cutler, 2002). 
    The traditional approach has been challenged as it has also been argued that mainly 
low risk people buy insurance, implying advantageous selection (Buchmueller et al., 
2013). Although it seems fair to argue that the health policy implications of 
advantageous selection seem less straightforward than those of adverse selection, the 
first question to be addressed is if the empirical evidence in health care mainly 
supports adverse or advantageous selection in health care. 
    A substantial number of empirical studies have been conducted to test the prediction 
from the classical asymmetric information model. Those empirical studies which will 
be reviewed in Section 2.2 demonstrate inconsistent results. Findings from Ellis 
(1989), Cutler and Rebber (1988), Frank et al. (2000) etc. provide evidence for adverse 
selection. They adopted different measures of consumers’ risk type (e.g. ex-ante health 
expenses, ex-post health expense, age, health status and etc.) to confirm that those 
consumers with higher risk are more likely to have higher insurance coverage.  
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    However, not all empirical studies find a positive correlation. On the contrary, 
Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) and Fang et al. (2008) discovered that people with 
a lower risk of suffering financial loss buy more insurance, this being indicative of 
advantageous selection. De Meza and Webb (2011) explained advantageous selection 
from a theoretical perspective. They dropped the assumption from the classic model 
that everybody has identical risk preference, and declared that individuals know better 
about both their risk type and risk aversion than insurance companies. Advantageous 
selection is driven by risk aversion in which people who are risk averse could buy 
more insurance coverage even though they have lower risk of suffering financial loss 
due to sickness.  
    The presence of asymmetric information has diverse effects on health insurance 
market. Conditioning on different settings, empirical studies have yielded 
contradictory conclusions about the relationship between risk type and level of 
insurance coverage. Most studies have tried to identify adverse or advantageous 
selections in the context of people’s choice between different plans or the choice of 
buying a supplementary health insurance plan. Thus they are different from this paper 
from the perspective of background.  
    Most of the existing literature examined adverse or advantageous effect in the 
context of supplementary insurance market due to the universal coverage for public 
insurance in high-income countries, which will be shown in literature review in the 
next section. As an emerging economy, China has been experiencing a change of the 
healthcare system in a short period of time, namely 10 years. It makes it an interesting 
case for investigation. Before 2003, only a small proportion of the population (e.g. 
formal employees) were covered by public insurance, leaving the rest facing the choice 
of either no health insurance or buying private insurance. Since 2003, the government 
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launched a reform in some experimental areas with a goal to achieve universal 
coverage of public insurance. However, newly launched public insurance plans which 
are subsidized by the government are voluntary insurance plans and only cover around 
50% medical costs. Therefore, people covered under the public system still have an 
incentive to buy private insurance. There are two types of insurance markets in China: 
1) A pure private insurance market where people do not have public insurance and 
face the choice of buying private insurance; 2) A supplementary insurance market 
where people have public insurance and face the choice of buying a supplementary 
private insurance. We are able to study the consequence of asymmetric information in 
the above-mentioned contexts: the Chinese health insurance market between 2004 and 
2009. 
2.2 Literature Review 
In this section, empirical evidence for adverse selection and advantageous selection 
will be presented. It is not a systematic review in the strict sense, but relevant literature 
was identified by using key words searches on “adverse selection; advantageous 
selection; health insurance market” and using the library search engine from 
University of York, and E-resources including EconLit, Health Management 
Information Consortium, and Google Scholar. In addition, I also searched literature by 
reading reference lists from topic-related literature (citation pearl growing).  Empirical 
studies are presented below where they are closely related to the topic and have more 
than 20 citations.  
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    2.2.1   Empirical evidence for adverse selection 
Empirical evidence for adverse selection is inconclusive. Some studies have shown 
findings consistent with the classic hypothesis of a positive correlation between risk 
and insurance coverage (Cutler and Reber, 1998; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1997; 
Marquis, 1992; Ellis, 1989; Ellis, 1985). Other studies find evidence of advantageous 
selection whereby consumers with lower expected medical costs tend to have higher 
insurance coverage (Johar and Savage, 2012; Fang et al. 2008; De Meza and Webb, 
2001; Waterhouse,1996).  
A table of the literature organized by their empirical methodology is provided 
hereafter in Table 2. Empirical strategies to identify adverse or advantageous selection 
could be categorized into three groups: 1) comparison of risk measurement between 
different groups; 2) binary outcome regressions; 3) other methods. 
2.2.1.1   Comparison of the means  
Some early studies adopted comparisons of risk measurement between different risk 
groups (Ellis, 1989; Cutler and Zeckhause, 1997; Altman et al., 1998; Cutler and 
Rebber, 1988; Frank et al., 2000). Instead of using the term “adverse selection”, Ellis 
(1989) put forward “biased selection” to refer to the situation where a health plan 
“attracts a group of enrollees that differs significantly from the population average”. 
The data adopted by this study is a two-wave panel data from a large financial services 
firm with over 20,000 employees. Those employees had three different options for 
health insurance with different premiums, deductibles, co-payments and stop-losses. 
Firstly, employees were divided into nine groups according to their out-of-pocket 
health expenditure in the first wave. And then, researchers predicted their expected 
out-of-pocket health costs in the second wave. Second step, non-parametric loss 
function was used to calculate the “best” plan choice by minimizing the expected value 
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of out-of-pocket health costs. The result uncovered biased selection across the three 
plans. The results showed that employees with higher previous out-of-pocket expenses 
in 1982 and 1983 are more likely to choose the most generous plan.  
    Cutler and Zeckhauser (1997) did a case study using claims and enrolment data 
from Harvard University and Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC). 
They compared enrollees’ different characteristics and expenses for different health 
plans and found that employees in a more generous plan (GIC’s FFS plan) spend more 
and have higher risk than HMO members, indicating adverse selection. 
    Cutler and Rebber (1998) examined adverse selection using data from health 
choices by employees at Harvard University. Harvard University had a reform on 
health insurance pricing following the US government’s proposal of changing health 
insurance from non-market goods into privately running plans in competitive market 
in 1986. They used age and predicted medical spending as the indicators for consumers’ 
risk type. By analysing the characteristics of plan enrollment changes, they found 
employees who moved from a more generous plan (PPO) to the less generous plan 
(HMO) were 4-years younger on average than those who remained in PPO. Moreover, 
the average age-weighted medical spending for HMO enrollees was predicted to be 5 
percent less than HMO enrollees. Their results indicated that significant adverse 
selection was induced by this reform. It caused welfare loss equivalent to 2 to 4 percent 
baseline spending.  
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Table 2: List of literature about adverse or advantageous selection 
Literature Data Methodology Control Variables Results 
Comparison of the means of variables indicating individuals’ risk type 
Ellis (1989) 
Panel data from two large 
financial services firms 
Comparison of previous 
out-of-pocket expenses 
among different plans 
 
Adverse selection: employees 
with higher previous out-of-
pocket health expenses are 
more likely to choose the 
most generous plan 
Cutler and Rebber (1988) 
Health choices by 
employees at Harvard 
University 
Comparison the means of 
age, medical spending by 
different groups of risk 
type 
 
Adverse selection: employees 
who moved from Preferred 
Provider Organization (PPO) 
to Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) are 4-
year-younger in average than 
those who remained in PPO 
Frank, Glazer and 
McGuire (2000) 
Panel data from health 
claims and enrolment files 
from Michigan Medicaid 
program from 1991 to 
1993 
Comparison between the 
predicted out-of-pocket 
medical expenditure and 
actual medical expenditure 
 
Adverse selection: age and 
sex can explain around 21 
percent of the variation 
between actual and predicted 
spending 
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Table 2: (Continued) 
Literature Data Methodology Control Variables Results 
Cutler and Zeckhause 
(1997) 
Claims and enrolment data 
from Harvard University 
and Massachusetts Groups 
Insurance Commission 
Comparison of the 
enrolees’ different 
characteristics and 
expenses for different 
health plans 
 
Adverse selection: employees 
in the more generous plan 
spend more, have higher risk 
Altman, Cutler and 
Zeckhause (1998) 
Claims and enrolment data 
from Massachusetts Group 
Insurance Commission 
Comparison of the 
enrolees’ different 
characteristics and 
expenses for different 
health plans 
 
Adverse selection: People 
moving into more generous 
plan spent 47% more service 
in the next year 
Logistic or Probit regression 
Scitovsky, McCall and 
Benham (1978) 
Enrolment data from 
Stanford University 
employees 
Logistic regression 
Income, distance to the 
hospital, years of 
employment, age, 
gender, number of 
covered in the family, 
marital status 
Adverse selection: people 
subscribed to the generous 
plan were more likely to be 
older and less healthy 
Wang et al. (2006) 
Panel data from the 
voluntary China’s Rural 
Mutual Care Health 
Insurance Scheme 
Logistic regression 
Minor health, severe 
health, age, gender, 
household size, marital 
status, education, 
income, living area 
Adverse selection: individuals 
with worse health status are 
more likely to buy the 
insurance than those with 
better health 
Savage and Wright (2003) 
1989-1990 National Health 
Survey 
Probit regression 
Age, country of birth, 
health status, marital 
status 
Adverse selection: private 
hospital insurance are selected 
by people who requires 
hospital services that have 
long waiting time in public 
hospitals 
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Table 2: (Continued) 
Literature Data Methodology Control Variables Results 
Wolfe and Goddeeris 
(1991) 
Panel data from the 
Retirement History Survey 
between 1969-1979 
Probit regression 
Health status, years of 
education, gender, 
ethnicity 
Adverse selection: Individuals 
who have high lagged value 
of medical expenses are more 
likely to buy supplemental 
insurance 
Gao and Wang (2009) 
Enrolment data from a 
large Chinese insurance 
company: cross sectional 
data 
Probit Regression 
Occupation, age, 
gender, marital status, 
living area, premium, 
ex-post claim 
occurrence 
Coexistence of adverse 
selection and advantageous 
selection: buyers who made 
more insurance claims intend 
to purchase less limits of basic 
insurance but more additional 
insurance 
Other methods 
Marquis (1992) RAND experiment data Simulation Method  
Adverse selection: the number 
of consumers in high risk 
quartile who bought the most 
generous plan were 73% more 
than those in low risk quartile 
Van de Ven and van Vliet 
(1995) 
Postal survey among 
privately insured 
individuals in the 
Netherlands 
Risk adjustment model  
Adverse selection: age and 
sex adjusted model can 
explain 40% expenditure 
variance between low- and 
high- cost plans 
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Table 2: (Continued) 
Literature Data Methodology Control Variables Results 
Cardon and Hendel (2001) 
Single population from the 
1987 National Medical 
Expenditure Survey 
Estimation of a two-stage 
model 
 
Adverse selection: healthier 
people are willing to pay less 
for insurance, while less 
healthy people are willing to 
pay more for insurance 
Buchmueller et al. (2013) NHS data from 2004-2005 
Tests of the prediction 
from the classic model 
 
Advantageous selection: 
individuals who bought 
private insurance have less ex-
ante risk of hospitalization 
Fang, Keane and 
Silverman (2008) 
Medicare Current 
Beneficiary Survey and 
Health and Retirement 
Study 
Least square regression  
Advantageous selection: 
Medigap consumers are 
healthier than those without 
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    Another study from Altman et al. (1998) suggested that adverse selection is a 
quantitatively important reason for the different premiums across health plans. 
They analyzed the data from Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC) 
by comparing individuals’ characteristics with different health plans and found 
that people moving into more generous plan spent 47 percent more in the next year. 
In addition, a 2 percent effect of adverse selection was calculated. It accounts for 
the different premiums between two plans after adjusting for age and sex. 
Frank et al. (2000) adopted data from health claims and enrolment files from 
Michigan Medicaid program from 1991 to 1993, including adults “who were 
eligible for Medicaid in 1991 and who were continuously enrolled in Medicaid 
programs till the end of 1993”. They firstly claimed that the better the individual 
knows their future medical expenditure, “the bigger the distortion created by the 
plan in order to attract the profitable individuals” in a theoretical framework. They 
demonstrated the theory in an empirical study to compare the difference between 
predicted and real expenditure. Nine classes of services, such as birth-related 
disease, cancer care, gastrointestinal, etc., were identified according to ICD-9 
codes and were analyzed respectively. A two-part model following Duan et al. 
(1983) and Manning et al. (1987) was used for each class of services. Age, sex, 
and prior spending were assumed to be known by individuals to predict their future 
spending. They found that age and sex can explain around 21 percent of the 
variation between actual and predicted spending. The proportion was even bigger 
when prior spending was included in prediction model.  
    2.2.1.2     Discrete choice models 
A second common method to investigate the relationship between risk type and 
insurance coverage are binary outcome regressions like logistic or probit 
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regressions (Scitovsky et al., 1978; Wolfe and Goddeeris, 1991; Wang et al., 2006; 
Savage and Wright, 2003; Gao and Wang, 2009).  
    Although Scitovsky et al. (1978) did not bring up “adverse selection” directly, 
their study found a weak positive relationship between risk type and insurance 
coverage. They examined factors affecting Stanford University employees’ 
enrolment choice between two health plans (Kaiser Plan and Fee-for-service Plan). 
They regressed consumer’s choice (a dummy variable) on their family income, 
distance from home to the clinic, years employed, age, sex, health status, numbers 
of covered members in family, and marital status. Among those independent 
variables, age and health status can capture the risk type of the consumer. The 
least-squares regression results indicated that people subscribed to fee-for-service 
plan—a slightly more generous plan—were more likely to be older, less healthy, 
single and without children, indicating a positive relationship between risk and 
insurance coverage. However, they also admitted that there is a long-term effect 
of the existence of fee-for-service plan (since fee-for-service plan was the original 
plan that everybody had before the introduction of Kaiser Plan), so the effect of 
age of choosing between two plans still needs further investigation.  
Research from Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991), on the difference of medical 
expenditure between Medicare beneficiaries with and without Medigap (a private 
supplementary insurance plan), also indicated the existence of adverse selection. 
A longitudinal dataset, Retirement History Survey, was employed in the Probit 
estimation of supplementary insurance. Coefficients of previous hospital and 
physician expenditures were significantly positive, which indicated the positive 
relationship between risk type and insurance coverage, but they also claimed that 
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the magnitude of adverse effect was not serious enough to cause efficiency 
problem.  
Savage and Wright (2003) examined adverse selection by adopting probit 
regression using data for choices and private hospital use in Australia from 1989 
to 1990. Five subsamples, young singles, young couples, couples with dependents, 
old couples and old singles, were analyzed separately. They measured individuals’ 
risk type by their chronic medical conditions. Except for the old singles subsample, 
results from the other four groups suggested that private hospital insurance was 
selected by people who require hospital services that face long waiting times in 
public hospitals.  
Wang et al. (2006) conducted research in the context of a voluntary Rural 
Mutual Health Care health (RMHC) insurance scheme in China. Longitudinal data 
employed in their logistic regression contains two waves of survey, 2002 and 2004, 
before and after the establishment of RMHC.  As well as the whole sample, two 
subsamples were also analysed in logistic regressions. Because the subsidized 
scheme only covers individuals rather than covering all the family members, it 
allows the researchers to further examine the effect within households. The first 
subsample included those individuals in either fully enrolled or absolutely non-
enrolled households, while the second subsample includes individuals in partially 
enrolled households. Risk type was measured by dummy variables indicating 
whether the respondent suffered from minor/serious health problems. Their 
findings suggested that individuals with worse health status are 1.6 times more 
likely to buy RMHC than those with better health status. Adverse selection was 
more obvious in partially-insured families because non-enrollees in partially 
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insured families have the best health status while enrollees in those families have 
the worse health status.  
    2.2.1.3 Other models 
The third category includes literature using other methods like risk-adjustment 
models, simulation method, and least square regression (Marquis, 1992; Van de 
Ven and van Vliet, 1995; Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Buchmueller et al., 2013; 
Fang et al., 2008). 
    Marquis (1992) adopted a simulation method using the RAND experiment data 
to estimate the effects of adverse selection. RAND experiment, conducted from 
1974 to 1982 in the United States, is a famous randomized trial in the health 
insurance market. This dataset provided information about households’ 
anticipation of their health care spending, which was adopted as a measure of risk 
in the model. Individuals risk was allowing division into different groups. 
Controlling for age and gender, the number of consumers in high risk quartile who 
bought the most generous health plan were 73 percent higher than the number in 
low risk quartile. 
    van de Ven and van Vliet (1995) conducted research based on a postal survey 
among consumers who were insured by the largest private health insurance 
company in the Netherlands. Their risk-adjustment model showed that risk factors 
like age and gender explain 40 percent expenditure variance between low- and 
high-cost plans. If all risk factors were included, such as prior health and prior 
costs, 80% variance could be explained.  
    Cardon and Hendel (2001) estimated a two-stage structural model using data of 
single population from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey in the US. 
In the first stage of the model, individuals chose the health insurance that gives 
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them the highest expected utility under uncertain health status in the next stage. In 
the second stage, consumers chose the health care consumption after realization of 
health status. Adverse selection was captured by examining the difference of 
private information/signals for the health status in next stage. Their findings that 
healthier people are willing to pay less for insurance while less healthy people are 
willing to pay more for insurance also demonstrated the existence of adverse 
selection. 
   2.2.2 Empirical evidence for advantageous selection 
    Empirical studies do not always find a positive relationship between risk type 
and insurance coverage. Buchmueller et al.(2013) tried to test the prediction of 
theoretical models in Australian private health insurance market. A test for 
selection into private health insurance by regressing realized losses on insurance 
coverage was conducted to examine the relationship between risk type and level 
of insurance coverage using NHS data collected by Australian Bureau of Statics 
in 2004 and 2005. The regression showed no significant difference in costs 
between those with private insurance and those without. By comparing the 
predicted probability of being hospitalized across two groups, the authors found a 
negative rather than a positive relationship. Individuals who bought private 
insurance have lower probability of hospitalization than those without insurance. 
Furthermore, they provided the underlining reasons for the advantageous selection. 
Income and risk aversion were claimed to be the causes because both are positively 
related to insurance coverage and negatively related to individual’s risk type. On 
the one hand, the richer the individual, the more insurance coverage is s/he would 
like to buy.  On the other hand, the richer the individual, the healthier s/he is likely 
to be, because s/he can buy healthier food etc. Therefore, risk type and insurance 
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coverage can be negatively related under this situation. The same is the case with 
risk aversion.  
Fang et al. (2008) put forward strong evidence of advantageous selection in the 
US Medigap insurance market and also concluded sources from empirical 
strategies. Two datasets, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) and 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), were employed in this study. Results from 
regression of total medical expenditure on Medigap status (equals to 1 if the 
consumer bought Medigap otherwise 0) revealed that Medigap consumers are 
healthier than those without because important healthy factors (e.g. Body Mass 
Index and smoking) were positive and had significant partial relationship with 
Medigap coverage. Sources of advantageous selection were investigated in detail, 
including income, education, longevity expectations, financial planning horizons 
and cognitive ability. However, this study showed no support for risk preference, 
mentioned in Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997), for being a source of 
advantageous selection.  
    2.2.3 Empirical evidence in the context of Chinese insurance market 
Two papers dealing with adverse or advantageous selection in the context of 
China are discovered after a search into the literature. In addition to Wang et al. 
(2006) mentioned above, Gao and Wang (2009) used enrollment data from a large 
Chinese private insurance company. They performed a multilinear regression 
initially to estimate the relationship between the basic insurance purchased and 
whether the consumer claimed medical expenses afterwards. Estimates from this 
regression exhibited a negative relationship between the level of basic insurance 
and the consumer’s claim, implying advantageous selection. Furthermore, a probit 
model was adopted to identify the indicator of people’s additional insurance status. 
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Claims were identified to be significantly and positively correlated to the 
consumer’s additional insurance status. After adjusting for endogeneity problems 
due to the potential relationship between claim and insurance status, their findings 
were consistant with the prelimilary results that claims were positively correlated 
to the consumer’s addiitonal insurance status.  
    2.2.4 Reflection on the empirical literature 
The presence of asymmetric information has diverse effects on health insurance 
market. Conditioning on different settings, empirical studies have derived 
contradictory conclusions about the relationship between risk type and level of 
insurance coverage.  
Most studies are conducted in high-income countries where most or all the 
population are covered by at least one type of health insurance. These studies 
attempted to identify adverse or advantageous selections in the context of people’s 
choice between different plans or the choice of buying a supplementary health 
insurance plan. Thus, they are different from this paper from the perspective of 
motivation and context. In the context of this study, around 80% of the sample do 
not have health insurance.  
Studies also use different proxies to measure people’s risk of suffering financial 
loss in the event of illness: 1. Realized utilization (inpatient and outpatient visits); 
2. Self-reported health; 3. Age; 4. Illness; 5. Realized medical expenditure; 6. 
Predicted medical expenditure.  In this research, we add some of those variables 
as control variables but use another way to measure risk which we consider is more 
appropriate, this being whether expected medical cost is greater than the premium 
that individual would face.  
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In general, there is no unique conclusion that could be generated from the 
existing literature on whether there is adverse or advantageous selection in 
competitive health insurance market. In the next section, the data and methodology 
employed in this study will be explained.  
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
    The publicly available panel data from China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) is used in this study. CHNS contains information about health, 
demographic, socioeconomic and nutrition policy studies. It covers nine provinces 
across north to south of China with different geography, economic development, 
public resources and health indicators. A multistage and random cluster process is 
used to draw samples. In each province, counties are stratified by low, middle and 
high income groups. Four counties are randomly chosen from a weighted sampling 
strategy. Provincial cities and a lower income city are chosen in seven provinces, 
while large cities were selected in other two provinces.  
    All together, they have conducted 8 waves since 1989 on four different levels, 
including household survey, individual survey, community survey, and nutrition 
and physical examination. Different questions are designed for different levels of 
survey. For each wave, they take three consecutive days to collect data for all four 
surveys. The household questionnaire asks about demographic information, 
economic activities (e.g. income and expenditure), and health services. Detailed 
data on health care utilization, health insurance coverage and medical providers 
are included in this health service section. An individual survey has been 
conducted since 2004, extracting all questions about individual activities, lifestyle 
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and health status etc. from household survey. Community questionnaires are 
answered by a knowledgeable respondent about the community infrastructure. The 
survey covers 4,400 households and 19,000 individuals for all 9 waves. The 
official website claims that the follow up rate is said to be high in the description, 
but they also include new respondents into the survey each year.  
    Observations in wave 2004, wave 2006, and wave 2009 are included in this 
study. Before wave 2000, the dataset does not contain information about whether 
respondents bought commercial insurance. From 2003, Chinese government 
started to launch the experimental public health insurance program in some areas 
in order to achieve universal coverage. However, this target has not been achieved 
yet. Therefore, there are still people without public insurance who face the choice 
of buying private insurance. Furthermore, public insurance schemes do not cover 
all medical expenditure, which means people with public insurance still have the 
risk of financial loss. Thus they also face the choice of purchasing supplementary 
health insurance privately. Consequently, there are two types of insurance markets 
in China since 2003: 1) A pure private insurance market where people without 
public insurance choose whether or not to buy private health insurance. Private 
insurance market is increasingly thriving in recent years, but their insurance plans 
do not vary much. Most of those plans cover a proportion of the inpatient cost for 
consumers. 2) A supplementary insurance market where people who have public 
insurance face the choice of buying supplementary private health insurance.  
    In order to test the choice effect in different markets, observations are split into 
two subsamples according to their public insurance status. Data cleaning processes 
include dropping observations with unknown and missing data for specific 
variables in regressions, correcting miscoded data for the variable “treatment costs” 
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and recoding missing as zeroes from “treatment costs” for certain observations. 
Observations missing information for age, household income, self-reported health, 
education are dropped from this study. In addition, 43 observations, who are 
supposed to be coded as missing, are miscoded for variable “treatment costs” in 
wave 2000 as “99999”, this also indicating missing information.  
After dropping such cases, there are 17,513 observations available for the 
analysis. Among them, 7,751 individuals do not have public insurance and 229 of 
them (2.95%) have private insurance (as shown in Figure 13).  Meanwhile, there 
are 9,762 individuals with public insurance and 227 (2.33%) with supplementary 
private insurance. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Insurance=0
Commercial 
Insurance=0
97.05%
Commercial 
Insurance=1
2.95%
Public Insurance=1
Commercial 
Insurance=0
97.67%
Commercial 
Insurance=1
2.33%
Figure 13: Observations for subgroups 
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2.3.2 Survey questions 
Table 3 lists the variables that are available for the analysis. Private health 
insurance status is a dummy variable generated from the question 
 “Which of the following types of medical insurance do you have?”  
1) Commercial insurance;  
2) Free medical insurance;  
3) Urban employee medical insurance: passway model;  
4) Urban employee medical insurance: block model;  
5) urban employee medical insurance: catastrophic disease insurance;  
6) Cooperative insurance; 
7) Health insurance for women and children;  
8) EPI (expanded program of immunization) insurance for children;  
9) Other.  
 
This dummy is 1 when respondent crossed the option “commercial insurance” 
and 0 otherwise.  
The premium for private insurance is recorded from the “what is your monthly 
contribution to this insurance?”  
Information for medical expenditure is contained in the section starting with the 
question “During the past 4 weeks, have you been sick or injured? Have you 
suffered from a chronic or acute disease?” We calculate individual’s medical 
expenditure in the past 4 weeks by aggregating answers from those follow-up 
questions: 
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 1) “How much money did you spend on the illness or injury (spending 
outside the formal health sector)? (yuan)”  
2) “How much did this treatment cost or has this treatment cost so far 
(including all registration fees, medicines, treatment fees, bed fees, etc.)?” 
3) “How much money was spent or has been spent on treating your illness 
or injury in addition to the costs mentioned above? (yuan)”  
   
    Medical expenditure here is defined as the amount that the individual spent on 
treating the illness. These three questions are located in different sections of the 
questionnaire and they do not overlap. Question 1 is asking the situation before the 
individual went to the formal health sector. Question 2 is asking the situation when 
the individual went to the formal health sector. Question 3 is asking whether there 
is any expenditure the individual has not included in the answers to question 1 and 
2.  In China, people pay for medical services out-of-pocket at first and then apply 
for reimbursement from the health insurance (Yip et al., 2012).    
Moreover, respondents who reported they were not sick in the last 4 weeks with 
missing values in “treatment costs” were treated as having 0 medical expenses in 
the analysis.  
The outpatient (inpatient) reimbursement rate is from the question “What 
percentage of the fees for outpatient (inpatient) care does your (public) insurance 
pay (not including registration fee)?” respectively.  
Health status is recoded into four dummy variables, namely, excellent, good, 
fair and poor, according to their answers to “Right now, how would you describe 
your health compared to that of other people your age?”  
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Variables available for controlling risk preference include smoking status, time 
spent doing exercise and whether the respondent drinks every day.  
In addition, we have information on demographic characteristics like age, 
gender, years of education, working status, current marital status, disabled status 
and household income. Among them, “years of education” is not directly collected 
from the survey, but calculated from the question “How many years of formal 
education have you completed in a regular school?”  
   2.3.3 Estimation of premium  
    CHNS records the premium for private insurance if respondents bought private 
insurance. However, for those who did not have private insurance, we do not know 
the price they would face. Therefore, for these people, the premium is predicted 
for individuals who did not buy private insurance because everybody faces a 
potential cost of buying health insurance. The premium is predicted for two types 
of respondents: 1) respondents who bought insurance but did not report the 
premium; 2) respondents who did not buy insurance. For the second type of 
prediction, we are predicting what the price of insurance would have been, if they 
searched the private insurance market. The prediction method is identical for both 
types and is based on linear regression, specified as: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝒙
′
𝒊𝜆 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                     (2.1) 
    Where P denotes premium; 𝒙′𝒊 is a vector of predictors containing age, age 
squared, gender, smoking status, and medical expenditure in the past wave. In 
order to rule out inflation across waves, we predict premium for each wave 
separately. Therefore, the predicted premium can be calculated as: 
𝑃?̂? =  𝒙
′
𝑖?̂?                                                                              (2.2) 
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Table 3: List of variables 
Variable name Explanation Continuous or dummy 
Private insurance Whether the respondent bought 
private insurance? 
Dummy 
Public insurance Whether the respondent bought 
public insurance? 
Dummy 
Premium What is the monthly contribution 
for this insurance? 
Continuous 
Medical expenditure (in RMB) What is the medical expenditure in 
the past 4 weeks? (calculated from 
dataset) 
Continuous 
Outpatient reimbursement rate  % fees outpatient covered in public 
insurance plans 
Continuous 
Inpatient reimbursement rate  % fees outpatient covered in public 
insurance plans 
Continuous 
Number of facilities Number of facilities in the 
community 
Continuous 
Health Excellent Right now, how would you describe 
your health compared to that of 
other people your age? Excellent 
Dummy 
Health Good Right now, how would you describe 
your health compared to that of 
other people your age? good 
Dummy 
Health Fair Right now, how would you describe 
your health compared to that of 
other people your age? Fair 
Dummy 
Health Poor Right now, how would you describe 
your health compared to that of 
other people your age? Poor 
Dummy 
Smoking Whether the respondent is smoking. Dummy 
Drinking every day Whether the respondent drinks 
every day 
Dummy 
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Time for Exercise  Time spent in doing exercise in 
minutes per week 
Continuous 
Working status Are you presently working? Dummy 
Household income per capita per 
year 
Calculated household annual 
income of the observations (inflated 
to 2011) 
Continuous 
Ln household income per capita 
(in RMB) 
Ln (household income+1) (inflated 
to 2011) (per year) 
Continuous 
Education  How many years of formal 
education have you completed in a 
regular school? 
Continuous 
0,1,2,…18 
Urban Whether the respondent lives in 
urban area 
Dummy 
Age Age of the respondents Continuous 
Disabled Whether the respondent is disabled? Dummy 
Married Whether the person is married? Dummy 
Male Gender of the respondent Dummy 
 
    2.3.4 Distinguishing adverse selection and moral hazard in empirical studies 
    A challenge for empirical studies to identify adverse selection is to distinguish 
between adverse selection and moral hazard because both of them could generate 
a positive relationship between individuals’ medical cost and insurance coverage 
(Pauly, 1974; Abbring et al., 2003; De Donder and Hindriks, 2009; Einav and 
Finklstein, 2011). With adverse selection, the positive correlation comes from 
people have better knowledge of their higher expected medical cost being more 
likely to buy higher insurance coverage. With moral hazard, people may have 
incentive to take less effort to keep being healthy or less incentive to control 
utilization after joining the insurance plans. This would also generate positive 
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correlation between medical expenditure and insurance coverage. Although they 
have same consequence, the two situations suggest very different policy 
implications. Therefore, it is of great importance to distinguish between the two 
phenomena for empirical studies.   
    2.3.5 Risk measurement 
To measure the risk type for respondents, we use a dummy indicating whether 
the individual’s expected medical expenditure is greater than the private insurance 
premium. The reason for using expected medical expenditure is because that, at 
the time of the decision, exact medial expenditure in the next wave is unknown to 
individuals. In addition, individuals have more incentive to purchase the private 
insurance if their expected medical expenditure is greater than the premium. 
Otherwise, it is not financially beneficial for them to purchase insurance.  
    2.3.5.1 Prediction of expected medical expenditure—fixed effects 
To generate this risk measurement dummy, the first step is to forecast expected 
medical expenditure for each individual. If we use pooled OLS, the estimation 
would be biased because of the heteroskedasticity across panel units and serial 
correlation within panel units. Thus, we use fixed effects model to allow for 
heteroskedasticity across panel units (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The fixed 
effects model is specified as: 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝒙
′
𝒊𝒕−𝟏𝛽1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (2.3) 
Where i and t denote the individual and wave respectively. 𝑚𝑖𝑡 is the medical 
expenditure observed in the current wave. 𝒙′𝒊𝒕−𝟏  are regressors in wave t-1 
including age, age squared, self-reported health dummies, log of household 
income, years of education and marital status. 𝜑𝑖 are individual-specific effects. 
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The fixed effects model allows 𝜑𝑖  to be correlated with the regressors𝒙
′
𝒊𝒕−𝟏 . 
However, fixed effects models do not permit time invariant variables like gender. 
Therefore, we divide the sample into two subsamples and forecast medical 
expenditure for males and females separately in order to explore gender effects.  
In model (2.3), the medical expenditure we observe from the survey could 
potentially contain the moral hazard effect from having insurance. If we did not 
use it as an explanatory variable, the insurance effect would be captured in the 
error term. The coefficients estimated in model (2.3) would be biased if the 
insurance effect is correlated with variables in vector 𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏. For example, self-
reported health in the past wave is likely to be correlated with insurance status in 
the current wave. Therefore, we further add 𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡 into the fixed-effect prediction 
function as in model (2.4), where 𝐼𝑖 represents the private insurance status in wave 
t. We then treat every individual as if they did not have private insurance in the 
current wave to wash out moral hazard effects.  
𝑚𝑖 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝒙
′
𝒊𝒕−𝟏𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                 (2.4) 
Thus, the predicted medical expenditure  𝑚?̂? can be calculated as: 
                   𝑚?̂? = 𝜑?̂? + 𝒙
′
𝒊𝒕−𝟏?̂?1                                                             (2.5) 
    2.3.5.2 Risk measurement 
    In the final step, a dummy variable 𝑅𝑖indicating whether their expected medical 
expenditure is greater than the potential premium is generated. 𝑅𝑖, as shown in 
equation (2.6), is equal to 1 if individual’s expected medical expenditure is greater 
than premium and equal to 0 if otherwise.  
𝑅𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑚?̂? − 𝑃 < 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚?̂? − 𝑃 > 0
                                                                           (2.6) 
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2.3.6 Empirical strategy to identify adverse or advantageous selection 
    Logistic regression is adopted to identify the correlation between individual’s 
risk type and their insurance coverage.  
𝐼𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑅𝑖 + 𝒙′𝒊𝛿2 + 𝜈𝑖                                                          (2.7) 
Where 𝐼𝑖  indicates individual’s private health insurance status. 𝑅𝑖  is a dummy 
variable (measure of risk) indicating whether individual’s predicted medical 
expenditure is greater than premium.  𝒙′𝒊  is a vector of variables containing 
individual characteristics (e.g. age, gender, self-reported health, risk preference, 
wealth Level, supply side factor, etc).  𝜈𝑖 is the error term. 𝛿1 , and  𝛿2  are 
correspondent parameters. In practice, we use vce option in Stata to bootstrap 
standard errors of the estimates. Various studies have suggested that there are 
several variables influencing the decision of buying health insurance, like “risk 
preference, health status in the past, and the expected expenditures (related to 
premium)” (Van de Ven, 1987; Cutler, and Zeckhauser, 1997; Einav, and 
Finkelstein, 2011). Such variables are included in the regression as control 
variables. For the public insurance subsample, we add another three control 
variables—outpatient reimbursement and inpatient reimbursement rate for public 
insurance and current working status—into the regression. 
For measuring risk preference, we use smoking status, drinking status and time 
spent exercising as proxies. In health economics, individuals’ risk preference can 
possibly affect the decision of purchasing health insurance and the amount of 
preventive effort both of which could influence the risk of mortality (Anderson 
and Mellor, 2008). There is debate about how to measure individuals’ risk 
preference. Some literature in health economics uses smoking status, drinking 
status, seat beat use etc. (Vescusi and Hersch 2001; Hakes and Viscusi, 2007), 
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while other studies employ surveys asking hypothetical questions (Barsky et al., 
1997; Dave and Saffer, 2007). One concern on using measures of health behavious 
as proxies for risk preference is that they may also reflect individuals’ time 
preference (Anderson and Mellor, 2008). A criticism of surveys asking 
hypothetical questions is that these may not reflect individuals’ real behaviour 
when they are at financial risk (Glaeser, 2000). For our study, the choice of proxies 
of risk preference is limited by the data. We can only use smoking and drinking 
status, time spent exercising as crude measures of risk preference. This is a 
potential weakness of the study.  
    2.3.7 Data descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents whole sample characteristics. The average age for the whole 
sample is 48.3 years old. 48.4% of them are male, 82.1% are currently married, 
and 26.9% are living in urban area. Average annual premium for private insurance 
is RMB 1171.6 (£97.63 per month), while annual household income is RMB 
26,029.6 (£2196.08 per month). If the individual is sick, the mean of medical cost 
in 4 weeks is RMB787.9.   
Table 5 shows descriptives for non-public insurance subsample. For this sample, 
average age of the respondents is 47.1 years old, approximately 47 percent of them 
are male and 80.7 percent of them are currently married. This table also provides 
comparisons across two clusters of people, those who bought commercial 
insurance and those who did not. P value from the test for significance of the 
difference between two clusters are also reported in the table.1 Altogether, there 
                                                     
1 T test is used to test the difference of means for continuous variables and pr test (test for 
proportions) is used to test the differences of means for dummy variables. 
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are 8,135 people (96.7%) that do not have any health insurance and 271 people 
(3.2%) that only have commercial insurance. Comparisons of the means between 
two clusters show that there are a larger proportion of people (63% vs 34%) with 
greater medical expenditure in the “buying private insurance” cluster, indicating 
adverse selection. It also suggests that people with private insurance are younger, 
have higher household income, spend more time for exercise and have more years 
of education. In addition, the proportion of people with good and fair self-reported 
health status in “having insurance cluster” is smaller, implying they are less 
healthy even though they are younger.  
Table 4: Data descriptive statistic for the whole sample 
Variable Mean Standard dev. 
Age 48.351 15.942 
Male 0.484 0.500 
Years of education 7.218 4.159 
Married 0.821 0.383 
Disabled 0.006 0.078 
Urban 0.269 0.443 
Premium  1171.552 885.605 
Expected medical expenditure 83.344 93.613 
Household income  (in RMB) 26029.580 33661.69 
Medical expenditure (in RMB) 106.620 1403.291 
Medical expenditure (expenditure>0) (in RMB) 787.910 3744.357 
Smoking status 0.278 0.448 
Drink every day 0.105 0.306 
Time spend for exercise (in minutes) 13.194 58.386 
Presently working 0.606 0.491 
Number of facilities in the community 1.306 0.769 
Outpatient reimbursement rate (%) 11.794 26.798 
Inpatient reimbursement rate (%) 13.236 25.567 
Self-reported health: excellent  0.131 0.338 
Self-reported health: good 0.513 0.500 
Self-reported health: fair 0.308 0.462 
Self-reported health: poor 0.048 0.213 
Number of observations 17,513  
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Table 5: Data descriptive statistic for non-public-insurance subsample 
 
Full sample Insurance=0 
Obs=8135 
Insurance=1 
obs=271 
  
Variable Mean Mean Mean Difference P 
(ttest/prtest) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) 
Greater medical expenditure 
(than premium) 
  
0.347 0.338 0.631 -0.293 0.0000 
(0.476) (0.005) (0.029) 
  
Annual premium (in RMB) 958.0847 956.392 1008.915 -52.523 0.1524 
(828.827) (9.258) (37.365)   
Expected medical 
expenditure (in RMB)  
84.516 83.879 103.657 -19.778 0.0003 
(92.336) (1.008) (127.134)   
Household income per year 
(in RMB) 
  
17082.720 16754.190 26944.690 -10190.500 0.0000 
(26216.980) (287.312) (1982.466)   
Medical expenditure in past 
4 weeks (in RMB) 
  
72.836 74.038 36.742 37.297 0.2526 
(906.360) (10.198) (17.803) 
  
Medical expenditure in past 
4 weeks (expenditure>0) 
(RMB) 
  
606.197 615.222 321.194 294.028 0.2641 
(2553.309) (82.743) (147.953) 
  
Lag medical expenditure in 
past 4 weeks (in RMB) 
  
51.769 52.910 17.535 35.375 0.2357 
(795.262) (8.956) (10.198) 
  
Lag medical expenditure in 
past 4 weeks(>0）(in RMB) 
  
654.396 664.230 279.529 384.701 0.2854 
(2758.729) (109.692) (152.961) 
  
Smoking status 
  
0.283 0.286 0.199 0.087 0.0009 
(0.450) (0.005) (0.024) 
  
Drink every day 
  
0.100 0.101 0.070 0.030 1.6465 
(0.299) (0.003) (0.016) 
  
Time spend for exercise per 
week (in minutes) 
  
11.635 11.012 30.332 -19.320 0.0000 
(61.172) (0.661) (5.766) 
  
Lag smoking status 
  
0.290 0.294 0.177 0.117 0.0000 
(0.454) (0.005) (0.023) 
  
Lag drink every day 
  
0.100 0.101 0.066 0.035 0.0296 
(0.300) (0.003) (0.015) 
  
Lag time spend for exercise 
per week (in minutes) 
  
6.305 6.132 11.483 -5.351 0.0347 
(47.733) (0.520) (4.176) 
  
Number of facilities in 
community 
1.322 
 
 
1.316 1.520 -0.203 0.0001 
(0.814) (0.009) (0.067)   
Self-reported health: 
excellent  
  
0.119 0.119 0.107 0.012 0.2742 
(0.323) (0.004) (0.019) 
  
Self-reported health: good 
  
0.522 0.516 0.499 0.017 0.0001 
(0.496) (0.006) (0.029) 
  
Self-reported health: fair 
  
0.308 0.313 0.379 -0.066 0.4034 
(0.462) (0.005) (0.022) 
  
Self-reported health: poor 
  
0.051 0.052 0.015 0.037 0.0029 
(0.220) (0.002) (0.007) 
  
      
Lag self-reported health: 
excellent  
  
0.136 0.135 0.177 -0.042 0.0226 
(0.343) (0.004) (0.023) 
  
Lag self-reported health: 
good 
  
0.516 0.513 0.520 -0.007 0.3099 
(0.500) (0.006) (0.030) 
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Table 5: (Continued) 
 Full sample Insurance=0 
Obs=8135 
Insurance=1 
obs=271 
  
Variable Mean Mean Mean Difference P 
(ttest/prtest) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) 
Lag self-reported health: fair 
  
0.304 0.307 0.288 0.119 0.0000 
(0.460) (0.005) (0.024) 
  
Lag self-reported health: 
poor 
  
0.044 0.045 0.015 0.030 0.0087 
(0.205) (0.002) (0.007) 
  
Age 
  
47.112 47.539 34.319 13.219 0.0000 
(15.939) (0.174) (1.022) 
  
Male 
  
0.472 0.472 0.480 -0.008 0.3971 
(0.499) (0.006) (0.030) 
  
Years of education 
  
6.930 6.859 9.041 -2.181 0.0000 
(3.999) (0.044) (0.202) 
  
Presently working 0.582 0.587 0.415 0.172 0.0000 
(0.493) (0.006) (0.033)   
Married 
  
0.807 0.814 0.601 0.212 0.0000 
(0.395) (0.004) (0.030) 
  
Urban 
  
0.259 0.251 0.498 -0.247 0.0000 
(0.438) (0.005) (0.030) 
  
Number of observations 7,751 7,570 181   
  
   Descriptive statistics for public insurance subgroup are shown in Table 6. It 
shows different characteristics from the public-insurance subsample in terms of 
risk measurement.  Among people who bought supplementary private insurance, 
there are only 64% of them with medical expenditure being greater than premium, 
compared with 91% in the other cluster. We also observe that people with 
supplementary private insurance are younger, have more years of education, earn 
higher income, have higher outpatient reimbursement rate, and spend more time 
exercising.  
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Table 6: Data descriptive statistic for public-insurance subsample 
  Full sample insurance=0 insurance=1 
  
Variable Mean Mean Mean    Difference P (ttest) 
 (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) 
Greater medical 
expenditure  
  
0.907 0.913 0.646 0.266 0.0000 
(0.291) (0.003) (0.030) 
  
Annual Premium (in 
RMB) 
1335.784 1336.132 1320.666 15.466 0.394 
(892.872) (8.676) (45.524)   
Expected medical 
expenditure   (in RMB) 
82.44269 82.353 86.341 -3.989 0.256 
(94.578) (0.910) (7.480)   
% outpatient fee covered 
by public insurance 
  
20.970 20.923 23.033 -2.110 0.1628 
(33.280) (0.321) (2.375) 
  
% inpatient fee covered 
by public insurance  
  
23.129 23.152 22.159 0.993 0.3070 
(30.526) (0.295) (1.962) 
  
Household income per 
year (in RMB) 
  
22361.350 22059.010 35487.070 -13428.050 0.0000 
(32972.290) (305.987) (4378.744) 
  
Medical expenditure in 
past 4 weeks (in RMB) 
  
132.612 133.965 73.850 60.115 0.2904 
(1688.445) (16.509) (31.494) 
  
Medical expenditure in 
past 4 weeks (in RMB)  
(expenditure>0) (in 
RMB) 
  
902.188 915.385 422.488 492.897 0.2306 
(4325.571) (110.790) (172.027) 
  
Lag medical expenditure 
in past 4 weeks (in 
RMB) 
  
77.026 77.669 49.094 28.576 0.3720 
(1357.197) (13.266) (29.640) 
  
Lag medical expenditure 
in past 4 weeks(>0）(in 
RMB) 
  
641.451 647.546 389.581 257.966 0.3570 
(3871.375) (109.326) (229.159) 
  
Smoking status 
  
0.274 0.275 0.244 0.031 0.1392 
(0.446) (0.004) (0.027) 
  
Drink every day 
  
0.109 0.108 0.130 -0.022 0.1405 
(0.312) (0.003) (0.021) 
  
Time spend for exercise 
per week (in minutes) 
  
14.394 13.952 33.589 -19.637 0.0000 
(56.122) (0.536) (5.078) 
  
Lag smoking status 
  
0.279 0.279 0.244 0.036 0.1092 
(0.448) (0.004) (0.027) 
  
Lag drink every day 
  
0.111 0.111 0.114 -0.003 0.4382 
(0.314) (0.003) (0.020) 
  
Lag time spend for 
exercise per week (in 
minutes) 
  
11.262 11.007 22.366 -11.359 0.0004 
(52.600) (0.504) (4.515) 
  
Self-reported health: 
excellent  
  
0.256 0.256 0.353 -0.097 0.4064 
(0.230) (0.002) (0.014) 
  
Self-reported health: 
good 
  
0.583 0.583 0.504 0.079 0.2163 
(0.402) (0.004) (0.025) 
  
Self-reported health: fair 
  
0.136 0.136 0.134 0.002 0.4707 
(0.343) (0.003) (0.022) 
  
Self-reported health: 
poor 
  
0.025 0.025 0.008 0.017 0.0439 
(0.156) (0.002) (0.006) 
  
Lag self-reported health: 
excellent  
  
0.138 0.137 0.175 -0.037 0.0463 
(0.345) (0.003) (0.024) 
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Table 6: (Continued) 
 Full sample insurance=0 insurance=1   
Variable Mean Mean Mean    Difference P (ttest) 
 (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) 
Lag self-reported health: 
good 
  
0.509 0.508 0.602 -0.094 0.4802 
(0.499) (0.005) (0.032) 
  
Lag self-reported health: 
fair 
  
0.305 0.307 0.199 0.108 0.0001 
(0.460) (0.004) (0.025) 
  
Lag self-reported health: 
poor 
  
0.048 0.048 0.024 0.024 0.0410 
(0.213) (0.002) (0.010) 
  
Age 
  
49.304 49.503 40.670 8.833 0.0000 
(15.879) (0.153) (1.088) 
  
Male 
  
0.493 0.492 0.549 -0.057 0.0382 
(0.500) (0.005) (0.032) 
  
Years of education 
  
7.439 7.393 9.472 -2.079 0.0000 
(4.265) (0.041) (0.252) 
  
Number of facilities in 
community 
1.293 1.289 1.467 -1.778 0.0001 
(0.731) (0.007) (0.053)   
Presently working 0.606 0.608 0.560 0.048 0.0714 
(0.489) (0.005) (0.033)   
Married 
  
0.832 0.834 0.756 0.078 0.0007 
(0.374) (0.004) (0.027) 
  
Urban 
  
0.274 0.056 0.053 0.004 0.4064 
(0.446) (0.002) (0.014) 
  
Number of observations 9,762 9,475 287   
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2.4 Results for testing adverse or advantageous selection 
2.4.1 Results for non-public-insurance group 
    Table 7 displays the results from logistic regressions for non-public-insurance 
subsample, including both coefficients and average marginal effects. The 
dependent variable is individual’s commercial insurance status, while the variable 
of interest is the dummy “greater medical expenditure. All other control variables 
are listed in the results table. Without any control variables (column i), the 
coefficient of risk measurement is positive and significant, suggesting that buying 
private insurance is positively correlated with the probability of having greater 
medical expenditure than insurance premium.  
When we include all control variables in column (ii), main results still holds. 
The coefficient is still positive and significant and the marginal effect does not 
change much. It implies that, even if we control for other variables, this result is 
still in line with data descriptive statistics and reveals that there is adverse selection 
in this market. This suggests that a 1% increase in household income will increase 
the probability of buying insurance by 0.9%. Even though only 2.39% of the whole 
sample bought commercial insurance, this not a negligible marginal effect.  
If individuals have more years of education, they are more likely to buy 
insurance. For this subsample, we also find a strong regional effect that living in 
urban area will increase the probability of choosing private health insurance. 
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Table 7: Results of logistic regressions for non-public-insurance subsample 
       (i)  (ii)  
 Commercial 
insurance 
Marginal 
effect2 
Commercial  
Insurance 
Marginal 
effect 
Greater medical 
expenditure than premium 
0.314 0.009 0.333 0.009 
 (2.33)**  (2.17)**  
Age   -0.077 -0.002 
   (2.91)**  
Age square   0.000  
   (1.45)  
Number of facilities   0.056  
   (0.81)  
Presently working   -0.429 -0.012 
   (2.70) **  
Lag self-reported health: 
good 
  -0.172  
   (0.97)  
Lag self-reported health: 
fair 
  -0.321  
   (1.45)  
Lag self-reported health: 
poor3 
  -0.513  
   (0.95)  
Lag smoking status   -0.163  
   (0.74)  
Lag drink everyday   0.471  
   (1.59)  
Ln household income   0.379 0.010 
   (5.22)**  
Male   -0.217  
   (1.21)  
Lag time for exercise   0.000  
   (0.21)  
Education   0.057 0.002 
   (2.35)*  
Married   -0.056  
   (0.27)  
Urban   0.669  
   (4.25)** 0.024 
_cons -3.651  -5.218  
 (6.76)**  (6.17)**  
N 7,751  7,751  
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 Marginal effect here refers to average marginal effect.   
3 Reference group is perfect health. 
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     2.4.2 Results for public-insurance group 
    Table 8 demonstrates regression results for people who have public insurance 
and face the choice of buying a supplementary coverage. A negative correlation is 
found between an individual’s risk type and insurance coverage, which conflicts 
with the classical prediction from Rothschild and Stigliz (1976). It is noticeable 
that when we control for other variables, the marginal effect is even stronger. A 1% 
increase in the probability of having greater medical expenditure than premium 
will result in a 2.5% decline in the probability of buying supplementary insurance. 
It entails that there is advantageous selection in the supplementary health insurance 
market.  
However, the negative correlation between risk measurement and private 
insurance status could be due to the fact that employers bought private insurance 
for their employees. If this is the case, we cannot call it advantageous selection 
because it is not individual’s own choice. Nevertheless, the coefficient of 
individual’s working status is negative, indicating that people who currently have 
a job are less likely to buy private insurance. This could rule out this suspicion. 
Furthermore, compared with people who report excellent health in the past wave, 
people who report good health status are less likely to buy supplementary 
insurance. We also found significant effects of outpatient and inpatient 
reimbursement rate, but their impacts are too small to be of concern. 1% increase 
in outpatient and inpatient reimbursement rate increase will result in a 0.019% 
increase in the probability of purchasing supplementary insurance. Other 
indicators of buying supplementary insurance include outpatient fee covered, 
household income, and education.  
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In addition, although we know the percentage of outpatient and inpatient fee 
covered by public insurance, we do not know respondents’ expenditure for each 
service. Therefore, we could not subtract the expenditure paid by public insurance 
from total medical expenditure for this group. We report both regression with and 
without those two variables in column (ii) and (iii), and the results do not change 
dramatically, especially when we compare the marginal effect. Finally, although 
we found advantageous selection, we did not find significant effects related to the 
risk preference variables.  
    The results find adverse selection in a pure private insurance market where 
people choose whether or not to buy health insurance. Meanwhile, this study also 
identifies advantageous selection in the supplementary insurance market. 
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Table 8: Results of logistic regressions for public-insurance subsample 
 (i) (ii)  (iii)  
 Commercial 
insurance 
Commercial  
Insurance 
Margin
al effect  
Commercial  
Insurance 
Marginal 
effect 
Greater medical 
expenditure than 
premium 
 
-1.200 
(8.88) ** 
 
-1.138 
(8.05)** 
-0.025 -1.122 
(8.00)** 
-0.025 
(Marginal effects) -0.027     
      
Number of facilities  0.156 0.003 0.167  
  (1.99) *  (2.16)**  
Outpatient fee covered  0.009 0.00019   
  (2.74)**    
Inpatient fee covered  -0.009 
(2.31)* 
0.00019   
Age  -0.042  -0.043  
  (1.51)  (1.55)  
Age square  0.000  0.000  
  (0.69)  (0.73)  
Presently working  -0.374 -0.008 -0.385 -.009 
  (2.12)*  (2.18)*  
Lag self-reported health: 
good 
 -0.407 
(2.29)* 
-0.009 -0.409 
(2.31)* 
 
      
Lag self-reported health: 
fair 
 -0.629 
(2.85)** 
-0.014 -0.634 
(2.87)** 
 
      
Lag self-reported health: 
poor4 
 -0.715  -0.720  
  (1.59)  (1.60)  
Lag smoking status  -0.229  -0.232  
  (1.20)  (1.21)  
Lag drink everyday  0.072  0.088  
  (0.30)  (0.37)  
Ln household income  0.250 0.005 0.253 .005 
  (3.55)**  (3.59)**  
Male  0.186  0.184  
  (1.11)  (1.10)  
Lag time for exercise  0.002  0.002  
  (1.96)*  (1.90)  
Education  0.086 0.002 0.088 .001 
  (3.87)**  (3.94)**  
Married  0.248  0.249  
  (0.90)  (0.90)  
Urban  0.196  0.170  
  (1.16)  (1.01)  
_cons -2.999 -4.745  -4.779  
 (32.06)** (5.94)**  (5.97)**  
N 9,762 9,762  9,762  
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
      
                                                     
4 Reference group is perfect health. 
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2.5 Sensitivity analysis: prediction of medical expenditure—
GLMs   
    Expenditure data always have a skewed distribution, because there is substantial 
proportion of zero expenditure. The situation is the same in this dataset. Literature 
on proposing alternative methods to model expenditure could be categorized into 
two categories (Fleishman et al., 2006). The first suggestion is to take log of 
expenditures to reduce the skewness. However, it needs retransformation of the 
estimates from the logged form to unlogged form, which would lead to biases if 
there is heteroskedasticity on the log scale (Manning, 1998). The second 
suggestion is using generalized linear models (GLMs). We choose GLMs to 
predict medical expenditure because it does not need retransformation of the 
dependent variable and it models both mean and variance functions on the original 
scale of the dependent variable (Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004).  
    A simple model with outcome medical expenditure and predictors is 
implemented in Stata software. We allow for Poisson-like variance by assuming 
that the variance is proportional to the mean, and use a logarithmic link function 
to model expenditures. Predictors include age in t-1, age square in t-1, self-reported 
health in t-1, log of household income and year dummies. Since GLMs do not 
exploit panel data structure, we include year dummies to control for the 
heterogeneity being correlated with the time-varying covariates.  
    Table 9 demonstrates the results for logistic regressions using this type of 
predicted medical expenditure. This alternative way to predict medical expenditure 
does not change the main result. Even controlling for other variables the sign of 
the coefficient still holds the same. This suggests that our result is relatively robust 
with regard to the different methods of predicting medical expenditure.  
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Table 9: Final results using GLMs predicted medical expenditure 
 (i)   (ii)  
 Non-public insurance group Public insurance group 
 Commercial 
insurance 
Marginal 
effect 
Commercial  
Insurance 
Marginal 
effect 
Greater medical expenditure 
than premium 
0.333 0.009 -1.138 -0.025 
 (2.17)*  (8.05)**  
Number of facilities in 
community 
0.056  0.156 0.003 
 (0.81)  (1.99)*  
Outpatient fee covered   0.009 0.0002 
   (2.74)**  
Inpatient fee covered   -0.009 -0.0009 
   (2.31)*  
Age -0.077 -0.076 -0.042  
 (2.91)**  (1.51)  
Age square 0.000  0.000  
 (1.45)  (0.69)  
Present working status -0.429 -0.012 -0.374 -0.008 
 (2.70)**  (2.12)*  
Lag self-reported health: good -0.172  -0.407 -0.009 
 (0.97)  (2.29)*  
Lag self-reported health: fair -0.321  -0.629 -0.014 
 (1.45)  (2.85)**  
Lag self-reported health: poor -0.513  -0.715  
 (0.95)  (1.59)  
Lag smoking status -0.163  -0.229  
 (0.74)  (1.20)  
Lag drink everyday 0.471  0.072  
 (1.59)  (0.30)  
Ln household income 0.379 0.010 0.250 0.006 
 (5.22)**  (3.55)**  
Male -0.217  0.186  
 (1.21)  (1.11)  
Lag time for exercise 0.000  0.002  
 (0.27)  (1.96)*  
Education 0.057 0.002 0.086 0.002 
 (2.35)*  (3.87)**  
Married -0.074  0.248  
 (0.33)  (0.90)  
Urban 0.669 0.018 0.196  
 (4.25)**  (1.16)  
_cons -5.218  -4.745  
 (6.17)**  (5.94)**  
N 7,751  9,762  
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
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2.6 Policy implications  
    There are five goals of the Chinese health care reform which is officially 
launched in 2009, including 1) To improve the health insurance system by 
guaranteeing universal coverage of the social insurance, raising the government 
subsidies and reimbursement ceiling, improving the management of “health care 
funds” run by the government. 2) To insure people with critical illness. 3) To 
establish a national essential medicines system to meet patients’ needs by 
categorizing “essential medicines” and setting guidance prices for them. 4) To 
improve the primary health services delivery system. 5) To provide everybody 
with equal access to public health services. However, Chinese government did not 
set an explicit goal for the private insurance market. Policy implications we present 
below are based on the above mentioned aims of the reform, and we divide them 
into two sections according to the different findings derived from the two different 
contexts. 
    2.6.1 Policy implications for adverse selection 
    In this study, we found adverse selection in the pure private insurance market. 
Adverse selection is considered costly in general because it will lead to different 
types of inefficiencies in the market. Firstly, from the demand side, consumers 
contracting with wrong plans will suffer from not being fully insured (Cutler and 
Zackhause, 1997). Second, as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) suggested, the market 
can not merely achieve separating equilibrium because of asymmetric information. 
Therefore, inefficiency is raised here if low-risk type consumers would obtain less 
than optimal coverage (Belli, 2001). The third type of inefficiency comes from 
insurance companies who have incentives to distort their mix of customers by 
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changing their insurance policies. In this case, some consumers with under-
provided service by insurance companies may suffer from less than efficient 
quality of care (Glazer and McGuire, 2006). Last but not the least, there would be 
an equity problem if insurance companies anticipate adverse selection and reject 
high-risk type individuals. In other words, those high-risk type individuals may 
have less access to insurance.  
    Solutions to deter adverse selections are discussed extensively in literature. An 
extreme method would be full insurance coverage scheme, in which the 
government provide full and compulsory insurance for all individuals independent 
of their risk type (Neudeck and Podczeck, 1996). It is a way to achieve the best 
possible outcome, but it is not Pareto efficient for the market outcome. This 
approach could lead to ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard by reducing consumer’s 
incentive to regulate their health behaviour to prevent bad events or the incentive 
to control for utilization if bad events take place.  
    An alternative proposed by Cutler and Zeckhause (1999) is reinsurance, which 
means the insurance for insurers. It works via removing all extreme spending from 
plan premiums. For example, one insurance plan could cover a proportion of the 
spending that is over a certain amount by buying another insurance from another 
company in a free market. If the problem of adverse selection comes from those 
high-spending users of more generous plans, reinsurance could reduce it. The risk 
of reinsurance is that if the expenditure of high-spending consumer is pooled, 
insurance companies may have less incentive to control consumer’s utilization, 
again leading to moral hazard.  
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to risk adjustment and it is 
adopted in many high-income countries like Germany and the Netherlands. Van 
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den van and Ellis (2000) define it as “the use of information to calculate the 
expected health expenditures of individual consumers over a fixed internal of time 
and set subsidies to consumers or health plans to improve efficiency and equity”. 
The primary rationale for regulating a competitive health plan market is to provide 
financial access to health plan coverage for high-risk individuals. There are 
different risk adjustment models to predict the expected medical expenditure for 
individuals, including demographic models, prior year expenditures, diagnosis-
based risk adjustment, and information derived from prescription drugs, self-
reported information, mortality, and models using other information. Those 
models have various predicted power with a maximum of predicting more than 20 
percent of actual variance (Van de Van and Ellis, 2000). Subsidizing premiums 
according to individual risk types is well acknowledged as an efficient way to 
decrease insurance companies’ incentive to denying high-risk consumers or 
distorting their policy. However, Cutler and Zackhause (1997) put forward that 
risk adjustment reduces employees’ or consumers’ incentives to choose the most 
cost-effective contracts. This is because if most of the premium is subsidized by 
employers or government, consumers would not notice much of an increase in the 
price of insurance.  
With respect to low-income countries, McLeod et al. (2012) discussed the role 
of risk adjustment in South Africa. Its health system shares some similar features 
with China’s health system, and it is also in the progress of health care reform with 
one objective of universal coverage. Their article justifies the need for using at 
least age, gender and HIV prevalence in the risk adjustment model at provincial 
level. Besides, there are other middle-income or low-income countries 
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experimenting with risk-adjusted capitation fees including Thailand and Viet Nam 
(Ginneken, 2008).   
However, one obstacle for China to apply risk adjustment is that its population 
is much larger than other countries. Giving each provincial government right to 
generate their risk adjustment models could be one potential solution to deal with 
large population. 
China officially started the public health insurance reform by providing two 
voluntary schemes, NCMS and URBMI, to rural and urban population in 2009. To 
deal with adverse selection, the Government adopts a method which is very similar 
to the first means mentioned above, which is providing compulsory insurance to 
the public. They require full household enrollment to the scheme. It means that 
one household either has all members to join the scheme or none. Currently, the 
public health insurance coverage has reached over 96% in China, and only a few 
individuals are without any public insurance coverage. Non coverage is more 
likely to be related to geographical reasons rather than risk type (Qin and Lu, 2014). 
Therefore, full household enrolment is considered to be an effective way to reduce 
adverse selection. 
    2.6.2 Policy implications for advantageous selection  
In the context China’s partial public insurance system, where people have public 
insurance but have the choice of buying a supplementary insurance, we found 
advantageous selection where low-risk type individuals are more likely to 
purchase private insurance. Theoretically, advantageous selection would not lead 
to inefficiency if we do not consider transaction costs (Einav and Finklstein, 2011). 
However, for those with lower expected medical expenditure than their premium, 
they have too much insurance than is efficient. In contrast, those people who have 
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higher expected medical expenditure still face the risk of financial loss if they are 
not privately insured, especially when household income is a significant indicator 
of buying complementary insurance.  
    One of the goals of the government is to provide equal access to public health 
services. Results from our analysis suggest that high-risk individuals may still face 
financial barriers to health services and are under insured. Particularly when 
individuals have serious illness, they risk catastrophic health expenditure.  
    Policies could be set directly to address access problems for those with high 
expenditure. First of all, providing a more generous public insurance plan could 
reduce their financial loss directly, such as setting no deductibles or even offering 
full public insurance. Nevertheless, it might be too expensive to improve the 
benefit package for public insurance plans, bearing in mind that China is still at 
the stage of trying to roll-out universal coverage. Moreover, more generous public 
insurance plans might lead to moral hazard and cause welfare loss to the society. 
To prevent the risk of catastrophic health expenditure, Chinese government has 
been experimenting with Critical Illness Insurance since 2012.  
Other solutions to drive out over-insured consumers could be via taxing 
insurance or “outlaw insurance coverage” (De Meza and Webb, 2001; Einav and 
Fenklstein, 2011). In other words, situation could be improved by using the money 
gained by insurance companies to subsidize those with higher expected medical 
expenditure than insurance premium. It could be fulfilled by applying the opposite 
strategies to deter adverse selection. For example, taxing applied to existing 
private insurance plans and redistributing the money raised to subsidize those 
high-risk type individuals could be one way to improve welfare. 
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2.7 Discussion 
We investigated the choice of buying private insurance in Chinese insurance 
market, to test whether there is adverse or advantageous selection in buying private 
insurance. Since there are two types of costumers for private insurance market, we 
separate the sample into two subsamples. The first group is in a pure private 
insurance market, including people who do not have public insurance and face the 
choice of buying a private coverage. The second group is in a supplementary 
insurance market, containing people who have public insurance and face the 
choice of buying additional private insurance. By employing logit regressions 
using a survey data, we found adverse selection in the pure private insurance 
market and advantageous selection in the supplementary insurance market.  
The results could imply that context matters when considering whether there is 
adverse or advantageous selection in competitive insurance markets.  Recall those 
studies finding advantageous selection like Fang et al. (2008) and Buchmueller et 
al. (2013), they are also estimating supplementary insurance markets. For 
illustration, Fang et al. (2008) found that Medigap costumers are healthier than 
those without Medigap, in which Medigap is a supplementary health insurance 
plan to Medicare in the United States. Although the generalizability still need to 
be further established, it is worthwhile to conduct further study to test our 
hypothesis.  
It was shown in the literature review that most of the previous empirical studies 
used data from insurance companies, but we adopted survey data in this study. The 
advantage of insurance company data is that information for variables of key 
interest is more complete and accurate. However, they only have the sample who 
are enrolled in the plan but do not have the sample who did not buy the insurance. 
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CHNS data enables us to investigate a larger population to get a more complete 
picture of the Chinese insurance market. Disadvantages of CHNS include that it is 
not conducted every year, so there are two or three years’ gap between waves. 
Predictions based on wave t-1 might be inefficient because of the gap. In addition, 
variables collected in waves before 2000 are not quite consistent with variables 
post wave 2000. Thus, we can only include one wave of data to predict expected 
spending 2 to 3 years later, which may lead to prediction bias. Firstly, there is a 2-
to-3-year gap between two periods, but 0 gap would be more valid for prediction. 
Besides, it would be better to include more than one year of previous data to predict 
expected spending in the subsequent period, but we can use only one wave due to 
the availability of the dataset. Second, we do not have information on whether 
individuals have multi contracts with private companies. In other words, the 
survey does not collect information for whether respondents bought private 
insurance from the same company or not and whether insurance company refused 
to sell them insurance.  
2.8 Conclusion  
    In this study, we tested the theoretical hypothesis that individuals with higher 
risk of suffering financial loss will have higher insurance coverage in China’s 
private insurance market. We found co-existence of adverse selection and 
advantageous selection, but this arises under different markets conditions. Adverse 
selection is identified in a pure private insurance market where people choose 
whether or not to buy health insurance and advantageous selection is found in a 
supplementary insurance market. It implies that it might not be a simple “yes or 
no” answer to the theoretical hypothesis but depends on the context that we are 
considering. Further studies are called to test this hypothesis.   
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Results from this research indicate that in the era of reform in China’s health 
insurance market, there are still problems that call for attention. We proposed 
several solutions including risk adjustment in pure private insurance market, 
taxing insurance contracts and redistributing subsidies for high risk individuals in 
the partial public insurance market.  
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Chapter 3: Universal Coverage and Ex-ante Moral 
Hazard in China 
3.1 Introduction 
Classical economic theory predicts that health insurance will reduce an 
individual’s incentives towards taking preventive efforts to remain healthy (Arrow, 
1963). For example, compared with the case of no insurance, the insured may 
smoke more or exercise less, which ultimately may increase demand for health 
care utilization. Since this change in behaviour in response to insurance occurs 
before the event of sickness, it is termed ex-ante moral hazard. 
Empirical evidence of ex-ante moral hazard has been seen in other markets. For 
example, Zavadil et al. (2007) found evidence of ex-ante moral hazard in the Dutch 
car insurance market. They define ex-ante moral hazard as agents having less 
incentive to reduce the probability of an accident. Although there is a theoretical 
possibility of ex-ante moral hazard in health care, some literature (Zweifel and 
Manning, 2000; Kenkel, 2000) suggested that it might have little consequence for 
health insurance markets, since risk aversion may also interact with the effect of 
insurance coverage on preventive activities. For example, even though the 
monetary component of health care access is covered by insurance, risk-averse 
individuals may still suffer from utility losses from ill-health, so this may dampen 
any incentive to reduce preventive effort for those who have insurance. 
The theoretical debate on the extent to which ex-ante moral hazard impacts on 
health care expenditures in the presence of insurance helps formulate hypotheses 
to be subjected to empirical scrutiny. For example, one could test whether health 
insurance affects people’s behaviour to the extent that they undertake less 
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preventive activities to maintain health. There is a large empirical literature that 
has attempted to answer this question. However, this literature provides 
inconsistent conclusions. Some papers (Kenkel, 2000; Courbage and Coulon, 2004; 
etc.) are in line with the view that insurance induces little ex-ante moral hazard, 
but others (Cherkin et al., 1990; Dave and Kaestner, 2009; Yilma et al., 2012) 
provide evidence of the existence of substantial ex-ante moral hazard. Section 3.2 
will review and debate these findings. 
    The work presented here examines whether there is evidence of ex-ante moral 
hazard following the introduction of a public health insurance system in China, 
and whether implementing nearly universal coverage led to a decrease in 
individual preventive behaviour prior to illness. Since a reduction in preventive 
efforts will increase the probability of ill-health or disease, the existence of ex-ante 
moral hazard will increase health care expenditures. As a consequence, there will 
be an external cost on society. As an upper-middle income country (World Bank, 
20155), China has not reached the same level of health care spending as high-
income countries. Health expenditure in 2013 was 5.6% of GDP, well below the 
OECD average of 9.3%. Moreover, since the reform has been officially in place 
since 2009, this chapter could provide some policy implications if the government 
wants to improve the efficiency of the programme.  In addition, the government 
has equity justifications for providing effective insurance. Thus, it is of great 
importance to analyse whether health care spending is used effectively.  
The paper is divided into six sections. Section 3.2 is a review of the existing 
empirical literature. Section 3.3 introduces the data employed in this study. Section 
                                                     
5 Source from: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-
bank-country-and-lending-groups 
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3.4 presents the empirical strategy. Following the methodology, results are 
presented in section 3.5. Discussion and conclusions are given in the sixth, and 
final section.  
3.2   Literature review of empirical studies 
This section presents a review of empirical studies on ex-ante moral hazard in 
health insurance markets as listed in Table 10. We searched for relevant literature 
using the key words “ex-ante moral hazard; health insurance” in the library search 
engine from University of York, E-resource like EconLit, Health Management 
Information Consortium, and Google Scholar. In addition, I also read empirical 
studies from the reference lists of related literature. Studies are summarised below 
if :1) these are closely related to the topic 2) they can inform the methodology of 
this study; 3) they have more than 20 citations. Testing whether there is ex-ante 
moral hazard requires a test of the pure effect of insurance coverage on individuals’ 
preventive behaviours. An ideal scenario would be to ensure nothing else could 
affect changes in preventive behaviours except insurance. In this case, a test of ex-
ante moral hazard would consist of simply comparing preventive efforts in a 
population before and after taking up insurance.  
However, in reality this requirement is seldom satisfied. One significant 
empirical challenge is individual unobservable heterogeneity. For instance, an 
individual’s risk preferences are unobserved and these could be positively 
correlated with both preventive efforts and insurance coverage. Risk-averse 
individuals may exert more preventive efforts and at the same time be more likely 
to buy insurance when it becomes available. In this case, the incentive for changing 
preventive efforts may be more related to risk preferences rather than a change in 
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the status of insurance coverage. Thus, a failure to control for risk preference could 
lead to biased estimates of the effect of ex-ante moral hazard. To overcome the 
problem of individual unobserved heterogeneity, strategies such as randomized 
controlled trials (Manning et al., 1987), natural experiments, instrumental variable 
(IV) techniques (Courbage and Coulon ,2004; Kelly and Markowitz, 2009), 
propensity score matching methods (Yilma et al. 2012), structural models (Yilma 
et al., 2012; Courbage and Coulon, 2004; Kelly and Markowitz, 2009) and 
difference in difference methods (Dave and Kaestner, 2009; Preux, 2011; 
Ghislandi et al., 2014) have been employed. Table 10 presents a summary of the 
key literature in this area.  
Keeler and Rolph (1988) adopted data from a randomized controlled trial, the 
RAND health insurance experiment, to investigate whether there is ex-ante moral 
hazard. They used well care visits as the proxy for preventive behaviour and 
compared the number of “well care” visits between different coinsurance groups. 
Well care visits refer to the preventive visits that individuals do physical exam in 
health care facilities. Their results showed that people with free medical insurance 
make fewer well care visits than people with co-payments, which provided 
evidence of ex-ante moral hazard.  
Roddy et al. (1986) explored ex-ante moral hazard in the US insurance market 
taking advantage of a natural experiment. In July 1977, the United Mine Workers 
of America (UMVA) health plan changed via the introduction of a 40% co-
payment requirement which affected the insurance coverage of beneficiaries. 
Before the reform, UMVA members and their families had been provided with full 
coverage health insurance without a deductible. In December 1997, there was a 
strike that led this coinsurance being suspended. Starting in March 1978, the health 
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plan changed to a $5 co-payment for outpatient visits and prescription drugs.  They 
considered three periods in their study: 1) A baseline period of full coverage from 
January 1977 to July 1977; 2) The first year of 5% co-payment from April 1978 
to March 1979; 3) The second year of 5% co-payment from April 1979 to March 
1980. They used the number of visits for preventive care as a proxy of preventive 
activities and compared the demand for preventive care among three periods. They 
identified a 25% fall in preventive visits in the first $5 co-payment per visit period 
compared to 40% coinsurance period and a 28% fall in the second $5 co-payment 
period. The authors considered that these reductions are indicative of ex-ante 
moral hazard. However, using co-payment as a proxy for insurance coverage status 
makes it difficult to separate ex-ante moral hazard from ex-post moral hazard. This 
strategy has rarely been used in recent literature. 
Although natural experiments provide an opportunity to study the effect of 
insurance on preventive behaviours, the disadvantages are considerable. First, they 
fail to control the time trend and other factors that could also affect preventive 
efforts. For example, the number of hospitals and health centres might have 
changed during the experimental period. These would influence the utilization of 
health care services if not appropriately controlled for. Thus, a causal effect of 
insurance will not be identified in this case. Moreover, the use of the co-payment 
as an indicator of the change in price of health services in the early literature might 
be more related to ex-post moral hazard rather than ex-ante moral hazard, because 
the requirement for co-payment happens after using health care facilities which is 
supposed to be ex-post. More recent literature seldom adopts this proxy to measure 
ex-ante moral hazard (Courbage and Coulon, 2004; Stanciole, 2008; Kelly and 
Markowitz 2009). 
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    Recent studies have started to use other approaches to examine ex-ante moral 
hazard in health insurance markets, such as instrumental variable (IV), system 
equations methods, difference in difference, and matching methods. In particular, 
they have started to estimate ex-ante moral hazard by testing several behaviours 
of preventive effort under insurance coverage. Such behaviours include smoking 
behaviour, alcohol consumption, effort in exercising and obesity (Courbage and 
Coulon 2004; Bhattacharya and Packalen, 2008; Stanciole, 2008). Courbage and 
Coulon (2004) tested for ex-ante moral hazard using the year 2000 wave of the 
British Household Panel Survey in the context of UK private insurance system. 
Two proxies for the indication of preventive care used were the frequency of 
exercise and being a smoker. Initial results from a simple probit model could not 
reject the null hypothesis of no evidence for ex-ante moral hazard. However, this 
result could be subject to bias due to endogeneity because insurance status could 
correlate with both health behaviours and the error term that includes the effect of 
risk preference. Nevertheless, their results were validated by further implementing 
an IV strategy. They instrumented private medical insurance choice by choice of 
political party support. Results from IV estimates confirmed that there was no clear 
evidence of ex-ante moral hazard.   
    Using data from the 1993-2002 Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance system in 
the US, Kelly and Markowitz (2009) used IV techniques to investigate whether 
insurance affects the probability of being obese. They regressed body mass on 
insurance status and other control variables and instrument insurance status with 
the percentage of each state’s workforce employed in firms of different sizes to 
address endogeneity bias. Their findings showed that having insurance is 
associated with a higher body mass and that there exists a positive correlation 
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between having insurance and being overweight, but they found no evidence 
showing that insurance affects the probability of being obese.  
Another approach is to use system equations methods, which usually involves a 
structural equation for health insurance coverage and reduced form equations for 
lifestyle behaviours. Stanciole (2008) inspected ex-ante moral hazard in the 
context of the US market by adopting the U.S Panel Study on Income Dynamics 
from 1999-2003. He estimated a system of multivariate probit equations and found 
that among lifestyle choices such as heavy smoking, heavy drinking, lack of 
exercise and obesity, ex-ante moral hazard was only identified from the effect of 
insurance coverage on an increase in the probability of being obese. Using the 
same methodology, Khan and Kaestner (2008) found evidence of ex-ante moral 
hazard in people in public programmes from the US but limited evidence for 
employer sponsored and Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) coverage.  
The difference in difference (DID) method is used to compare a change over 
time in a control group to the same change in a treatment group. The treatment 
effect on the outcome of interest is based on the difference between the changes in 
the control and treatment groups. Using DID, Dave and Kaestner (2009) presented 
evidence of ex-ante moral hazard in the context of Medicare in the United States. 
Their results revealed that Medicare beneficiaries were associated with an increase 
in unhealthy behaviours (e.g. smoking, physical activities, alcohol participation 
etc.). They further adopted difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach 
as a robustness check. This approach introduces another difference between 
interactions of uninsured status and age dummies for any differential trends 
between individuals who are insured versus uninsured. Results from DDD are very 
similar to the simpler DD method in this study.  
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Preux (2011) adopted data from the US Health and Retirement Study in a DID 
study and found anticipatory ex-ante moral hazard. Individuals were found to 
reduce investments in healthy lifestyle (e.g. physical activity, smoking and 
drinking) before being insured if they expected to be insured in the future. 
Propensity score matching is another method used in the literature to overcome 
a lack of randomization in observational studies to ensure treated and control 
groups have similar characteristics. It allows for a comparison of control and 
treatment groups that have a similar ex-ante probability of participating in the 
treatment. Yilma et al. (2012) employed this method to test for the presence of ex-
ante moral hazard with reference to malaria prevention in Ghana. They used a 
panel data in the Brong Ahafo regions and found that ex-ante moral hazard is 
present, especially when the level of effort and cost required for prevention is high.  
    In summary, in order to estimate whether there is ex-ante moral hazard in health 
insurance markets, an empirical difficulty is to deal with the endogeneity problem 
of insurance status because insurance status is both correlated with unobserved 
risk preference and health preventive behaviours. Existing empirical studies 
provide various strategies to overcome this problem, providing several options for 
identifying a causal effect. Interestingly, a large literature is within the context of 
high-income countries with compulsory health insurance programs, and very few 
papers investigate ex-ante moral hazard in the context of voluntary health 
insurance systems. This paper further contributes to the existing literature by 
estimating whether ex-ante moral hazard existing in the Chinese health insurance 
system in which enrolment is voluntary
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Table 10: Table of empirical literature on health insurance and ex-ante moral hazard 
Literature Data Methodology 
Preventive 
behaviours being 
tested 
Control Variables Results 
Roddy et al. 
(1986) 
The United Mine 
Workers of America 
Health and 
Retirement Funds’ 
Computerized claims 
system 
Natural experiment: Compare 
preventive care utilization 
between difference co-payment 
groups 
Preventive care None Ex-ante moral hazard 
Keeler and 
Rolph (1988) 
RAND Health 
Insurance 
Experiment 
Randomised controlled trial: 
Compare well care visits 
between different coinsurance 
groups 
Well care visits None Ex-ante moral hazard 
Cherkin et al. 
(1990) 
Data from 
Washington State 
enrolees in a health 
maintenance 
organization 
Natural experiment: 
Compare utilization data 
between enrolees with co-
payment and without co-
payment 
Preventive care None 
Ex-ante moral 
hazard 
Yilma et al. 
(2012) 
Panel data of 400 
households in Brong 
Ahafo region 
Propensity-adjusted household 
fixed effects model 
No. of members 
who slept under 
net 
Age, gender, wealth, 
wage, employment 
status, religion 
Ex-ante moral hazard  
Courbage and 
Coulon (2004) 
2000 British 
Household Panel 
Survey 
Instrumental variable, Probit 
model 
The frequency of 
exercising, and 
being a smoker 
Age, gender, 
education, subjective 
well-being, income 
There was no 
evidence of ex-ante 
moral hazard. 
Kelly and 
Markowitz 
(2009) 
Behavioural Risk 
Factor Surveillance 
System 
Regress body weight on health 
insurance status and other 
control variables with 
instrumental variable 
techniques to address 
endogeneity of health insurance 
Obesity 
Age, gender, 
education, ethnicity, 
race, number of 
children, income 
marital status, food 
price 
Ex-ante moral hazard 
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Table 10: (Continued) 
Literature Data Methodology 
Preventive 
behaviours being 
tested 
Control Variables Results 
Stanciole (2008) 
U.S. Panel Study of 
Income dynamics 
(1999-2003) 
Multivariate probit model of 
individual choice of insurance 
coverage and lifestyle choices 
Heavy smoking, 
heavy drinking, 
lack of exercise 
and obesity 
Age, gender, 
income, marital 
status, kids, chronic 
disease, education, 
race, employment 
status, living area 
Health insurance has 
significant incentive 
effects on lifestyle 
choices, increasing the 
propensity to heavy 
smoking, lack of 
exercise and obesity 
and decreasing the 
propensity to heavy 
drinking. 
Khan and 
Kaestner (2008) 
Medicare current 
Beneficiary Survey 
(2000-2005) 
Multivariable regression 
models 
Exercise, weight, 
diet, alcohol 
consumption, and 
smoking 
 
They find limited 
evidence of ex-ante 
moral hazard with 
employer sponsored 
and HMO coverage. 
Spenkuch 
(2012) 
Data from Seguro 
Popular Experiment 
in Mexico 
Least squares estimates 
Preventive care 
(flu shot, pelvic, 
pap smear, 
mammogram, eye 
exam) 
Age, gender, wealth, 
employment status, 
location type, 
number of doctors, 
Self-rated health, 
BMI, chronic disease 
They find evidence of 
ex-ante moral hazard 
Tavares (2014) 
4th Portuguese 
National Health 
Survey (2005) 
Multivariate Probit regressions 
physical activity, 
eating healthy 
snacks, dirking 
alcohol between 
meals 
Age, gender, 
income, education, 
family size, married, 
employment status, 
chronic disease 
There is evidence of 
ex-ante moral hazard 
in deciding to do sports 
and eating healthy 
snacks. 
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Table 10: (Continued) 
Literature Data Methodology 
Preventive 
behaviours being 
tested 
Control Variables Results 
Dave and 
Kaestner (2009) 
First eight waves of 
the Health and 
Retirement Study 
(HRS) 
Difference-in- deference 
estimates; and difference-in- 
difference-in-difference 
estimates 
Exercise, smoking 
and alcohol use 
Age, marital status, 
employment, 
household size, 
number of living 
parents, assets, total 
years worked and 
year dummy 
variables 
Obtaining health 
insurance reduces 
prevention and 
increase unhealthy 
behaviours among 
elderly men. 
Preux (2011) 
Nine waves of the 
US Health and 
Retirement Study 
Difference-in- deference 
estimates; and difference-in- 
difference-in-difference 
estimates 
Physical activity, 
smoking, and 
drinking 
Mobility, gender, 
race, marital status, 
education, 
employment status, 
years of working, 
wealth, self-assessed 
health 
If uninsured 
individuals expect to 
be covered in the 
future, they will reduce 
their investment in 
healthy lifestyle 
already before being 
insured. 
Ghislandi et al. 
(2014) 
Thai Health and 
Welfare Survey 
Difference-in- deference 
estimates  
Smoking, 
drinking, drinking 
and driving, 
annual check-up 
Age, gender, 
education, out-of-
pocket expenditure 
They find no evidence 
of ex-ante moral 
hazard. 
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3.3   Data 
The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) is used to investigate the 
extent of ex-ante moral hazard in China. It is an on-going survey, which aims at 
examining the impact of social and economic transformation on individuals’ 
health behaviours, health status and nutrition. It is a longitudinal survey conducted 
every 2 to 3 years. The sample size—selected by a multistage, random cluster 
process—is representative, containing approximately 4,400 households with 
26,000 individuals across 9 provinces, each with a different geography, level of 
economic development, available public resources, and status on key health 
indicators. It takes 3 consecutive days for each interview to collect information 
for the four component surveys: household; nutrition; community and adult. 
Survey questions include information on household and individual economic, 
demographic, and social factors.  
 We use waves 2006 and 2009 in the analysis. Wave 2006 is before the 
officially launched reform and wave 2009, immediately following the reform.  
We investigate all individuals who are eligible for the three types of public 
insurance schemes. There are 4,997 observations in each wave in the original 
dataset. First, we dropped observations on survey respondents who are under 18 
because they are too young to make economic decisions. We further deleted 
observations that are covered by commercial insurance plans and observations 
who had public insurance before wave 2006 because their insurance status does 
not change from pre to post reform. Furthermore, observations with missing 
values for age, marital status, education, household income, height, and weight 
are dropped from the study. Finally, we only keep individuals observed in both 
2006 and 2009 to ensure the comparability of preventive behaviours between the 
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two waves. This leaves 2,918 observations in each wave on which to undertake 
analysis. None of these 2,918 individuals were insured in wave 2006. 2766 
changed their insurance status from uninsured to insured in wave 2009, while 152 
of them remained uninsured in wave 2009. A possible reason for explaining them 
not joining the schemes could be due to the low enforcement level of local 
government (Qin and Lu, 2014). Or they simply chose not to join.  
 
Table 11: Comparable data descriptive statistics 
     Control Treatment 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Wave2006: 
Smoking  0.276 0.449 0.276 0.448 
Veg fruit (in grams) 169.735 366.476 227.625 619.763 
Overweight  0.199 0.399 0.237 0.527 
Obesity 0.106 0.308 0.086 0.281 
Preventive care 0.022 0.146 0.013 0.114 
Number of cigarettes 
per day 
4.216 8.427 4.724 9.465 
Time for exercise per 
day (in minutes) 
7.466 42.813 5.579 26.864 
Age 49.820 14.149 49.448 15.357 
Male 0.440 0.496 0.461 0.500 
Education (in yrs) 6.255 4.114 7.579 4.300 
Household income 
per capita per year (in 
RMB) 
17947.380 27314.140 25012.600 42856.84 
Married 0.865 0.342 0.855 0.353 
Presently working 0.657 0.475 0.678 0.469 
Chronic disease 0.092 0.289 0.118 0.324 
Urban 0.198 0.399 0.204 0.404 
Number of 
Observations 
2,766  152  
 
Table 11 illustrates comparable descriptive statistics for the sample used for 
estimation in wave 2006. “Veg fruit” represents individuals’ vegetable and fruit 
consumption within 3 days in grams. Overweight and obesity are dummy 
variables generated from BMI which is a measure based on individuals’ weight 
in relation to their height to see whether they have healthy weight. It is calculated 
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as the weight divided by square of the height. An individual is defined to be 
overweight if his/her BMI is between 25 and 30, while s/he is defined to be obese 
if his/her BMI is bigger than 30. Preventive care is also a dummy variable 
indicating if an individual visited for preventive care in the past 4 weeks. The 
comparative descriptives tells that people who remained uninsured (treatment 
group) ate more vegetables and fruit, were more likely to be overweight, less 
likely to be obese, took less preventive care visits, smoke more cigarettes per day, 
took less time for exercise. In addition, the average year of education for control 
group (people who changed from being uninsured to insured) is 6.3 years, while 
the number for treatment group is 7.6 years. Individuals in treatment group earned 
more household income per capita, and were more likely to have chronic disease 
thus less healthy.  
3.4    Empirical strategy to test ex-ante moral hazard 
To estimate the effects of insurance status on an individual’s health behaviours, 
we choose all available proxies for preventive behaviours in our dataset that have 
been used in previous literature, including smoking status, number of cigarettes 
per day, vegetable and fruit consumption, overweight, obesity, preventive care 
visits, time spent exercising.  
Lifestyle decisions like smoking, veg fruit consumption and exercise, are 
widely used because the literature has suggested that they may affect future health. 
They can be seen as investments, or a disinvestment in the case of smoking, in 
health production. A study from McGinnis (1993) found that “tobacco smoking, 
poor diet and physical inactivity, and misuse of alcohol have been estimated to be 
responsible for 900,000 deaths annually — nearly 40% of total yearly mortality 
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in the United States”. Preventive care visits in our dataset include general physical 
tests and receiving different types of vaccine injections.  A concern of using 
preventive care visits as a proxy of preventive behaviour is that preventive care 
visit is also related to ex-post moral hazard. This may be less of a concern in China 
because most preventive care services are not included in health insurance plans 
and, thus, it might be reasonable to consider such visits as a preventive behaviour 
that an individual makes to avoid future disease.  
Overweight and obesity are outcomes of having an unhealthy lifestyle. Since 
body weight can be lowered with proper diet and exercise, overweight, obesity 
and their associated health conditions are preventable and not directly related to 
the utilization of health care. Even though obesity is the output of an unhealthy 
lifestyle, it can be used as a proxy for many lifestyle choices. Kelly and Markowitz 
(2009) argue that body weight and obesity are desirable outcomes in their study 
of ex-ante moral hazard. 
Since we only observe survey data before and after the reform, random 
assignment of observations to a control and treatment group is not available for 
the study. Instead, assignment to treatment cannot be assumed random as 
individuals are likely to self-select into insurance status. The difference-in-
difference approach may also suffer from a self-selection problem because the 
Urban Basic Medical Insurance (UBMI) and New Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(NCMS) are voluntary programmes, and it is not possible to control for people 
who chose to join the program. That is, we cannot assume that the take-up of 
insurance is exogenous to individual’s behaviour. Thus, difference-in-difference 
methods do not allow us to examine the pure causal effect of universal coverage 
on health behaviours due to this endogeneity problem. Some literature deals with 
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this problem by using a system of equations regressions. However, it is not 
plausible here due to the small sample size we have at our disposal. 
Instead we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data and use matching 
methods. This makes it possible to deal with the self-selection into voluntary 
programmes by matching individual’s characteristics across a control and 
treatment group prior to the reform at t-1 (2006). The basic identifying assumption 
is that, conditional on t-1 characteristics, the outcomes we observe are 
independent of the selection mechanism into treatment. 
    3.4.1 Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity score matching (PSM) has been used in previous studies to control 
for observed differences in characteristics between treated and control individuals 
by ensuring common support and balance across pre-treatment covariates.  It is a 
means for dealing with selection bias in observational studies to identify causal 
effects. Proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score is a 
matching method used to match individuals within a control group to treated 
individuals. Matching is undertaken on the basis of the closeness of the relative 
propensity of receiving treatment for individuals in the control and treated groups. 
After matching all background information across individuals in the treatment and 
control group, assumed to be correlated with both the outcome and treatment 
assignment, the difference in outcomes between the two groups identifies the 
treatment effect (in this case public insurance status). The approach is useful 
under the assumption that selection into insurance is based on observable 
characteristics. 
There are different matching algorithms that can be used, such as nearest 
neighbour matching, calliper, and kernel density matching (Caliendo and 
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Kopeinig, 2008). Nearest neighbour (NN) matching is the most straightforward 
matching estimator. It matches the individual from the control group to a given 
individual in the treatment group with the closest propensity score. The propensity 
score is the estimated probability of an individual being treated obtained from a 
probit or logit regression of treatment status against covariates for both control 
and treated individuals. Calliper matching is useful when the closet remaining 
neighbour to a treated individual is far away. In such circumstances matching may 
lead to bias since treated and control individuals may not be sufficiently similar 
across characteristics and hence have divergent propensity scores. In this case, 
caliper matching imposes a tolerance level, or a caliper, on the maximum 
propensity score distance. This improves matching and reduces bias but is 
potentially at the cost of removing individuals from the treated group for whom 
close matches within the defined calliper for the control group cannot be found.  
Kernel density matching is a non-parametric matching estimator that uses 
weighted averages of all individuals in the control group to construct the 
counterfactual outcome for treated individuals, with weights depending on the 
distance between the treated individuals and the controls.  Individuals from the 
control group who are far away from the treated on the basis of a propensity score 
receive a lower weight than those close to the treated individual. 
Since matching locates observations in a control group and pairs them with 
observations in a treated group, this implies that it is better to have more 
observations in the control group relative to the treated group. This allows for a 
closer match to treated individuals. However, there are fewer observations (n=152) 
in the control group in our sample. In order to ensure we can find matched 
observations from a “control” group for our “treated” group, we reverse the two 
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groups. In other words, the control group in our analysis is now defined as 
observations who change insurance status from being uninsured to being insured. 
Accordingly, the treated group includes individuals who remain uninsured in both 
waves. An implication is the interpretation of our results should be read in reverse, 
but it does not affect the intuition from our results for testing for ex-ante moral 
hazard. By reversing the usual treatment and control groups, we are testing 
whether individuals who remain uninsured (new treatment group), have different 
(more positive) health behaviours to individuals who take-up insurance (new 
control group).  
There are two key assumptions using PSM. First, the assignment to treatment 
(in this case not taking up public insurance) is independent of outcomes given the 
propensity score. This is known as the conditional independence assumption. It is 
often written as p(T ⊥ y|𝑝(𝑥))  where 𝑝(𝑥)  is the propensity score, based on 
characteristics x, T is treatment assignment and y is the outcome. In addition to 
being used as proxies for preventive behaviours, health behaviours such as 
smoking, time for exercise and etc. are often used as proxies for risk preference 
in empirical studies. We match on these proxies for risk preference using pre-
reform data (2006) together with socio-economic variables. This satisfies the 
above conditional independence assumption because individuals in the control 
and treated groups have identical/similar propensity to join the insurance 
programs after matching on both general socio-economic characteristics and risk 
preferences. Second, there is common support over estimated propensities. Our 
empirical strategy satisfies this assumption as shown in Figure 14. Those Extreme 
observations are off support and are needed to be thrown out of the analysis 
because we cannot find suitable controls for them.  
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Figure 14: Graph showing common support before PSM 
 
 
To implement PSM, we first calculate the propensity score using information 
from 2006 (wave t-1). The propensity score is the probability of assignment to 
treatment conditional on all covariates observed prior to treatment (note that post-
treatment variables are not included as they might be contaminated by the 
treatment).  
P(X)=Pr{𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒6 = 1| 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1} 
In the second step, we use multiple matches to each treated individual, using 
nearest neighbour matching. The matching is undertaken with replacement, which 
means each observation in the control group could be used multiple times to 
match to observations in the treatment group. Moreover, we define a calliper of 
0.0001 which means the maximum propensity score difference is 0.0001. The 
                                                     
6 Note that the control and treatment groups are reversed 
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
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covariates we used for matching including age, education, gender, marital status, 
working status, living area, chronic diseases, log household income and risk 
preference proxies. Proxies for risk preferences include: smoking status, 
vegetable and fruit consumption, being obese and time spent for exercise per day 
and preventive visits. All are measured prior to the reform at t-1 (2006). After 
matching, each individual in the treatment and control group have very similar 
propensity to enter into one of the three public insurance schemes. It is important 
to match risk preference in wave 2006 to control for the endogeneity problem of 
the update of insurance status, to ensure that following matching the distributions 
of risk preference in the control and treatment group are balanced. This ensures 
that observed differences in the behavioural outcomes can more reliably be 
ascribed to changes in behaviour due to changes in insurance statues rather than 
underlying risk preferences. Following matching, there are 2,899 observations 
available from which outcomes in wave 2009 can be analysed, 19 observations 
were out of common support (3 in the treated group and 16 in the control group).           
Table 12 shows the results from testing pre-treatment balance following PSM. 
The null hypothesis of the t test is that variables for matching have the same mean 
within control and treatment groups. The higher the p value, the better the balance 
between control and treatment groups. We are able to achieve good balance for 
some variables like age, education, urban, but not for variable like smoking, veg 
and fruit consumption, or presently working.  
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Table 12: Pre-treatment imbalance testing results after PSM for wave 2006 
     Mean t-test p>|t| 
Variable Control Treated  
Smoking 0.26 0.35 0.088 
Veg fruit 152.76 188.47 0.389 
Overweight 0.20 0.23 0.405 
Obesity 0.09 0.06 0.497 
Preventive care 0.01 0.02 0.512 
Time for exercise 
per day in 
minutes 
5.35 8.04 0.490 
Age 49.65 49.80 0.928 
Male 0.43 0.46 0.627 
Education (in 
yrs) 
7.31 7.46 0.768 
Ln Household 
income per capita 
per year (in 
RMB) 
8.50 8.40 0.477 
Married 0.88 0.90 0.569 
Presently 
working 
0.66 0.72 0.295 
Chronic disease 0.09 0.12 0.411 
Urban 0.21 0.20 0.765 
No. of obs. 2763 136  
 
    In the third step, we estimate the average treatment effects on treated (ATET) 
given the propensity score. The ATET is the causal effect of universal coverage 
on the outcome of an individuals’ health related behaviours. Results are reported 
in the section 3.5. 
    3.4.2   Coarsened Exact Matching 
As an alternative to PSM we also apply coarsened exact matching (CEM). 
Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) is a monotonic imbalance-reducing matching 
method that is designed to improve the estimation of causal effects (Iacus et al., 
2011). As can be seen from Table 12, PSM improves balance across pre-treatment 
covariates for some variables, but not others, notably smoking status, working 
status and veg and fruit consumption. CEM is an exact matching algorithm which 
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is likely to lead to better balance across covariates. Therefore, we apply CEM as 
the main matching method and report most of the results based on this method. 
CEM and PSM have similar aims to other matching methods, which is to find at 
least one non-treated (control) observation with similar observable characteristics 
for every treated case. However, CEM is considered to be a faster and easier 
matching method which requires fewer assumptions and possesses more attractive 
statistical properties for many applications than other matching methods 
(Blackwell et al., 2009). The method performs exact matching for discrete 
variables, and coarsens continuous variables into intervals or groups prior to 
performing exact matching on the coarsened variables. Since exact matching is 
performed across discrete and coarsened variables, an advantage is that it creates 
balance across variables. 
CEM benefits from two features: 1) the balance between treated and control 
group is chosen ex-ante by the user because the user chooses the interval level of 
balance (that is the width of the groups for continuous variables in which 
matching takes place). Except for health behaviours, we wish to match as many 
observable characteristics as possible, so that the difference of the outcome 
(health related behaviours) between control and treated group is due to insurance 
status. 2) Since the approach coarsens variables like age and educational years 
into groups and perform exact matching, adjusting the imbalance on one variable 
has no effect on other variables (Blackwell et al., 2009). On the other hand, PSM 
often requires users to trade off among different matching logarithms and to check 
the resulting balance, which may improve for some variables but get worse for 
others.  
106 
 
In practice, for dummy variables like gender the approach performs exact 
matching. Generally, CEM is considered a better matching method than other 
traditional matching strategies, since it will reduce the imbalance of the dataset 
with smaller variance and bias (Ho et al., 2007). However, because criteria for 
coarsened exact matching are stricter and hence more difficult to locate, CEM 
will end up with a smaller sample size than the propensity score method. For 
example, finding exact matches is more difficult than finding approximate 
matches using PSM. 
The implementation of CEM includes two steps. In the first step, the control 
and treatment groups are defined. Here we are interested in the effect of the reform 
in insurance market launched in 2008. However, since we reverse the treatment 
and control group, the treatment group comprises those people who remain 
uninsured. We start with exactly the same sample size and also the same set of 
covariates used for matching as in PSM. By matching observations according to 
a wide set of potential confounders in wave t-1, we wish to control for other 
variables that are both correlated with health insurance and health behaviour. We 
perform CEM on age (coarsened into 5 groups,16-36, 36-55, 55-75,75-95, and 95 
above), years of education (coarsened into 4 groups, 0-6, 6-12, 12-18, and 18 
above), gender, marital status, working status, living area, chronic diseases, log 
household income, smoking, being obese, vegetable and fruit consumption 
(coarsened into 2 groups, 0-600, and 600 above), and time for exercise per day 
(coarsened into 5 groups, 0-18, 18-36, 36-54, 54-72, and 72 above). After 
processing, there are 1623 observations in wave 2009 available for analysis. 
Table 13 shows the results for pre-treatment imbalance after CEM. Although 
we lost more data than from PSM, the imbalance is systematically reduced with 
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CEM as evidenced for the following variables, like obesity, smoking status, 
preventive care. The null hypothesis of the t test is that variables for matching 
have the same mean within control and treatment groups. The P values in CEM 
are generally bigger than the ones in PSM, which indicates that the balance has 
been improved after performing CEM. 
 
Table 13: Pre-treatment imbalance testing results after CEM for wave 2006 
     Mean t-test p>|t| 
Variable Control Treated  
Smoking 0.24 0.24 1.000 
Veg fruit 168.66 200.76 0.382 
Obesity 0.05 0.05 1.000 
Time for exercise 
per day in 
minutes 4.93 4.96 0.989 
Age 48.71 49.48 0.546 
Male 0.44 0.44 1.000 
Education (in 
yrs) 7.14 7.34 0.592 
Ln Household 
income per capita 
per year 8.46 8.54 0.384 
Married 0.89 0.89 1.000 
Presently 
working 0.71 0.71 1.000 
Chronic disease 0.10 0.10 1.000 
Urban 0.21 0.21 1.000 
No. of obs. 1492 131  
 
In the second step we implement normal Logit or OLS regression by using the 
matching weight from the CEM.  Weights need to be incorporated into the 
analysis because we match with replacement and hence many control individuals 
can be matched to a given treated individual. We estimate: 
𝐻𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑖 + 𝒙′𝒊𝛿2 + 𝜈𝑖                                                              (3.1) 
Where 𝐻𝑖 indicates individual’s health preventive behaviours. If 𝐻𝑖  is a binary 
variable, we implement normal logit regression. However, if 𝐻𝑖 is a continuous 
108 
 
variable, we implement OLS regression. 𝐼𝑖  is a dummy variable indicating 
whether an individual I is enrolled in one the public insurance schemes. 𝒙′𝒊 is a 
vector of variables containing individual characteristics (e.g. age, gender, whether 
having chronic diseases, income, etc.),  𝜈𝑖 is the error term. 𝛿1 , and  𝛿2  are 
corresponding parameters to be estimated. 
Table 14 illustrates the situation of data loss from both PSM and CEM. It 
suggests that data lost is mostly from the control group (98.38%). This will have 
little impact on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) since the 
ATET is defined on treated individuals for whom matches are formed. The vast 
majority of treated individuals have matches.  Although CEM improves the 
balance of the data across treated and control groups, it also suffers from losing 
more observations than Propensity Score Matching (PSM). Based on this 
vulnerability, we also report the results from PSM for sensitivity analysis for the 
main results. In total, CEM produces 131 treated individual matched with 1492 
controls, whilst PSM produces 136 treated individuals matched with 2763 
controls. 
 
Table 14: Sample size after performing PSM and CEM 
 Whole sample size Number of observations in 
control group 
Number of observations in 
treated group 
  Data loss  Data loss   Data loss 
Original 2,918  2,766  152  
PSM 2,899 19 2,763 3 136 16 
CEM 1,623 1295 1,492 1,274 131 21 
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3.5 Results 
Table 15 illustrates the overall average treatment effect (ATET) for the 
outcomes we are interested in. We have reported results from both the PSM 
method and CEM method. The two methods do not give very different results. As 
we can see from Table 15, ATETs are statistically insignificant in most outcomes 
except for “time for exercise per day”. Generally, individuals not entering into 
public health insurance spend slightly more time exercising. In other words, 
participation in the public health insurance scheme will lead on average to 14.35 
minutes less exercise per day, which indicates evidence of ex-ante moral hazard. 
The result from PSM is very similar for this health preventive proxy but we find 
a slightly larger effect. However, we find no significant effect on an individual’s 
smoking behaviour, number of cigarettes per day, being overweight, being obese, 
and preventive care visits. Together this indicates public health insurance 
participation has a very limited effect on reshaping individual’s health behaviours. 
An explanation for this result is that some of the health behaviours such as 
smoking are quite addictive, for which it takes more time to change behaviour. 
Exercise takes less time to take up and this shows in our short run analysis. 
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Table 15: Results for ex-ante moral hazard from pooled sample 
 Coarsening Exact Matching Propensity Score Matching 
Variable 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P value 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P value 
Smoking 
0.30 
(0.20) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.135 
0.29 
(0.06) 
0.263 
Smoking(male) 
0.44 
(0.28) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
0.117 
0.64 
(0.10) 
0.536 
Veg and fruit consumption 
-45.71 
(37.52) 
-45.71 
(37.52) 
0.223 
-13.8947 
(37.96) 
0.674 
Overweight 
0.01 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.962 
0.27 
(0.05) 
0.469 
Obesity 
0.01 
(0.36) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.977 
0.10 
(0.03) 
0.836 
Preventive care 
0.28 
(0.44) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.521 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.436 
No. of cigarette per day 
0.71 
(0.83) 
0.71 
(0.83) 
0.393 
5.05 
(1.31) 
0.346 
Time for exercise per day 
(in minutes) 
14.35** 
(4.68) 
14.35** 
(4.68) 
0.003 
14.78** 
(4.81) 
0.004 
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
     
    Health behaviours may vary for different income groups. For example, low-
income individuals may do less exercise because they do more labour intensive 
work in general. Similarly, it has been shown empirically that people with low 
income generally smoke more (Sobal and stunkard, 1989). Therefore, it is 
sensible to divide the sample according to income level in order to investigate 
heterogeneity in effects across income groups. Accordingly, ATETs are 
calculated separately for two income groups (a relatively low income group and 
a relatively high income group) employing CEM alone.  
The cut-off point we use is the median of per capita household income (RMB 
9617.167) in our sample.  Results are reported in Table 16.  The results are similar 
to Table 15. Participation in public health insurance has no effect on an 
individual’s smoking behaviour for both income groups. One interesting result is 
the average probability to be overweight for high-income individuals is reduced 
by 1.1%. In contrast, there is no significant adjustment for low-income individuals. 
Reductions in the time for exercise per day are observed for both high income and 
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low-income groups. On average, high-income individuals spend 12.64 minutes 
less after participating in the program.  
 
Table 16:  ATETs by income groups 
 Low Income  
Obs=811 
High income  
Obs=812 
Variable 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P value 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. 
Err.) 
P value 
Smoking 
0.31 
(0.26) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.236 
0.47 
(0.31) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.131 
Veg and fruit 
consumption 
1.13 
(44.08) 
1.13 
(44.08) 
0.979 
-5.80 
(40.80) 
-5.80 
(40.80) 
0.887 
Overweight 
-0.0043 
(0.2997) 
-0.0008 
(0.0575) 
0.989 
0.63** 
(0.31) 
0.11** 
(0.52) 
0.037 
Obesity 
-0.25 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.745 
-0.18 
(0.63) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.777 
Preventive care 
0.29 
(1.10) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
0.791 
0.30 
(0.65) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.644 
No. of cigarette 
per day 
0.04 
(1.31) 
0.04 
(1.31) 
0.977 
1.94* 
(1.12) 
1.94* 
(1.12) 
0.085 
Time for exercise 
per day in minutes 
14.29** 
(6.23) 
14.29** 
(6.23) 
0.003 
12.64** 
(6.31) 
12.64** 
(6.31) 
0.045 
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
     
      
    Individuals with higher education might have more health knowledge 
(Grossman, 1997), thus Table 17 reports the ATETs by education levels. We have 
divided the sample into two sub-samples. One group of individuals have 
education less than or equal to 9 years, and the others with years of education of 
more than 9 years. We use this cut-off point because China has a 9-year 
compulsory education policy, which highly encourages everybody to have at least 
9-years of education. Participation in the public health insurance has no effect on 
all outcomes of interests for the less educated group. In contrast, well-educated 
individuals in average spend 14 minutes less on exercise if they have insurance.  
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Table 17:  ATETs by education 
 Low education (<=9 yrs) 
Obs=1414 
High education (>9yrs) 
Obs=209 
Variable 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P value 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P 
value 
Smoking 
0.16 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.597 
0.48 
(0.42) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
0.249 
Veg and fruit 
consumption 
8.48 
(37.71) 
8.48 
(37.71) 
0.822 
-16.90 
(37.22) 
-16.90 
(37.22) 
0.650 
Overweight 
0.34 
(0.28) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.214 
0.67 
(0.46) 
0.11 
 (0.07) 
0.139 
Obesity 
-0.98 
(0.74) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.190 
1.83* 
(0.88) 
0.06* 
 (0.03) 
0.89 
Preventive care 
0.78 
(0.58) 
0.02 (0.02) 0.191 
(outcome not 
vary)--- 
--- --- 
No. of cigarette 
per day 
0.37 
(0.99) 
0.37 
(0.99) 
0.710 
2.67 
(1.66) 
2.67 
(1.66) 
0.419 
Time for exercise 
per day in minutes 
13.85 
(4.22) 
13.85 
(4.22) 
0.361 
14.10** 
(8.91) 
14.10** 
(8.91)  
0.043 
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
     
    Table 18 displays the estimates of ATETs by gender. Generally, there is no big 
difference between males and females. We find significant effects for male in 
terms of smoking and number of cigarettes per day. They indicate that individuals 
who remain uninsured smoke more than insured males, which is the opposite of 
what ex-ante moral hazard would suggest. A significant difference between men 
and women is in the effects of public insurance participation on time spent 
exercising. On average men spend nearly 7 minutes less per day; this being 
significant at 1% level while the reduction amounts to 11 minutes for woman, but 
this is only significant at 10% level. Again this suggests ex-ante moral hazard 
effect with regard to time spent exercising. 
Table 19 reports the estimates of ATETs by age groups, since there is a huge 
gap between young and elder people in terms of health behaviours. For example, 
older people may exercise less because of their mobility status, so it is reasonable 
to investigate the outcome difference within each age group.  We have fixed the 
age threshold to 50 years. Again, the results show no large difference for most 
outcomes except for Time for Exercise per Day. Participation in public health 
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insurance has no significant effect on older individual’s time spent on exercise. In 
contrast, younger individuals are significantly affected with about 13 minutes less 
for exercise after participating in the programme. 
 
Table 18:  ATETs by gender 
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
 
 
Table 19:  ATETs by age 
 Age<50 
Obs=896 
Age>=50 
Obs=727 
Variable 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P value 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P value 
Smoking 
0.34 
(0.33) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.297 
0.29 
(0.34) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
0.405 
Veg and fruit 
consumption 
-22.53 
(40.25) 
-22.53 
(40.25) 
0.576 
19.24 
(44.67) 
19.24 
(44.67) 
0.667 
Overweight 
0.40 
(0.33) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.233 
0.44 
(0.34) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.190 
Obesity 
-0.27 
(0.63) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.673 
-0.14 
(0.77) 
-0.006 
(0.04) 
0.860 
Preventive 
care 
0.13 
(1.10) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
0.908 
0.44 
(0.66) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.505 
No. of 
cigarette per 
day 
0.78 
(1.16) 
0.78 
(1.16) 
0.502 
1.55 
(1.26) 
1.55 
(1.26) 
0.220 
Time for 
exercise per 
day in 
minutes 
12.95* 
(6.88) 
12.95* 
(6.88) 
0.060 
7.05 
(5.42) 
7.05 
(5.42) 
0.194 
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
   
    In conclusion, we do not find evidence of ex-ante moral hazard for most of the 
health related behaviors except time spent exercising. Generally, people who are 
 Male 
Obs=667 
Female 
Obs=956 
Variable 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P 
value 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
ATET 
(Std. Err.) 
P 
value 
Smoking 
0.65* 
(0.36) 
0.16* 
(0.86) 
0.062 
-0.31 
(1.06) 
-0.007 
(0.02) 
0.769 
Veg and fruit 
consumption 
9.14 
(47.78) 
9.14 
(47.78) 
0.848 
-11.11 
(38.38) 
-11.11 
(38.38) 
0.772 
Overweight 
0.36 
(0.36) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
0.303 
0.46 
(0.32) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.145 
Obesity 
0.88 
(0.60) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.161 
-1.51 
(1.03) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
0.148 
Preventive care 
1.27 
(0.88) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.204 
-0.17 
(0.76) 
0.006 
(0.03) 
0.829 
No. of cigarette per day 
3.24* 
(1.67) 
3.24* 
(1.67) 
0.054 
-0.33 
(0.38) 
-0.33 
(0.38) 
0.392 
Time for exercise per day 
in minutes 
7.89*** 
(8.43) 
7.89*** 
(8.43) 
0.009 
11.12* 
(4.75) 
11.12* 
(4.75) 
0.053 
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not in the public insurance system spend more time doing exercise per day than 
people who participated in the universal coverage system. However, public 
insurance does not affect other health related behaviours or indicators.  
3.6   Discussions and conclusion 
In this study, we aimed to examine whether universal coverage has affected 
health related behaviours of insured individuals by employing data from CHNS 
from waves 2006 and 2009. In order to identify a causal effect, we used propensity 
score matching and coarsened exact matching methods. By using matching 
methods, we attempt to control for observed heterogeneity between control and 
treatment individuals. Moreover, by performing matching on panel data, we avoid 
the problem often associated with voluntary insurance schemes because we match 
on the probability of entering the insurance scheme. Thirdly, we deal with the 
endogeneity of the insurance status by matching on individuals’ pre-treatment risk 
preference. 
The results from CEM and PSM are quite consistent. They do not provide 
strong evidence for ex-ante moral hazard. For example, insured and uninsured 
individuals are not significantly different in smoking, number of cigarettes per 
day, vegetable and fruit consumption, obesity, overweight, and preventive care 
visits. Nevertheless, we find significant differences between treatment and control 
groups in terms of time spent exercising. People with insurance spend less time 
doing exercise than people without insurance, which provides evidence of ex-ante 
moral hazard. This may be because time spent exercising is not that addictive. It 
requires less time to change behaviour, so the effect is shown in our short run 
analysis. 
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We further divide the sample into different subsamples by income, education, 
gender and age to examine differences from the pooled sample. For example, 
unlike the results from the pooled sample, we do not find any significant 
differences according to insurance status for people with low education, but find 
evidence of ex-ante moral hazard in the higher education subsample in terms of 
time spent exercising. This might be because of a substitution effect since people 
with low education generally do more exercise at work. Furthermore, in the 
sample of people older than 50 years old, there is no difference in any health 
preventive behaviours, whereas we find significant results for time spent 
exercising within the subsample of individuals younger than 50 years old. This, 
to some extent, confirms that our results are reasonable because older people 
naturally spend less time exercising so any differences in this group would be 
harder to detect.  
    Although there is a theoretical possibility that insurance would affect 
individuals’ health behaviours, we did not find strong evidence in the context of 
Chinese universal coverage system, except for time for exercise. There are two 
possible explanations for this result. 
    First, near universal coverage does not provide full insurance and individuals 
still have to pay for some medical services out-of-pocket since individuals still 
have to pay up to 50 percent of co-payment with out of pocket expenditure for 
inpatient visits. The co-payment rate is even higher for outpatient visits. As a 
consequence, out-of-pocket payments from individuals could be significant, 
thereby diluting incentives for ex-ante moral hazard. Thus, being covered by 
insurance may not necessarily change preventive efforts because there is still a 
financial burden.  
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         Second, we only look at the behaviour in the period immediately after the 
reform, which is quite a short run analysis. Young and educated people seem to 
be the only group that are affected by the preventive variable in our analysis. They 
are more likely to understand the policy change and take actions in short run. 
However, many life style behaviours do not alter immediately after entering to 
the insurance program, such as overweight and obesity. Few studies using short 
run data find evidence of ex-ante moral hazard for these two proxies for 
preventive behaviours (Courbage and Coulon, 2004; Stanciole, 2008; Khan and 
Kaestner, 2008).  Further studies could focus on long run effects on those life style 
activities. 
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Chapter 4: Ex-post Moral Hazard after the 
Universal Coverage Reform in China 
4.1 Introduction 
Near universal coverage is one of the most important achievements of China's 
2008 health care reform. According to official statistics, the reform has increased 
coverage from 20% in 2000 to 99.6% in 2014 by providing two new medical 
insurance schemes to rural and urban residents (China Health Statistical Yearbook, 
2014). On the one hand, these insurance reforms have increased people’s access 
to health care by reducing the prices they face at the point of use. Where this is in 
response to health care need, it potentially satisfies previously unmet need. On 
the other hand, medical insurance may increase health care usage beyond that 
needed because of the lower cost of health care to the individual, which is termed 
"moral hazard" (Pauly, 1968). Total medical expenditure in China has greatly 
increased by 82.4 percent from 2006 to 2011 (China Health Statistical Yearbook 
2013). Moral hazard, and not just previously unmet need, could be one of the 
reasons contributing to the drastically increased expenditure.  
There are two types of moral hazard, ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante moral hazard 
refers to the effect of health insurance on an individual’s behaviour before the 
event of sickness. For example, people may not invest in preventative behaviours, 
such as smoke more or take less time exercising, after receipt of health insurance. 
Ex-post moral hazard refers to the situation when health care services are required. 
Having insurance will increase the use of health care because the price is lower 
than it would be if an individual does not have insurance. Because it happens after 
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the event of sickness, it is termed ex-post moral hazard. This increase could be 
due to demand-side as well as supply-side activities. Demand-side moral hazard 
describes the situation where being insured lowers the financial cost of health care, 
so it encourages a higher rate of usage (Donaldson and Gerard, 1989). Supply-
side, or supplier induced moral hazard implicitly assumes that there is asymmetric 
information between physicians and patients. The asymmetric information is due 
to physicians having more knowledge about health care services than patients, 
leading them to “choose a quantity or a quality of treatment different from the one 
that patients would choose themselves with the same information” (Bardey and 
Lesur, 2006). It is most likely to occur in a system that mainly uses fee-for-service 
and where doctors have financial incentives to provide excess services than would 
otherwise be efficient in resolving the health problem (Bardey and Lesur, 2006). 
This paper focuses on ex-post moral hazard and insurance coverage. It aims at 
examining whether and to what extent medical expenditure increases as the price 
of health care services decreases. The policy implications of ex-post moral hazard 
have been under great discussion since Pauly (1968). As an emerging economy, 
China’s universal coverage is reported to be unsustainable because the 
expenditure is higher than the health care budget in some provinces (Fang, 2015). 
Ex-post moral hazard might be a significant contributor to this problem.  
Economists and policy makers propose various methods to reduce moral hazard, 
among which deductibles and co-payments are the most common. China’s 
universal coverage also introduced these two methods to deal with moral hazard 
and to complement the limited medical funding from the government (which is 
tax-financed). The deductible is set such that individuals must pay out of pocket 
before the insurer pays any expenses. Meanwhile, the co-payment rate is set to 
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allow the individual to share a proportion of health care expenditure each time a 
medical service is accessed. However, doctors in China are not monitored or paid 
if they control the total medical expenditure. If doctors act more in the financial 
interest of the hospital (because hospital are driven by profit incentives), they may 
have incentive to prescribe medicines with higher price or let the patients take 
high-tech tests when it is not necessary. These issues motivate the idea of 
conducting this empirical study. It is of great policy importance to investigate 
whether higher medical expenditure is due to health insurance, and whether 
current deductibles and co-payments are effective enough to reduce moral hazard. 
The remainder of the paper can be divided into the following parts. Section 4.2 
presents a review of empirical studies for ex-post moral hazard. Section 4.3 
presents the background of insurance policies of the public insurance schemes. 
Section 4.4 introduces the data –Chinese Health and Retirement Longitudinal 
Study (CHARLS) – employed in this study. The empirical strategy and results are 
provided in Section 4.5. Concluding remarks are included in the last section. 
4.2   Empirical studies for ex-post moral hazard 
Many empirical studies have been conducted to test the existence of ex-post 
moral hazard because it has important policy implications. Using the key words 
“ex-post moral hazard; health insurance; universal coverage”, I searched literature 
in library catalogue of University of York and Google Scholar. Empirical studies 
are selected to review here if they can inform the methodology to answer the 
research question and have more than 20 citations (in Table 20). Empirical studies 
investigating the impact of health insurance on utilization can be divided into two 
categories, namely, supply side induced ex-post moral hazard and demand side 
induced ex-post moral hazard.  
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Studies investigating supply side induced moral hazard mainly focus on 
hospital responses to a change in the price of health care services. For example, 
Ellis and McGuire (1996) looked at hospital responses to the change in 
reimbursement policy by examining a natural experiment in New Hampshire in 
the United States. In January 1989, New Hampshire Medicaid introduced a 
discharge-based payment system to replace the former costs based system. They 
defined the moral hazard effect as the change in the length of stay per discharge 
“due to the change in treatment policy, holding patient severity constant”. By 
conducting several OLS regressions using five years of data from Medicaid 
psychiatric discharges, they argued that a 1.8 days reduction in length of stay per 
discharge in private hospitals could be seen as a pure moral hazard effect. That is, 
prior to the introduction of the discharge-based payment system moral hazard 
existed – hospitals had an incentive to keep patients in longer than necessary as 
this would increase their income. 
Similarly, Lundin (2000) examined physician incentives to changes in drug 
prescriptions in response to patients’ insurance coverage in Sweden. The author 
selected seven patent drugs that faced generic competition and tried to answer the 
question: do physicians take price into account when they decide which drug to 
prescribe. Prescription microdata at patient level was used in both simple probit 
models and random-effects probit models. A moral hazard effect was suggested 
because empirical evidence showed that patients who have to “pay large sums 
out-of-pocket” were less likely to have trade-name versions prescribed than 
patients getting most of their costs reimbursed. 
There is a methodological difference between the two categories of supply side 
and demand side studies of moral hazard. When looking at empirical evidence 
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from the supply side, researchers do not need to consider the problem of 
distinguishing adverse selection from moral hazard (Ellis and McGuire, 1996; 
Butler et al., 1997; Lundin, 2000). This is because moral hazard from the supply 
side is not correlated with consumer’s incentive to join an insurance scheme. 
Therefore, the issue of selection is not relevant. This class of literature is less 
relevant to our study because we do not have information of physicians’ behaviour.  
In contrast, issue of selection is a challenge for studies that examine demand 
side moral hazard. A positive correlation between health insurance and health care 
spending arises because of both moral hazard and adverse selection. With ex-post 
moral hazard, people covered by insurance may have an incentive to use more 
health care because the price is cheaper, which would generate a positive 
correlation between medical expenditure and insurance coverage. But at the same 
time, the positive correlation can also come from people who have better 
knowledge of their higher expected medical cost being more likely to take out 
health insurance. This happens before the event of buying insurance, and is 
referred to as adverse selection into the insurance scheme. In this case, health 
insurance is endogeous because of an individual’s unobserved expectations of 
higher medical cost. Although ex-post moral hazard and adverse selection have 
the same consequences, the two situations suggest very different policy 
implications. Adverse selection is considered costly in general because it will lead 
to different types of inefficiencies in the market. For instance, some consumers 
with under-provided services by insurance companies may suffer from less than 
efficient quantity of care if insurance companies have incentive to distort their 
mix of customers by changing their insurance policies (Glazer and McGuire, 
2006).  Possible solutions to adverse selection include full insurance at the 
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population level, but this will potentially cause ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard 
(Savage and Wright, 2003). Solutions to ex-post moral hazard, on the other hand, 
might include introducing a deductible and a co-payment rate to the insurance 
policy. 
Therefore, it is of great importance to distinguish between adverse selection 
and ex-post moral hazard in empirical studies in order to not overstate the effect.  
The literature has used different methods to estimate demand side ex-post 
moral hazard. Manning et al. (1987) employed data from RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment, where individuals were randomly assigned into different insurance 
plans with different co-payments. One of the main goals of the RAND experiment 
was to study the effect of cost sharing of health insurance on utilization of health 
services. Since the individual could not choose the health plan or the form of co-
payment, health insurance and co-payment were exogenous in their study. In other 
words, because of randomization insurance status was not endogenous and so 
adverse selection was not a problem. Results from the RAND experiment suggest 
that cost sharing reduces health care consumption. This increase could be both 
due to supply side moral hazard and the consumer’s response. Furthermore, they 
estimate the medical price elasticity to examine the responsiveness of consumer’s 
demand response to a price change. They found a price elasticity of -0.2, which 
means that a 1% increase in price will lead to a 0.2% decrease in medical 
expenditure. This is robust if accounting for health status and income (Newhouse 
et al., 1993).  
Chiappori et al. (1998) presented an empirical study on moral hazard effects 
in health care demand in France. In 1993, a reform called “The loi Veil” changed 
the cost sharing rate of some social insurance schemes. Since the reform gave 
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individuals no chance to choose insurance policies, adverse selection was ruled 
out from this study. Their paper mainly investigated two groups of people. The 
treatment group consisted of people who had a co-payment rate of 10%, while the 
control group contained people who faced no charge for physician visits. Results 
from panel probit regressions demonstrated that there was a significant structural 
change following the reform for the treatment group for home visits but not for 
office physician visits. They concluded that there is moral hazard for some office 
physician visits. When non-monetary costs were important, for instance for those 
with severe illness, the co-payment did not change health care demand.  
However, randomized experimental data or natural experimental data are not 
always available. Accordingly, other studies using non-experimental data have 
been proposed, but this usually means having to disentangle adverse selection and 
ex-post moral hazard.  
    Coulson et al. (1995) employed a two stage model to evaluate the moral hazard 
effect in a supplementary medical insurance market for the elderly in the United 
States. The data they employed was the Mail Survey of Health Insurance and 
Medicine Use, completed by elderly Pennsylvanian Medicare beneficiaries in 
1994. They measured health care utilization as prescription drug usage. In the first 
stage, they adopted a multinomial logit model to calculate insurance choice. In 
the second stage, they corrected the endogeneity bias of insurance status by using 
the estimates from first stage in a nonlinear least-squares second stage model. 
After ruling out the adverse selection effect, they found evidence of moral hazard 
in the context of supplementary medical insurance market. Their results showed 
that double insurance coverage produced a larger demand effect.  
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Vera-Hernandez (1999) examined private insurance choice in Catalonia. They 
employed similar methods to Coulson et al. (1995). In order to distinguish ex-post 
moral hazard from adverse selection, the author’s instrument health insurance as 
social class, occupation and etc, arguing that, after conditioning on these variables, 
health insurance status is no longer endogenous.  They found no significant 
increase in hospital visits under duplicate coverage (if the individual has 
compulsory medical public insurance and private insurance) in the subsample of 
heads of household, but a significant positive effect for non-heads of household. 
However, they did not conclude this was evidence of moral hazard because the 
results show that variables related to health status, such as chronic illness, acute 
illness, have an important impact on number of doctor visits.  
Koc (2005) also tries to avoid the unobservable endogeneity problem using 
instrumental variables. The study used US data from 2000 Medical Expenditure 
Survey. The econometric results demonstrated the presence of ex-post moral 
hazard and further suggested that moral hazard for physician visits is higher for 
people with better health. Their findings suggest that the additional health care 
used by the insured may be the intended result of purchasing insurance, implying 
the existence of demand side ex-post moral hazard.  
Similarly, Savage and Wright (2003) employed instrumental variable 
techniques to deal with the selection problem. They investigated moral hazard in 
Australian private hospitals using 1989-1990 National Health Survey. The 
predicted probability of being insured was treated as an instrument for insurance 
choice to avoid the endogenous problem of insurance choice. They found a 
substantial moral hazard effect from the significant increase in the length of stay 
for those people who are more likely to be insured. 
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Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991) also attempted to distinguish moral hazard and 
adverse selection in the context of Medicare supplementary insurance (Medigap) 
in the US. Retirement History Survey in a model of health care demand.  They 
assumed that health is persistent and decays between periods. Thus there is an 
autocorrelation problem in the health care demand function. By correcting the 
autocorrelation problem, the authors separate the adverse selection effect from 
moral hazard effect. After separating the adverse selection effect, they found no 
significant evidence of moral hazard. The 49% increase in hospital expenditures 
are all due to “unexplained” reasons rather than from ex-post moral hazard.  
    Bajari et al. (2014) conducted a two-step semi-parametric estimation to 
disentangle moral hazard and adverse selection using the US Health and 
Retirement Study. They calculated the elasticity of total medical expenditure with 
respect to a change in the rate of co-payment of medical expenditures and 
compared elasticity estimates among different insurance categories. They found 
a 1% increase in the rate of co-payment led to a 0.21% drop total medical 
expenditures, suggesting the existence of moral hazard.  
Barros et al. (2008) took a different approach by using a matching technique to 
estimate the impact of additional coverage on the demand for health care, in the 
context of the Portugal health insurance system. The treatment group included 
individuals covered by a common health insurance plan in Portugal (called 
ADSE). Since this group of people have access to Portuguese NHS like other 
citizens, they have double coverage. A matching estimator was used to estimate 
the average increase in the demand for health services among the treatment group 
that has double coverage. In general, they found a positive and large effect of 
ADSE on demand for health care. The largest effects are from the group of young  
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Table 20: Summary of the empirical literature on ex-post moral hazard 
Literature Data Context Methodology Results and size of the effect 
Ellis and McGuire (1996) 
Five years of data from 
Medicaid psychiatric 
discharges 
United States Natural Experiment 
Ex-post moral hazard: 1.8 
days’ reduction in length of 
stay per discharge when 
changed to a discharge-based 
payment system.  
Lundin (2000) 
Prescription microdata at 
individual level 
Sweden 
Simple probit models 
and random-effects 
probit models 
Ex-post moral hazard: patients 
who have to “pay large sums 
out-of-pocket” were less 
likely to have trade-name 
versions prescribed than 
patients getting most of their 
costs reimbursed. 
Manning et al. (1987) RAND experiment data United States 
Randomised Controlled 
Trial 
Ex-post moral hazard: the size 
of price elasticity is -0.2. A 
1% increase in price will lead 
to a 0.2% decrease in medical 
expenditure.  
Wright (2003) 
1989-1990 National 
Health Survey 
Australia Instrumental Variable 
No significant evidence of 
moral hazard. 
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Table 20: (Continued) 
Literature Data Context Methodology Results and size of the effect 
Chiappori et al. (1998) 
A longitudinal dataset at 
individual level 
France Natural experiment 
Mixed results: For GP home 
visits, change in relative price 
had a moderating influence.  
When non-monetary costs 
were important, the co-
payment did not change health 
care demand. 
Coulson et al. (1995) 
Data from the Mail 
Survey of Health 
Insurance and Medicine 
Use 
United States Two-stage model  
Ex-post moral hazard: people 
enrolled in a more generous 
plan fill 0.56 more 
prescription than those in a 
less generous plan. 
Koc (2005) 
2000 Medical 
Expenditure Survey 
United States Instrumental Variable 
Ex-post moral hazard: 
additional health care used by 
the insured may be the 
intended results of purchasing 
insurance. 
Bajari et al. (2014) 
US Health and 
Retirement Study 
United States 
Two-step semi-
parametric estimation 
Ex-post moral hazard: a 1% 
increase in the co-payment 
rate led to a 0.21% drop in 
total medical expenditures.  
Barros et al. (2008) 
Data from a survey in 
Portugal at individual 
level 
Portugal Matching technique 
Ex-post moral hazard: young 
people aged from 18-30 under 
ADSE coverage had 30% 
more blood and urine test than 
those with no ADSE.  
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people aged from 18 to 30 under ADSE coverage. They had 30% more blood and 
urine tests than those who were not covered by ADSE, but moral hazard effects 
could not be identified for dentist visits. 
The price elasticity refers to the percentage change in health care expenditure 
due to the percentage change in price of health care. If there is a negative 
correlation, it is defined as ex-post moral hazard (Pauly, 1968). The price 
elasticity of health services varies from study to study, ranging from -0.04 to -
0.67 (Zweifel and Manning, 2000).   
Different effect sizes could arise for several reasons. Firstly, the methods 
chosen by researchers might contribute to the different size of effect. For example, 
studies using instrumental variables employ different instruments for health 
insurance status. The power of the instruments in predicting health insurance 
status are different, thus the size of effect would be different. Secondly, the 
contexts of each study are distinct. Most of the empirical studies are within one 
country or area. They often have different demographic characteristics and health 
care systems. For example, if there is under-supply of health care facilities in one 
country, the price elasticity would not be as high as in those countries with more 
generous supply of health care facilities.  
Most of the empirical literature has shown evidence of ex-post moral hazard, 
though the effects don’t appear particularly large. If the randomized experimental 
data or natural experimental data are available, there is no need to consider the 
selection problem because changing the price of medical services is exogenous. 
However, if there is no exogenous shock to the price of medical insurance, 
researchers have to use other techniques to deal with the selection problem. The 
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literature has tended to use instrumental variables and matching methods in such 
circumstances. 
4.3   Background of insurance policies 
There are three types of public insurance schemes in China that covered 
approximately 98% of the population in 2015, namely the Rural New Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (NCMS), Urban Resident Medical Insurance Scheme (URBMI) 
and Urban Employee Basic Medical Scheme (UEBMI). According to their 
employment status and place of residence, there is only one type of scheme 
available for each individual. NCMS is designed to provide coverage for rural 
people, UEBMI for Urban formal employees, and URBMI for other urban 
residents. The only choice residents have is to enroll or not to enroll in their 
eligible scheme. This means that the scheme in which people are enrolled is 
exogenous to their knowledge and preferences, so adverse selection does not arise. 
The main funding source of UEBMI is payroll taxes, while government 
subsidies are the main funding sources for NCMS and URBMI. These three 
schemes are administered and operated by national and local authorities. At the 
national level, NCMS is administered by the Chinese National Health and Family 
Planning Commission, while NRBMI and UEBMI are administered by the 
Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. The Government 
decentralizes the operation of the schemes to each local government by providing 
guidelines. After that, each provincial government gives an implementation plan 
to their local governments, which allows the municipal and county level 
governments (lower level governments than provincial governments) to design 
and operate their own insurance policies. NCMS funds are pooled at the county 
level, and URBMI and UEBMI are pooled at municipal level. There are roughly 
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2,583 NCMS schemes, 333 UEBMI schemes and 333 UEBMI schemes (Meng et 
al., 2015), corresponding to 2,583 counties and 333 cities in China. In general, 
benefit packages of UEBMI are more generous than the other two schemes. After 
2012, the Chinese Government started piloting a reform that consolidated the 
URBMI and NCMS social health insurance schemes into one scheme called 
Urban and Rural Resident Medical Insurance (URRBMI) to achieve a more 
equitable and efficient health system within 20 years. 
Although there are many different policies under each scheme, the main 
elements of the schemes are very similar to each other. Basically, inpatient 
services and outpatient services are the two main categories. Under each category, 
deductibles, co-payment rates and caps are designed specifically by local 
municipal and county level governments. The co-payment rate 𝑙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑘for individual 
i living in k, having disease type j, receiving treatment in hospital of level l, can 
be shown as: 
𝑙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑘 = max (𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑘(𝛼𝑖ℎ, 𝑚𝑖), 𝑚𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑘)   j=0, 1; h=1, 2, 3; k=1, 2,…, 333  
                                                                                                                          (4.1)                          
Caps 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑘  are specified in different local government documentations. The 
amount that is higher than the cap is paid out-of-pocket. Subscript j is binary for 
catastrophic illness. The deductibles and co-payment rates are much lower for 
catastrophic diseases so that catastrophic spending is less of a financial threat for 
those patients. Subscript k represents different areas of residence. Therefore, the 
cap 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑘 varies across different types of illness j and different areas of residence 
k. 𝑚𝑖 represents the total medical expenditure per illness for individual i. If 𝑚𝑖 is 
less than 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑘 , the co-payment rate 𝑙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑘  equals to 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑘(𝛼𝑖ℎ, 𝑚𝑖) . The 
deductible 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑘 represents the amount that the insured person has to pay out-of-
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pocket, which varies across different areas of residence k. 𝐻𝑗𝑖𝑘(𝛼𝑖ℎ, 𝑚𝑖) is a step 
function showing the co-payment rates that the insured persons face. It depends 
on two elements, 𝛼𝑖ℎ and 𝑚𝑖. 𝛼𝑖ℎ represents different co-payment rates due to the 
level of hospitals h. Basically, patients are encouraged to seek health services 
from low-level hospitals. Therefore, the co-payment rates are lower for services 
from low-level hospitals.  One of the reasons is to deal with ex-post moral hazard, 
because low-level hospitals are often associated with lower prices for health 
services. 𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑘( 𝑚𝑖) is a step function that represents the co-payment rates that 
differ according to the total amount paid for the services. These differences are 
set out in Table 21. Lower co-payment rates are often associated with higher 
medical costs. If 𝑚 is larger than 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑘, the co-payment 𝑙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑘is  𝑚 − 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑘, which is 
the amount over the insurance cap.  
Table 21: An illustration of the insurance policy design for one county 
Outpatient Services Inpatient Services 
• Deductibles (in RMB) 
• Paid out-of-pocket 
• Varies among different classes of 
hospitals 
 
• Deductibles (in RMB) 
• Paid out-of-pocket 
• Varies among different classes of 
hospitals 
 
• Co-payment rate 𝑙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑘 • Co-payment rate 𝑙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑘 (for illustration) 
Village-based 
clinics 
No deductible 
but with cap 
30% 
Class 1 hospitals 
ℎ = 1 
30 %                       
The most generous 
Class 1 hospitals 
(The most 
generous) 
ℎ = 1 
Deductible-3000           
(in RMB) 
45% 
3000—10000 
(in RMB) 
40% 
10000-Cap (in 
RMB) 
35% 
Class 2 hospitals 
ℎ = 2 
40 % 
Class 2 hospitals 
ℎ = 2 
Deductible-5000           
(in RMB) 
50% 
5000—20000 
(in RMB) 
45% 
20000-Cap (in 
RMB) 
40% 
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Class 3 hospitals 
ℎ = 3 
50 %                       
The least generous 
Class 3 hospitals 
(The least 
generous) 
ℎ = 3 
Deductible-5000           
(in RMB) 
65% 
5000—20000 
(in RMB) 
60% 
20000-Cap              
(in RMB) 
50% 
Catastrophic 
diseases (𝑗 = 0,1) 
In % Catastrophic 
diseases (𝑗 = 0,1) 
 In % 
• Caps 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑘  (in RMB) 
The amount higher than the cap is 
paid out-of-pocket  
• Cap 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑘 (in RMB) 
The amount higher than the cap is paid out-of-
pocket  
 
 
4.4 Data 
    4.4.1 The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study  
The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) aims to 
collect representative and high quality micro data from a sample of residents over 
45 years old in China, but it still includes very few observations who are younger.  
The baseline survey took place in 2011. The sample included 10,000 households 
and 17,000 individuals in 150 counties and 450 villages. The survey is conducted 
every two years and we use data for 2011 and 2013. As mentioned in section 4.3, 
the consolidation of UEBMI and URBMI started in 2012. However, there are only 
2% of the observations that have the new URRBMI insurance.  
The study population of the survey draws from 28 provinces, which are diverse, 
with variations found in a wide-ranging set of socioeconomic factors and other 
related health, nutritional and demographic measures. CHARLS adopts a 
multistage stratified Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling, and an 
innovative software package (CHALRS-GIS) to make village sampling frames. 
All samples are drawn in four stages, including county-level sampling, 
neighbourhood-level sampling, household-level sampling and respondent-level 
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sampling. The goal of the sampling strategy is to collect a sample representative 
of the whole country. 
The household questionnaire contains 8 categories of information, including 
demographics, family structure, health status and function, biomarkers, health 
care and insurance, work, retirement and pension, income and consumption and 
interviewer observation. Interviewer observations include questions that the 
interviewer records. 
 In the section of health status and functioning, information is collected on self-
reported health status, general health status (according to the diagnosis) and 
disease history, lifestyle and health behaviours, functional limitations, cognition 
and depression.  
Another section covers health insurance and the use of health care. It asks 
respondents about their health insurance status, the type of health insurance, 
health care costs and utilization. Interviewees are asked about the total cost of 
their last visit to health care facilities and the amount of out-of-pocket medical 
expenditure. From the answers to these questions, we are able to calculate the co-
payment rate for each individual reporting that they have used health care services. 
There are two waves of data available for the analysis, wave 2011 and wave 
2013. Both of them are after the officially launched health care reform in 2008. 
Figure 15 presents the progress of data cleaning. The starting sample is 17,711 
individuals in wave 2011 and 19,063 in wave 2013. The data cleaning process 
includes dropping observations with missing data for some variables that are 
included in the regressions, such as age, marital status, education, and household 
income. Since people who are younger than 18 are more likely to be monitored 
by their parents, the decision to use medical facilities is unlikely to be made by 
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the respondent so these individuals are dropped from the analysis. The number of 
observations who are younger than 18 years old is relatively small (172 in both 
waves). In total, we have 33,497 observations available for the analysis, with 
17,490 in wave 2011 and 16,007 in wave 2013 respectively. There are 15,372 
individuals appearing in both waves (as shown in bracket in Figure 15). 
Figure 15: Data cleaning process for ex-post moral hazard 
  
   4.4.2 The calculation of the co-payment rate     
The co-payment rate used in the analysis is the 𝑙𝑖𝑘 in equation (4.1). The co-
payment rate  𝑙𝑖𝑘 consists of three elements, including the deductible 𝐴𝑘 ,  the co-
payment rate 𝛼𝑘𝐻(𝑥𝑘), and the cap 𝐶𝑘. However, the survey does not provide 
information for these three elements, just the total payment. 
The survey asks two sets of questions about outpatient and inpatient medical 
cost respectively. For outpatient services, the first question is the total outpatient 
cost. Individuals are likely to remember the total cost because most of the 
insurance policies require patients to pay the total cost at the time of use and apply 
for reimbursement afterwards. Nevertheless, interviewers are asked to check the 
receipts of the cost if possible. The next question is the amount that is self-paid. 
The same set of questions are again asked with regard to the last inpatient services 
used. Therefore, the co-payment rate is calculated as the reported self-payment 
Wave 2011
Starting Sample:
17,711
Analytical Sample:
17,490
(15,372)
Wave 2013
Starting Sample:
19,063
Analytical Sampe:
16,007
(15,372)
135 
 
divided by the reported total medical costs. This information is available only 
when the individual has used health services, so we do not have the information 
of the co-payment rates that would be faced by non-users. 
Other things that influence the co-payment are the level of facilities and the 
seriousness of the sickness. Even though the questionnaire does not ask about the 
level of the facilities individuals used, it provides information on the types of 
medical facilities the individual used. There are 8 types of facilities namely 1) 
general hospital, 2) specialized hospital, 3) Chinese medicine hospital, 4) 
community healthcare centre, 5) township hospital, 6) health care post, 7) village 
clinic/private clinic and 8) other. Three dummy variables are generated from this 
question indicating the level of hospital. Level one hospitals include 6) and 7), 
level two hospitals include 3), 4) and 5), while level three hospitals include 1) and 
2). Generally, the price for similar treatment is highest in level 3 hospitals and 
lowest in level 1 hospitals. 
    The questionnaire also includes a question asking about the kind of treatment 
the individuals received. There are 8 categories of treatment: 1) injection, 2) 
laboratory test, 3) surgery, 4) X-ray, CT, B ultrasonic, MRI, 5) Medications 6) IV 
(drip infusion), 7) traditional treatment (e.g. massage, acupuncture), and 8) other.  
   4.4.3 Data descriptive statistics 
Table 22 shows the data descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The average 
age of the whole sample is 59.75, among which 47% are male, 86% are married 
and 20% are based in urban areas. 91% of the sample is covered by one of the 
public insurance schemes. This has increased by 1% between wave 2011 to wave 
2013. 11% are covered by UEBMI, 5% are covered by URBMI, 73% are covered 
by NCMS, and 2% are covered by URRBMI. The medical cost increased from 
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148.23 to 232.14 (in RMB) from 2011 to 2013 with the average utilization 
increasing from 18% to 21%.  
Table 22: Data descriptive statistics for ex-post moral hazard (Whole sample) 
 Whole Sample Wave 2011 Wave 2013 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Co-payment rate  0.91 0.27 0.94 0.21 0.87 0.31 
Medical cost (in 
RMB) 188.33 1725.30 148.23 1262.40 232.14 
2117.6
2 
UEBMI 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 
URBMI 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22 
NCMS 0.73 0.44 0.73 0.44 0.73 0.44 
URRBMI 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 
Government 
medical insurance 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 
Public insurance 0.91 0.28 0.91 0.29 0.92 0.27 
Utilization 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.41 
Sickness 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.31 
Age 59.75 10.64 59.00 10.14 60.56 11.10 
Male 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Urban 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39 
Disabled 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.27 0.44 
Smoking 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.36 0.48 
Married 0.86 0.35 0.87 0.33 0.84 0.37 
Separated 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 
Divorced 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 
Household income 
(in RMB) 40446 491560 36377 678112 47990 27244 
Srh-excellent 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.20 
Srh-good 0.37 0.26 0.38 0.27 0.37 0.25 
Srh-fair 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 
Srh-poor 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 
Srh-very poor 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 
Illiterate  0.14 0.43 0.14 0.50 0.14 0.12 
Primary education 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.41 0.12 0.08 
Secondary education 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.09 
Vocational 
education 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.03 
Tertiary education 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.09 
No. of observations 33,497 17,490 16,007 
  
Table 23 presents descriptive statistics for the sample who utilized health care 
services. It shows that, although public insurance coverage went up 1%, the co-
payment rate went down from 68% to 40% from wave 2011 to 2013 and the 
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medical cost went up from 812 to 1,096. Without controlling for other variables, 
the data descriptive statistics suggest the opposite of ex-post moral hazard, 
because it suggests that as the co-payment rate decreases, medical cost increased.  
Table 23: Data descriptive statistics for ex-post moral hazard (Utilization=1) 
 Whole Sample Wave 2011 Wave 2013 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Outpatient Co-
payment rate  0.54 0.43 0.68 0.41 0.40 0.41 
Inpatient Co-
payment rate 0.51 0.32 0.59 0.32 0.50 0.32 
Medical cost (in 
RMB) 958 3803 812 2864 1096 4510 
UEBMI 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 
URBMI 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 
NCMS 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42 
URRBMI 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 
Government 
medical insurance 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 
Public insurance 0.95 0.22 0.94 0.24 0.96 0.20 
Utilization 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Sickness 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.26 
Level 1 hospital 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.40 0.49 
Level 2 hospital 0.32 0.36 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47 
Level 3 hospital 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.40 0.49 
Age 60.35 10.59 59.85 10.12 60.82 10.99 
Male 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 
Urban 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 
Disabled 0.27 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.31 0.46 
Smoking 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.30 0.46 
Married 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.34 0.84 0.37 
Separated 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.06 
Divorced 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 
Household income 
(in RMB) 56479 35732 53146 50249 55264 342445 
Srh-excellent 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.12 
Srh-good 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.19 
Srh-fair 0.30 0.41 0.29 0.40 0.31 0.42 
Srh-poor 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39 
Srh-very poor 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 
Illiterate  0.20 0.43 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.12 
Primary education 0.22 0.31 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.09 
Secondary education 0.24 0.32 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.09 
Vocational 
education 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.04 
Tertiary education 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.10 
No. of observations 6,541 3,175 3,366 
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 4.5 Empirical strategy to test ex-post moral hazard 
We measured ex-post moral hazard as the impact of variation in the co-payment 
rate on treatment cost, allowing us to calculate the price elasiticy of the medical 
care. It is important to justify that co-payment rate is exogenous in our analysis. 
The first requirement is that individuals do not choose insurance schemes with 
lower co-payment rates. As described in the last section, the co-payment rate in 
China is not chosen by an individual. It is voluntary for them to take out the 
insurance but the co-payment rate is exogenously decided by local health 
insurance policies. The second requirement is that individuals do not migrate to 
places (provinces) with a lower co-payment rate. It is reasonable to assume that 
individuals do not migrate to places with a lower co-payment rate because the 
primary driver of immigration in China is the choice of occupation rather than to 
get a cheaper medical services (Nahm and Tani, 2012).  Thirdly, it is worth 
noticing that the co-payment rate is different between inpatient and outpatient 
services within each insurance scheme. Insurance schemes are often more 
generous to inpatient services and offer lower co-payment rate for inpatient 
services. However, there is  gate keeping for inpatient services in China. Every 
individual needs to receive a referal from a doctor at an outpatient department 
before accessing inpatient services. And then, it is the doctor’s decision to give 
them inpatient or outpatient services, so individuals have no choice here as well.  
Since the co-payment rate is exogenous, the context is very similar to the 
literature that employes a form of natural experiment. The researcher does not 
need to consider the selection problem because the co-payment rate is set 
exogenously by the insurance policy makers. Therefore, we can use a simple fixed 
effect model to estimate the price elasticity of medical services.  The fixed effect 
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model captures the individual-specific effect. The specification of the model is as 
follows:  
𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝛾 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4.2)                          
Where log medical cost in the last 4 weeks is the dependent variable. Variation 
in co-payment rate comes from different residences and different levels of health 
facilities.  𝒙𝒊𝒕
′  is a vector including control variables. We control for individual’s 
health status using self-reported health. It includes 5 categories, starting from 
excellent, good, fair, poor to very poor. Other control variables are age, gender, 
education, urban, household size, household income, marital status, self-reported 
health, and level of hospitals visited. 𝛿𝑖 is individual specific fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is individual-specific error. 𝛽2, and 𝛾 are the coefficients to be estimated. 
If there is ex-post moral hazard, we would expect 𝛽2 to be negative. It suggests 
that people with lower co-payment rate (cheaper cost of medical services to the 
individual) are more likely to have higher medical expenditures, this being 
suggestive of ex-post moral hazard.  
4.6 Results for testing ex-post moral hazard 
There are three groups of people in the sample, non-users of medical services, 
outpatient users and inpatient users. For the key explanatory variable co-payment 
rate, we only know the co-payment rate for outpatient users and inpatient users. 
Therefore, I only include outpatient and inpatient users in the analysis, and omit 
the non-users. 
   4.6.1 Testing ex-post moral hazard for using outpatient services 
Table 24 shows the regression results for testing ex-post moral hazard 
associated with outpatient services. The dependent variable for each regression is 
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ln medical cost. Regressions (i) and (ii) include the samples of outpatient users in 
wave 2011 and wave 2013 respectively. Regressions (iii) (iv) (v) and (vi) are 
fixed-effects regressions including samples from both waves 2011 and 2013.  
The key explanatory variable co-payment rate is found to be negatively 
correlated to medical costs for the first five regressions. It indicates that 
individuals who face higher co-payment rate are more likely to have lower 
medical costs. For example, for wave 2011, as the co-payment rate increases by 
1%, the medical cost decreases by 0.44%. The magnitude increases from 0.44 to 
1.64 from wave 2011 to wave 2013. For the regressions (iv), (v) and (vi), I 
separate the sample according to the type of insurance schemes under which 
individuals are reimbursed. The effects are still negative and significant for 
NCMS and NEBMI The price elasticity of UEBMI is the highest. Since UEBMI 
has the most generous benefit package among the three schemes, it implies that 
the problem of ex-post moral hazard for UEBMI is more serious than its 
counterpart for NCMS. For the last regression, the number of observations is too 
small to yield meaningful results. 
With regard to other control variables, the regressions suggest that older 
individuals are more likely to be associated with higher medical costs. However, 
gender or living in urban areas do not play significant role in affecting medical 
costs. I also control the levels of hospital visited for each regression. The direction 
of the coefficients for these variables are to be expected because services at level 
3 hospitals are the most expensive. Putting level 2 hospitals as the comparison 
group, individuals who visited level 3 hospitals are more likely to have higher 
medical costs, while individuals who visited level 1 hospitals are more likely to 
have lower costs. This is in line with the expectations, because level 3 hospitals 
141 
 
are the most advanced hospitals so they are often associated with higher 
expenditure. Variables to control health status are self-reported health. The 
comparison group comprises those in good health, which is the second category 
below excellent health. The results suggest that individuals that reported the 
poorest health tend to have higher medical costs than those who reported good 
health, while other groups tend to have lower medical costs. When the sample is 
divided according to the reimbursement insurance scheme, this set of variables 
are no longer significant.  
    4.6.2 Testing ex-post moral hazard for using inpatient services 
    As mentioned in section 4.3, co-payment rates for inpatient services 𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑘( 𝑚𝑖) 
vary across different levels of inpatient costs. The higher the medical costs, the 
lower the co-payment rate. Thus, I separate them into different ranges of medical 
costs. However, since the sample size is too small, we cannot conclude from the 
regressions. The result is shown in Table 25.  
4.7 Discussion and conclusion 
This study aims to test whether there is ex-post moral hazard after the health 
insurance reform in China. We define ex-post moral hazard as the increase in total 
health care consumption due to a lower price from higher insurance coverage 
(Zweifel and Manning, 2000). In the empirical analyses, the co-payment rate is 
the key explanatory variable. A higher co-payment rate means a higher price of 
health care faced by a consumer. The regression results for outpatient users 
indicate a negative causal correlation between co-payment rate and total health 
care expenditure. This means that consumers who face a higher price are more 
likely to have lower total health care expenditure, which indicates there is ex-post 
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moral hazard for outpatient services. If the co-payment rate increases by 1%, the 
total medical expenditure decreases by 1.1%. The price elasticity—the percentage 
change in expenditure as a result of the percentage change in price-—is bigger in 
UEBMI than in NCMS.  
This increased medical expenditure could be partly due to unnecessary 
utilization of health care services, partly because newly available health insurance 
satisfies previously unmet needs. We tried to control individuals’ need by 
including measures of disability and self-reported health into the regression, but 
it does not suggest that the price effect we found are all unnecessary. Measuring 
individuals’ need is more complicated than that. It “must balance clinical, ethical, 
and economic considerations” (Wright et al., 1998). In addition, it is not possible 
for us to disentangle whether this induced demand is from the perspective of 
consumers or providers, because providers’ information is not available for the 
analysis.  
Nevertheless, the existing Chinese public insurance policies have put much 
emphasis on countering inefficient demand for care by consumers. First of all, co-
payment rates and deductibles are adopted to put some financial burden on 
patients so as to discourage “unnecessary” utilization. Indeed, the co-payment 
rates of Chinese public insurance (with an average around 50 percent) are 
generally higher than most of the high-income countries. The high co-payment 
rate imposes relatively higher financial barriers to the poor and unhealthy 
(Eggleston and Hsieh, 2004). Secondly, insurance policies provide financial 
incentives for consumers to demand care from those providers offering treatment 
at lower cost. As explained in Section 4.3, the co-payment rates are lower if the 
individual seek health care in a lower level hospital. This policy is based on the 
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fact that there is no gatekeeping process in Chinese health care system. 
Consumers can seek health care at any level of hospital (subject to their ability to 
meet out-of-pocket expenses).  Our results suggest that introducing consumer-
side regulations is not effective enough to counter ex-post moral hazard.  
Physician-patient agents’ theory asserts that physicians play an important role 
in choosing the amount of health care consumption of their patients because they 
act as experts with greater knowledge than their patients. The proposition from 
this theory is that it is ineffective to introduce co-payment rates because it keeps 
risk averse individuals from being covered by complete insurance (Ma and 
McGuire, 1997). Ideally, we would have these types of data and could study 
whether more drugs where prescribed, or whether patients had longer stays than 
necessary. However, in this study we have no information on whether the 
physicians write unnecessary prescriptions, whether patients had excessively long 
stays in hospital or patients’ types of stay. As introduced in Chapter 1, profits from 
selling drugs account for large proportion of hospitals’ total income (around 40%), 
which gives physicians strong incentives to prescribe unnecessary drugs. This is 
consistent with the findings of our empirical results. Methods to counter provider 
ex-post moral hazard were not widely used in China’s public health insurance 
policies at the start of the reform, but a provider payment reform has been 
underway in recent years.  
The literature provides several ways to counter supply-side moral hazard. 
Firstly, direct government regulation is considered as a means of controlling 
providers. For instance, general practitioners in UK are limited by the list of 
pharmaceutical prescribing. Findings from Irwin et al. (1986) indicate that “more 
regulation to encourage generic prescribing and local formularies is likely to lead 
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to cost effective changes in prescribing habits” (Donaldson and Gerard, 1989). A 
more recent example would be the national Electronic Medical Record System 
introduced by Bureau of National Health Insurance in Taiwan's health care sector. 
The system traces and advises both physicians’ and individuals’ behaviors. On the 
one hand, this system prevents consumers with excessive visits by guiding them 
to seek health services more properly. On the other hand, it also regulates 
physicians’ actives by monitoring their quantity and quality of treatments (Li et 
al., 2015). However, this system would have high administrative cost.  
Supply-side cost sharing of costs borne by the providers is the most common 
way to regulate provider’s behaviour (Donaldson and Gerard, 1989). For example, 
capitation will provide financial incentive for providers to lower cost if the 
Government rewards a fixed payment per enrolled consumer per period for 
strictly limiting services provided. Supply-side cost sharing will not add financial 
risk to patients (Eggleston and Hsieh, 2004). Existing empirical evidence from 
Taiwan and Korea indicates that supply-side cost sharing can improve efficiency 
without undermining equity (Lang et al., 2004; Kwon, 2003). Their findings prove 
that the introduction of capitation methods leads to a decrease in spending per 
case. Accordingly, Eggleston and Hsieh (2004) suggest that provider incentives 
would be the focus for future health care reform to counter inefficient health care 
demand. The Chinese government has been piloting a supply side cost-sharing 
payment method. Some of the areas have moved from fee-for-service payment to 
prospective payment. Prospective payments make providers bear the financial 
risks of over-provision and, thus, provide incentives for them to reduce inefficient 
use of services (Yip and Hiao, 2009). 
 
145 
 
Table 24: Regression results for ex-post moral hazard (outpatient users) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
 Wave 2011 Wave 2013 FE  FE NCMS FE UEBMI FE URBMI 
Co-payment rate -0.442 -1.642 -1.101 -1.089 -2.792 6.302 
 (6.90)** (21.61)** (9.34)** (2.83)** (2.75)*  
Age 0.009 0.007 0.171 0.144 0.774 2.109 
 (3.06)** (2.16)* (2.17)* (0.53) (0.99)  
Male 0.010 -0.071 0.094    
 (0.16) (0.86) (0.13)    
Urban 0.097 -0.130 0.641    
 (1.31) (1.57) (0.32)    
Smoking -0.134 -0.006 0.010 -0.590 1.996  
 (1.96)* (0.07) (0.05) (0.94) (1.46)  
Married 0.055 0.247 -0.361 0.170 2.446  
 (0.66) (2.61)** (0.94) (0.22) (0.98)  
Separated 0.307 0.759 -0.629 -2.504   
 (0.97) (1.39) (0.60) (1.47)   
Divorced 0.062 -0.066 -0.275 4.148   
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.33) (2.28)*   
Ln household 
income 
0.009 0.015 0.040 0.079 0.053 -0.057 
 (1.28) (1.75) (2.95)** (1.82) (0.57)  
Disabled 0.046 0.028 -0.029 0.610 0.202  
 (0.73) (0.40) (0.16) (1.21) (0.13)  
Level1hospital -0.713 -0.597 -0.588 -0.105 -4.439  
 (8.29)** (6.51)** (3.94)** (0.22) (2.01)  
Level3hoshospital 1.189 1.120 0.864 1.264 -0.614  
 (14.15)** (12.45)** (6.25)** (2.94)** (0.63)  
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Table 24: (Continued) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
 Wave 2011 Wave 2013 FE  FE NCMS FE UEBMI FE URBMI 
Self-reported 
health excellent 
-0.624 
(2.52)* 
0.047 
(0.18) 
-0.781 
(1.46) 
-1.281 
(0.78) 
2.169 
(1.00) 
 
       
Self-reported 
health fair 
-0.281 
(4.32)** 
-0.287 
(3.72)** 
-0.346 
(2.78)** 
-0.388 
(0.97) 
-0.484 
(0.59) 
 
       
Self-reported 
health poor 
0.251 
(3.95)** 
0.212 
(2.58)* 
0.149 
(1.32) 
0.218 
(0.71) 
-1.470 
(1.26) 
 
       
Distance to the 
facility 
0.002 
(0.0003)*** 
0.0007 
(0.0005)** 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
 
       
Primary 
education 
0.088 
(1.15) 
-0.048 
(0.13) 
0.013 
(0.06) 
0.837 
(1.36) 
3.638 
(1.81) 
 
       
Secondary 
education 
0.117 
(1.50) 
-0.521 
(1.44) 
0.012 
(0.06) 
0.517 
(0.82) 
1.897 
(1.04) 
 
       
Vocational 
education 
0.096 
(0.58) 
-0.815 
(1.10) 
-0.386 
(0.95) 
 2.958 
(1.51) 
 
Tertiary 
education 
0.126 
(1.72) 
-0.346 
(1.08) 
0.299 
(1.69) 
0.119 
(0.21) 
-1.752 
(0.75) 
 
_Cons 4.705 5.889 16.335 14.511 -44.600 -122.021 
 (19.60)** (22.13)** (3.33)** (0.86) (0.88)  
R2 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.45 0.43 1.00 
NT 3,175 3,366 6,541 1,542 342 71 
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
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Table 25: Regression results for ex-post moral hazard (inpatient users) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (j) 
Insurance 
scheme 
NCMS NCMS NCMS URBMI URBMI URBMI UEBMI UEBMI UEBMI 
Medical 
cost 
(0,3000) (3000,5000) >5000 (0,3000) (3000,5000) >5000 (0,3000) (3000,5000) >5000 
Co-
Payment 
rate 
0.909 -0.118 -0.636 102.438 0.479 -0.636 -0.719 0.060 -0.013 
 (1.66) (2.17)* (0.56)   (0.56)   (0.03) 
Age -0.019 -0.003 -0.018 0.629 -0.019 -0.018 0.007 0.008 -0.004 
 (0.93) (1.68) (0.77)   (0.77)   (0.54) 
Male -0.031 -0.003 0.339 35.791 -0.315 0.339 0.589 -0.037 0.077 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.80)   (0.80)   (0.43) 
Smoking 0.969 0.019 0.355 38.269  0.355 -0.125  -0.098 
 (1.99)* (0.50) (0.57)   (0.57)   (0.51) 
Married -0.073 -0.059 0.072 40.379 0.018 0.072 0.044 0.228 0.230 
 (0.14) (1.40) (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.70) 
Ln 
household 
income 
-0.018 -0.001 0.001 -7.786  0.001 0.791 0.002 -0.019 
 (0.33) (0.13) (0.01)   (0.01)   (1.01) 
Level3 
hospital 
-0.001 0.047 0.918 -5.281  0.918  -0.102 0.327 
 (0.00) (1.62) (1.56)   (1.56)   (1.49) 
Disabled -0.286 0.052 0.029 -21.001  0.029   0.195 
 (0.74) (1.70) (0.06)   (0.06)   (1.12) 
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Table 25: (Continued) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (j) 
Insurance 
scheme 
NCMS NCMS NCMS URBMI URBMI URBMI UEBMI UEBMI UEBMI 
Medical 
cost 
(0,3000) (3000,5000) >5000 (0,3000) (3000,5000) >5000 (0,3000) (3000,5000) >5000 
Srh-fair 0.030 0.042 -1.778   -1.778   -0.301 
 (0.06) (0.80) (1.12)   (1.12)   (1.31) 
Srh-poor 0.528 -0.031 0.588   0.588   -0.039 
 (1.18) (0.97) (1.44)   (1.44)   (0.19) 
Primary -0.006 0.083 0.110   0.110   0.198 
 (0.01) (0.89) (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.52) 
Secondary -0.057 -0.122 1.073   1.073   0.050 
 (0.06) (1.27) (1.48)   (1.48)   (0.13) 
Tertiary -0.321 -0.082       0.252 
 (0.45) (1.68)       (0.51) 
2013.Wave -1.560 -0.107 -0.162   -0.162   0.290 
 (2.55)* (2.38)* (0.35)   (0.35)   (0.89) 
Separated  0.128        
  (0.95)        
Divorced         0.568 
         (0.61) 
_cons 8.105 8.719 10.293 -168.625 9.496 10.293 -0.397 7.754 9.525 
 (4.92)** (58.40)** (5.30)**   (5.30)**   (11.43)** 
R2 0.16 0.22 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.10 
NT 171 83 27 9 5 27 7 7 121 
(* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01) 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion to the Thesis 
This thesis considers the unintended consequences of the major reforms to the 
Chinese health insurance market. The reforms aimed to provide universal 
coverage for the Chinese population, reduce financial barriers to health care, and 
ensure equal access to public health services. Health insurance schemes are 
typically associated with unintended consequences such as adverse selection, ex-
ante moral hazard or ex-post moral hazard. I explore these three topics with 
respect to China’s health insurance system in the thesis. In this concluding section, 
I will provide a summary of each of the thesis chapters, their policy implications, 
together with strengths and limitations. Finally, I will propose some future 
research. 
5.1 Summary of the findings 
The first substantive chapter sets out the context of China’s private insurance 
markets prior and after to the official large health insurance reform from 2004 to 
2009. It examines whether there is adverse or advantageous selection in China’s 
private insurance market. We look at two separate markets: the first is a pure 
private insurance market where people face the choice of purchasing private 
insurance or otherwise going without any health insurance. Secondly, we look at 
a supplementary insurance market where people are partially covered by public 
insurance but have a choice to buy a supplementary private insurance. In the pure 
private insurance market, the results provide evidence of adverse selection, with 
individuals at higher health risk more likely to buy private insurance. Solutions 
for the Government to deter adverse selection include full and compulsory 
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insurance, reinsurance for health insurance companies and risk adjustment 
methods (Neudeck and Podczeck, 1996; Cutler and Zeckhause, 1999; Van den 
van and Ellis, 2000). In a supplementary insurance market, we find evidence 
supporting advantageous selection. People at lower risk are more likely to buy 
supplementary insurance. This conflicts with classical theory of adverse selection, 
and the unexpected finding may be due to the difference in risk preference of the 
individuals. The theory of advantageous selection explains the individuals’ 
behaviour by adding the difference in risk preference.  
The second and the third substantive chapters consider the problem of moral 
hazard during the period of establishing nearly universal public insurance in 
China from 2006 to 2013. These two chapters take into account the setting in 
China where there has been a huge increase in total medical expenditure from 
2006 to 2013. Besides previously unmet need, ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard 
could be the reasons contributing to the drastically increased expenditure. By 
employing matching methods and using panel data, we are able to identify a 
causal relationship between health insurance coverage and individuals’ 
preventive behavior. However, we do not find strong evidence of ex-ante moral 
hazard. The only significant effect is on individuals’ time spent exercising, those 
with public insurance spending less time doing exercise than those who do not 
have insurance. Having public insurance, however, does not have a significant 
effect on preventive behaviors such as smoking, number of cigarettes per day, 
vegetable and fruit consumption, obesity, being overweight, or preventive care 
visits.  
The final substantive chapter is on the topic of ex-post moral hazard. It 
investigates whether and to what extent an individual’s hospital medical 
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expenditure increases as the price of accessing health care services decreases and 
whether current deductibles and co-payments are effective at overcoming ex-post 
moral hazard. The empirical results show that as the co-payment rate increases, 
medical costs decrease, providing evidence of ex-post moral hazard. The findings 
from this study suggest that current policies on demand-side regulations, such as 
co-payments and deductibles, are not effective enough to discourage 
“unnecessary” utilization.  High co-payments and deductibles may even impose 
relatively higher financial barriers to the poor and unhealthy.  A possible 
explanation is the physician-patients’ theory (Bardey and lesur, 2005). This 
theory emphasizes physicians’ expert knowledge about medical services, with 
physicians playing a more important role than patients in deciding the quantity 
and quality of health treatment. If this theory holds, regulatory solutions might be 
directed at changing physician incentives rather than patient behavior.  
5.2 Policy implications 
    Policy implications can be framed by the goals laid out by the Chinese 
Government. Five goals of the Chinese health care reform are explicitly expressed 
by the Government: 1) To improve the health insurance system by achieving 
universal coverage of public insurance schemes, raising government subsidies 
and reimbursement ceiling, and improving the management of “health care funds”; 
2) To insure people that have critical illness; 3) To establish a national essential 
medicines system to meet patients’ needs; 4) To improve the primary health 
service delivery system; 5) To ensure equal access to public services (Yip et al., 
2012).  
Findings from the first study (Chapter 2) suggest that whether there is adverse 
or advantageous selection is likely to depend on the context of the health 
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insurance market. For a pure insurance market, we find evidence supporting 
adverse selection. Currently, the Government does not really focus on private 
insurance. This study looks at the situation before the large reform starting in 2003. 
Since the start of the reform, the Government has taken actions in order to reduce 
adverse selection. In the public insurance market, both NCMS and URBMI are 
voluntary schemes in a pure health insurance market. The premium is subsidized 
by the government, so the price of public health insurance is much cheaper for 
the user than private insurance. It is reasonable for individuals to enter public 
health insurance prior to private health insurance. This is the same situation as the 
setting in a pure insurance market where individuals have the choice of entering 
into the public insurance schemes or otherwise going without any health insurance. 
Thus adverse selection potentially exists according to our findings from Chapter 
2.  To reduce adverse selection in NCMS and URBMI, the Chinese government 
requires full household enrollment into the schemes. This implies that a family 
either has all members enrolled into the program or none. Currently, the public 
health insurance coverage has reached over 96% in China, and only a few people 
are without any public insurance coverage. Non coverage is more likely to be 
related to geographical reasons rather than risk type (Qin and Lu, 2014). 
Therefore, full household enrolment is considered to be an effective way to reduce 
adverse selection.  
With regard to the pure private insurance market, although we find evidence of 
adverse selection, this market is quite small nowadays because of the 
development of near universal coverage. The private insurance market serves 
mainly as a provider of supplementary insurance. In this market, we find evidence 
supporting advantageous selection. People with lower risks are more likely to buy 
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private insurance. A problem associated with advantageous selection is that 
people who have higher expected medical expenditure still face the risk of 
financial loss if they are not privately insured because they face high co-payments. 
Accordingly, they may still have a financial barrier to health services. Policies 
could be designed directly to address such access problems. Providing more 
generous public insurance plans to such people is a potential solution. The 
Chinese Government has been experimenting with Critical Illness Insurance since 
2012 to reduce the financial risk for people that suffer from chronic disease or 
face catastrophic costs.  In addition, such people will have higher reimbursement 
rates and lower deductibles.  
Solutions to correct for adverse selection or advantageous selection, such as 
full and compulsory public insurance, may lead to moral hazard problems. The 
classical theoretical framework of Arrow (1963) predicts that providing higher 
insurance coverage may reduce individuals’ and providers’ incentives to control 
medical utilization. On the one hand, higher coverage may reduce individuals’ 
incentive to invest in preventive behaviours. This will increase the chance of 
falling ill, which is ex-ante moral hazard. On the other hand, higher insurance 
coverage may also reduce individuals’ or provides’ incentive to control medical 
utilization when health care is required. This is due to the price of treatment being 
lower than it would be if an individual does not have insurance.  
Near universal coverage has provided insured individuals with higher 
insurance coverage and lower prices for health care. However, we do not find 
strong evidence suggesting that universal coverage has affected health related 
behaviours in China. There are two possible explanations for the findings. First, 
near universal coverage does not actually provide full insurance. Out-of-pocket 
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payments from individuals remain high (Eggleston, 2012), thus diluting 
incentives for ex-ante moral hazard. Second, we only look at the preventive 
behaviour in our short run analysis of just 3 years. Some lifestyle behaviours do 
not alter immediately after entering the insurance programme and effects may 
take longer to materialise.  
Unlike the findings for ex-ante moral hazard, we have identified a causal 
relationship between the co-payment rate and health care expenditure for out-
patient services. This suggests that the Chinese public insurance system faces 
either potential inappropriate demand for care by consumers or inefficient supply 
of care by providers. Since the start of the reform in 2003, deductibles and 
relatively high co-payment rates have been adopted to deter inappropriate demand 
for care. The results from this chapter suggest that consumer-side regulations are 
not sufficient to counter completely ex-post moral hazard. Moreover, the high co-
payment rate imposes relatively higher financial barriers to the poor and 
unhealthy (Eggleston and Hsieh, 2004). This consequence is not in line with the 
goal of equity stated by the Government. Recent literature suggests that 
countering supply-side ex-post moral hazard is more effective in many Asian 
countries and regions with universal coverage (Eggleston and Hsieh, 2004). 
Physician-patient agents’ theory supports this idea and asserts that physicians play 
a more important role in choosing the amount of health care consumption of their 
patients. Therefore, future effort could be put into supply-side regulations so as 
to deter ex-post moral hazard. Direct government regulation and supply-side cost 
sharing of costs borne by the providers are two methods promoted by literature.  
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5.3 Strengths and limitations of the thesis 
In Chapter 2 we are able to use survey data to test whether there is adverse or 
advantageous selection. Most of the previous literature adopted data from 
insurance companies. Data from insurance companies has the advantage of being 
more accurate and complete, but it only covers the population who are enrolled 
in the insurance plan. CHNS enables us to study a larger population, including 
those individuals who decided not to purchase insurance. Moreover, the scenario 
before universal coverage reform in China provides a different context from 
previous literature because most of the population were not eligible for any public 
health insurance. It makes the study of a pure private insurance market possible.  
In this chapter, risk type is a key variable in the analysis. We argue that if 
individuals’ expected their medical expenditure to be greater than the premium 
then it would be rational for them to buy private insurance. Expected medical 
expenditure and the premium the individual would face are both important for 
generating the risk type variable. However, by definition, the premium paid is not 
available for individuals who do not purchase private insurance. Thus we have to 
predict the premium that they might have faced, but decided not to pay. 
Consequently, prediction error is a potential limitation for this chapter. Another 
limitation comes from the gap between the waves. CHNS has two or three years’ 
gap between waves. Predictions of the expected medical expenditure which is 
based on previous waves might be inaccurate, and more so the longer the gap 
between waves. Lastly, due to the limitation of the dataset, we can only use 
smoking and drinking status, time spent exercising as crude measures of risk 
preference. This is a potential weakness of the study. 
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Chapter 3 contributes to the literature in that it investigates ex-ante moral 
hazard in the context of a voluntary health insurance system, while most of 
literature on the subject is conducted within the context of high-income countries 
with compulsory health insurance programmes. Matching methods, such as CEM 
and PSM, make it possible to deal with self-selection on observable 
characteristics into voluntary programmes. By matching individual’s 
characteristics across a control and treatment group prior to the reform, we match 
their probability of entering the insurance scheme. Compared with PSM, CEM 
achieves better balance across covariates, but both matching methods give 
consistent results, suggesting that the results are robust to the choice of matching 
techniques. The relatively small sample size due to missing information in the 
dataset is a potential limitation of this chapter. Secondly, we only look at 
preventive behaviours in the period immediately after the reform. Some of the 
preventive behaviours do not change over such a short period of time. This could 
be one reason that we do not find strong evidence of ex-ante moral hazard. 
In Chapter 4, the exogeneity of the co-payment rate enables us to measure ex-
post moral hazard in a natural experimental setting. The co-payment rates are set 
exogenously by insurance policy makers. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish 
adverse selection from ex-post moral hazard. For this chapter, we employ another 
dataset, CHARLS. Since it focuses on people who are over 45 years old, there are 
more health care users than in the general population, especially for outpatient 
services. This means that we have a larger sample size on which to run the analysis. 
The results show a negative and significant correlation between the price of 
medical care faced by individuals and their medical expenditure. We provide 
evidence supporting the existence of ex-post moral hazard. However, this dataset 
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does not provide supply-side information. Thus it is not possible to disentangle 
whether this induced demand is from the perspective of consumers or providers.  
5.4 Challenges for future research 
Findings from Chapter 2 imply that setting (whether it is a pure or 
supplementary insurance market) matters when testing whether there is adverse 
or advantageous selection. This is an interesting angle for future research. 
However, this empirical study is still subject to some limitations due to the quality 
of our dataset. There is also a requirement for more empirical studies to support 
or otherwise the findings in this thesis. Chapters 3 and 4, on the topic of moral 
hazard and universal coverage, are both based on a relatively short run analysis. 
It is of policy importance to see whether the insurance reform is associated with 
“unnecessary” utilization in the long term. Further research could put emphasis 
on both demand-side and supply-side behaviours, so that policies could be 
designed more effectively to deal with inappropriate utilization.  
China has experienced radical changes in its health insurance system in a 
relatively short period of time. It has been in a process of experimenting and 
improving, which provides opportunities for researchers to find out what is 
working and how to best expand insurance coverage, improve health and protect 
against financial risk. For example, the Chinese government is experimenting 
with a consolidation of URBMI and NCMS. More research could be based on this 
consolidation process to see whether it is efficient and improves equity in access 
to health care between rural and urban populations. 
 This thesis tries to take the opportunities created by the reform to contribute to 
the health economics literature, focusing on the unintended problems associated 
with providing universal coverage. Future research could be on the topics of 
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improving coverage, equity and package design of the public insurance schemes. 
These studies deserve continuous attention in terms of methodological research. 
For instance, most of the limitations of this thesis are related to the availability of 
dataset. In future studies, qualitative research methods can supplement research 
methods to help understand issues like preventive behaviour, individuals’ risk 
preference, and necessary or non-necessary care. 
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List of Abbreviations 
𝑦ℎ                            Disposable income when individual is healthy 
Y                               Income 
𝑦𝑠                             Disposable income when individual is sick 
M/m                         Medical expenditure 
P                               Premium of health insurance 
EU                            Expected utility 
𝑢𝑠                            Utility when individual is sick 
𝑢ℎ                            Utility when individual is healthy 
𝜋                              Probability of getting sickness 
𝜋𝐿                            Probability of getting sickness for low-type consumers 
𝜋𝐻                           Probability of getting sickness for high-type consumers 
𝜆𝑃                        The net premium pay-out in the event of sickness 
𝛼1                            Generous health plan 
𝛼2                            Moderate health plan 
T                              A risk averse individual 
B                              A risk neutral individual 
𝛾𝑖                          The parameter indicating preference of specific individuals 
W                          Wealth 
w                           Wage 
𝐹𝑖                           A binary variable that affects the probability of financial loss  
Φ                           Transaction cost 
Q                           Quantity of health care consumed 
𝑥′𝑖                         A vector of predictors 
𝜆                            Coefficient 
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𝜑𝑖                   Individual-specific effects 
I                      Insurance status 
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